to thorough planning, intensive training, skillflil execution, and just plain good luck, the great majority of Allied ships and craft arrived off Normandy on time and at their appointed stations.
The selection of June 6, when the sun rose at 06:00 and high tide occurred between 09:45 and 12:45, meant the time of landing (H-Hour) on the invasion beaches would be as follows: Utah and Omaha, 06:30; GoldQ7:25-, Juno 07:35-07:45; Sword-.25.
Beginning around 02:00, British and US minesweepers began their dangerous work in the transport areas, the fire support areas, and the approach lanes to Utah Beach. Right behind them came the ships of the bombardment group, which anchored in their assigned areas, 11,000 yards (9,900m) offshore for battleships and cruisers and 5,000 yards (4,500m) offshore for destroyers.
At 04:05, under the gaze of Adm. Moon in US transport Bayfield, troops began to scramble down cargo-net ladders into craft that rose and fell in the strong swell. Even though the Utah landing force would have to navigate 11 miles (17km) of ocean to reach the shore, Pointe de Barfleur and Pointe du Hoc extended out into the Channel on either side of the beach approaches, moderating the sea state. Consequently, Moon’s landing craft were able to stay in formation as they headed for the shore. In addition, patrol craft (PC) and control landing craft equipped with radars and radios were on hand to guide the force to the beach. Landing craft with mounted artillery pieces and multiple five-inch rocket tubes accompanied the assault landing craft to provide them with direct fire support.
Benefiting from the element of surprise, at 05:30, naval forces landed a detachment of Army troops on the St. Marcouf Islands located only four miles (6km) offshore in the middle of the landing zone. The soldiers quickly took control of the position, which soon served as an anti-aircraft artillery site. Meanwhile, a German battery had opened up on US destroyers Fitch and Carry. To silence the German guns. Rear Adm. Morton Deyo, commander of the bombardment force at Utah, ordered his units to open fire. The thunderous salvoes disoriented the Germans, whose response was desultory and ineffective. US battleship Nevada, a veteran of Pearl Harbor, and US cruisers Quincy and Tuscaloosa lofted hundreds of shells at the German coastal gun redoubts near the center of the invasion beach. Later in the day they fired their shells far inland, knocking out German tanks, artillery, and troops that menaced the US 101st Airborne Division. British monitor Erebus znd cruisers Hawkins znA Black Prince worked over the enemy defenses on the flanks. Ironically, the latter cruiser operated off the port of St. Vaast-la-Hougue, where English King Edward III and his son, the “Black Prince,” landed in 1346 at the head of an invasion army. British light cruiser Enterprise, Dutch gunboat Soemba, and eight destroyers poured their fire directly into enemy defenses, especially in front of St. Martin-de-Varreville. The naval bombardment at Utah was especially accurate and within a short period of time the Allies had silenced German counter-battery fire and reduced other defensive positions to rubble.
Not for the first or last time in modern warfare, however, enemy mines exacted a toll of men and ships. German mines that Allied minesweepers failed to detect embedded in an offshore sandbank exploded and sank the destroyer Carry. During the first ten days of the operation, these lethal enemy weapons sank in the Utah area another destroyer, a destroyer escort, two minesweepers, a patrol craft, and five landing craft. Mines also damaged another 25 vessels.
As the first waves of the landing force approached the objective, LCTs prepared to release into the water 32 DD amphibious tanks. These armored vehicles, intended to provide the infantry with direct fire support were equipped with special canvas skirts, or “bloomers,” designed to keep them afloat on the approach to the shore. Lt. (j. g.) John B. Richer, USNR, the commanding officer of control vessel PC-1176, realized that the water was much too rough for the planned launch 5,000 yards (4,500m) offshore. He directed the commanders of the LGTs to carry the tanks into the relatively calm waters just off the beach. As a result of Richer s clear appraisal of the situation and bold action, not one of the precious amphibious tanks fell prey to the treacherous seas, as happened elsewhere on D-Day.
Meanwhile, other naval forces rapidly cleared lanes through enemy beach obstacles, which were not extensive and which the Germans had not mined. Then, at 05:42, one craft hit a mine and sank. Because of the loss of this and other guide vessels, strong cross-beach currents, and batde smoke over the Utah area, the first waves veered off toward the south-east. Thus, when the combat infantrymen of the 4th US division debouched from their craft at exacdy 06:30, they were a little over one mile (1.6km) from the beach they had planned to storm. Fortunately for the attacking American soldiers, the beach they actually landed on was much less heavily defended than their original objective.
