The conquerors claimed that they would make a 'new order'
prevail in the occupied states. Some groups in these states motivated
by ideology, others bv opportunism, or by the expecta
non oi profit declared their adherence to the new order. Thev
were the 'collaborators'. Italy did not recruit many except from
the substantia] colonies of Italians in southern France and in
Tunisia, whom the former consuls tried to organize. Thev failed
completely in Corsica. A handful of Corsican adherents to the
Italian 'new order' remained in Italy at a safe distance from their
iel low -countrymen, who would have carved them to pieces.
The Nazis were more successful. They granted privileged
status to the colonies of Volkdeutsche scattered about Hungarv,
Rumania, Slovakia and Croatia. People of German origin in
these countries effectively enjoyed double nationality. They
kept their language and appointed leaders who recognized
Hitler as their Fuhrer. They governed themselves and sometimes
raised taxes for their own profit.
Nazi propaganda in the countries they occupied was cunning
and persistent. Every medium wTas used to diffuse it, newspapers,
books, films and especially the radio. Libraries were purged.
Lecture series were organized, as well as concerts, exhibitions
and performances of plays. Despite rivalry between departments
in the German government, it was principally Goebbels'
methods, which had been employed so successfully in Germany,
which were adopted. Deviations from orthodoxy were silenced
by a painstaking and fastidious censorship. The same propaganda
slogans were repeated over and over again. Communists,
they said, were pernicious. So were liberal democrats, freemasons
and Jews. They condemned capitalists. They affirmed the
superiority of fascist socialism, which was historically inevitable.
They promised Europe peace and prosperity now that it had
finally been unified by the German rod. These propaganda slogans
were convincing so long as the Wehrmacht was winning
battles. After the Wehrmacht stopped winning, propaganda was
overshadowed by the facts themselves.
Groups of collaborators assembled in every state, except
Poland and Soviet Russia where, despite separatist tendencies
among minorities in these states, the Germans' systematic cruelty
provoked unanimous opposition to the occupation. In most
cases, 'collaborators' were drawm from fascist movements which
had existed before the war, but their numbers swelled with new
recruits. Some groups, such as the French Popular Party, transferred
their allegiance to the Germans, while German subsidies
created newT groups. They modelled themselves on Nazism, aped
Nazi rites and ceremonies, and furnished a supply of acolytes to
Mall the perverse operations of the German police. Although
Quisling was given power in Norway, the Germans generally
preferred to keep their collaborators in reserve, as a means of
exerting pressure on the authorities in command. The Iron
Guard in Rumania acted on Antonescu in this way. In France
various groups in the occupied northern zone exerted pressure
on the Vichy government. The groups of collaborators never
accumulated a large following, except perhaps in Flanders and
in Croatia. Public opinion generally ignored them or execrated
them.
Japan made use ofJapanese nationals who had already settled
in the conquered countries as businessmen or industrialists. She
also rallied the national liberation movements which had been
encouraged by Japanese victory. In Nankin the Japanese set up a
rival government to Chang Kai-Shek's. It planned to integrate
China into the new Asia. In India thevused Sadat Chandra Bose,
a militant in the Congress Party, to foment an uprising. Unlike
Nehru and Gandhi, Bose wanted to take advantage of British
misfortunes ofexpell the British from India. The Japanese raised
and outfitted a small volunteer army from Indian prisoners of
war.