The first-wave troops at Utah, supported ably by the DD tanks, quickly established positions ashore.
The men of 11 Navy underwater demolition teams (UDT) landed with the second wave and began clearing beach obstacles. By the end of the day, they had destroyed or removed steel and concrete structures from 1,600 yards (1,440m) of Utah Beach. Despite minor setbacks, the assault at Utah of 27 assault waves went especially well and by 18:00 Adm. Moon’s task force had landed over 21,000 troops, 1,700 vehicles, and 1,700 tons of supplies.
Omaha, the target of the US 1st Infantry Division and the second beach to be stormed by the assault formations of Adm. Kirk’s Western Task Force, proved to be the Allies’ greatest D-Day challenge. The preinvasion air bombardment of beach defenses was not especially effective at Omaha, Moreover, Kirk decided that his bombardment group would open up on the German coastal guns in his sector only 40 minutes before H-Hour, which contrasted with the two hours the British had allotted for their preparatory bombardments. As a result, there was not sufficient time to neutralize all the big German weapons trained on the landing area. Compounding the difficulties. Allied intelligence of the enemy’s defenses at Omaha was inadequate. As an illustration, the 14-inch guns of US battleship Texas 250 rounds into the German coastal gun site on top of Pointe du Hoc before US Army Rangers discovered it empty of the enemy’s big guns. Arkansas, the other American battleship off Omaha, French cruisers Georges Leygues and Montcalm, and British cruiser Glasgow leveled their guns against enemy defenses in the vicinity of Port-en-Bessin and St. Laurent but with limited success.
Furthermore, as at Utah, the landing ships at Omaha lowered their smaller craft: into the water some 11 miles (17km) off the beach, in contrast to the British, who established their lowering points four miles (6km) closer in. Adm, Kirk was concerned that if he moved his transports any closer, they would fall prey to the German long-range coastal guns. As a result of this decision, however, it took the American landing craft almost three hours to close with the shore. And, in the waters off-shore, not protected by the geography as at Utah, many landing craft fell out of formation. Landing waves became intermixed. In contrast to Utah, the LCTs on the left flank at Omaha launched their DD tanks into the sea about 5,000 yards (4,500m) offshore. The result was catastrophic. Twenty-seven tanks, most with their crews, foundered and sank in the heavy seas. Only five reached the relative safety of the beach. On the right flank, however, Lt. D. L. Rockwell, USNR, correctly assessed the danger and decided not to disembark his 32 tanks until the transporting LCTs touched sand.
The rough waters off Omaha took a heavy toll of Allied assault craft, including DUKWs laden with critical artillery pieces and boats specially designed to destroy offshore obstacles and clear lanes through to the beach. Seizing the initiative, several American commanders used their vessels to smash through the barriers and open passages to the beach. Some vessels got through, but others were damaged or sunk in such attempts. Many more were forced to mill around outside the defensive belts searching for a cleared lane to the beach.
Working mightily to create openings in the obstacle belts were 16 joint teams of Navy UDTs and Army combat engineers. Although German fire wiped out two of the teams, almost to a man, their comrades managed to detonate explosive charges and blow eight channels through the defensive works. The rising tide eventually forced the demolition men to suspend their efforts.
Witnessing the distress of the Army units on the beach, Capt. Harry Sanders, Commander Destroyer Squadron 18, ordered his ships to close with the shore to support the troops. Risking grounding and counterbattery fire, eight “tin cans” moved to within 800 yards (720m) of land and poured hundreds of rounds into German pill boxes and mortar positions, troop units caught in the open, and emplacements blocking the key exits from the beaches. US destroyer Emmens knocked down part of the Colleville church tower from which enemy spotters were adjusting fire on to the beach.
By 11:00 the crisis at Omaha had passed. Heroic army officers, sergeants, and even individual soldiers rallied the knots of men around them and stormed through the beach exits and over the bluffs which dominated the beach. Soon tanks, artillery, troops, and supplies began to pour ashore. The bravery and determination of American soldiers was key to the victory at Omaha, but the contribution of the small boat commanders, demolition men, and batdeship, cruiser, and destroyer sailors was equally vital. At the end of that momentous day, Maj. Gen. Leonard T. Gerow, commanding general of V Corps then pushing inland from Omaha, sent a message to Adm. Kirks flagship, the cruiser Augusta in which he simply said, “Thank God for the United States Navy.”
World History
