The economic damage that had been caused to Egypt as a result of the War was enormous. The blocking of the Suez Canal, the extensive damage caused to the cities along the Canal and the complete cessation of tourism, not to mention continued total mobilization of one of the largest armies in the world, combined to have a crippling effect on Egypt’s economy. The losses caused to its economy during that initial period were estimated at approximately ?250 million ($750 million). However, the massive Soviet aid made available to Egypt, and also the combined aid of the oil-rich Arab countries, which came to a total of approximately ?90 million ($250 million) a year, enabled Egypt to overcome some of its economic difficulties.
The new phase opened at the beginning of September 1968. Some
150,000 Egyptian troops were by now concentrated along the Suez Canal. The Egyptian commanders and the Soviet advisers considered that the
Time had now arrived for action to raise the morale of the Army and eliminate the psychological effects of the 1967 defeat. The move coincided with Nasser’s drive to raise the morale in the country as a whole, and to enhance the prestige of the Army. The time had now come, it was felt, to imbue the defensively-minded Egyptian forces with a new spirit, for morale was at a low ebb. (Testimony to this state of affairs was the number of Egyptian deserters crossing the Canal and giving themselves up to the Israeli forces.) On 8 September 1968, an Israeli patrol discovered a mine just north of Port Tewfik, at the southern extremity of the Canal, and exploded it. This was the signal for a co-ordinated Egyptian fire-plan along 65 miles of the Suez Canal to be activated. Over a thousand Egyptian artillery pieces together with mortars and tanks opened a highly-concentrated barrage on Israeli targets along the Canal. Israel’s losses in the sudden onslaught were 28 men killed and wounded. On the Egyptian side, the civilians had been warned to take shelter in advance, but the Egyptians admitted the loss of 26 dead and 104 wounded. This offensive was co-ordinated with a major propaganda offensive on the part of the Egyptians who hailed it as ‘a great victory’. The offensive was resumed some weeks later when again the Egyptians opened up with a heavy artillery barrage along the Canal, but this time their attack was coupled with the landing of Egyptian commando units on the Israeli-held bank. Israeli casualties rose to 49 killed and wounded, and the Egyptian media heralded once again a major victory.
The Egyptians disposed of a wide range of conventional Soviet artillery. Facing them, the Israel Defence Forces had 105mm howitzers mounted on the chassis of French AMX tanks, 155mm howitzers mounted on the chassis of the United States Sherman M4 tanks, and Israeli 160mm mortars also mounted on Shermans. However, the Israelis were outgunned by an overwhelming concentration of Russian-supplied artillery on the Egyptian side. (This tendency of the Israeli Command not to place adequate emphasis on the importance of artillery was to prove a very costly mistake, which would come to full expression in the 1973 War.) Because the Israeli units were so heavily outgunned by the Egyptians along the Canal, the strategy of indirect approach was chosen by the Israelis.
On the night of 31 October, Israeli commandos flown in by French Sud 321 helicopters penetrated to the heart of the Nile valley some 220 miles from the nearest Israeli-held area, and attacked three targets — the bridges of Qena and Najh Hamadi across the Nile and an electric transformer station near Najh Hamadi. These were some 300 miles south of Cairo and 150 miles north of Aswan. The operation against the bridges and the transformer station was a complete success, and it served to emphasize the existence of the ‘soft under-belly’ of Egypt. The warning was a clear one: wide areas of Egyptian territory were wide open to Israeli attack. In Egypt itself, there was a wave of criticism about inadequate security arrangements. Indeed, on 1 November, the day after the Israeli operation, an order was issued in Cairo creating a militia to protect vital points throughout the country. The Egyptians drew their conclusions from this operation and ceased operations along the Canal. Comparative quiet returned.
This lull gave Israel the much-sought-after opportunity to improve its defensive posture along the Suez Canal and to create the fortifications necessary to withstand the massive artillery barrages to which the Israeli forces had been subjected. Intensive discussions took place in the Israeli General Staff on the type of fortification system that should be built along the Canal. Lieutenant-General Chaim Bar-Lev, the Chief of Staff, entrusted Major-General Avraham (‘Bren’) Adan with the task of heading an inter-service team to bring to the General Staff a proposal for the creation of a defensive system in Sinai. Before this team went down to Sinai, Major-General Yeshayahu Gavish, GOC Southern Command and the commander of the victorious Israeli forces in the Sinai in the Six Day War, weighed the problems posed by the defence of the peninsula. Having regard to the losses incurred as a result of the Egyptian shelling, it was obvious to him that the troops holding the line must be given adequate cover in strongpoints; the main problem facing him, however, was whether to keep his forces on the water line or to maintain them in depth away from it. While holding the water line in strength created a series of fixed objectives under constant observation of the Egyptians, at the same time it gave the Israeli forces the advantage of observation and an ability to deal immediately with any crossing attempt by the Egyptians. Gavish came to the conclusion that it would be advisable to hold positions on the water front, particularly at all points that were probable, crossing areas, since he felt there would be no problem for the Egyptians to cross along the entire length of the Canal, and the Israelis must be prepared to answer this possibility.
Adan set about planning the defence of the line along the Suez Canal. He drew up the original plans for the fortifications, which were to be built in such a way as to give a maximum degree of observation (good visual observation by day and electronic observation by night) while exposing a minimum number of troops to enemy artillery fire. He planned individual fortifications for fifteen troops, at a distance of seven miles from each other, with mobile armour patrolling between them and with artillery and armour deployed to the rear ready to move forward and destroy any attempt to cross. These fortifications were conceived as a warning outpost system. They were not seen as a line of defence, hence the limitation to fifteen troops, the distance between them and their limited defensive facilities.
Gavish accepted Adan’s plan, with the proviso that at the northern end of the Canal all possible crossing points be covered by groups of fortifications. The Israeli defence plan based on this warning system along the Canal was brought to the General Staff for approval, and Major-General Ariel Sharon, Director of Training in the General Staff, and Major-General Israel Tal, attached to the Ministry of Defence, opposed it. They proposed to deploy only with armour at a certain distance from the Canal, and to control it by mobile armoured activity. Gavish later explained publicly his attitude to this problem. He saw the line acting in time of war as a series of observation posts and fortifications along all possible axes of advance, which would delay the enemy before he came on a series of
Defensive infantry brigade localities with their concentrated force of armour along the line of the passes, from the Mitla Pass in the south to Baluza in the north. During a war of attrition and in periods of cease-fire, the fortifications would serve as observation posts (affording protection from artillery fire during the former), as well as centres for electronic warning and control, and as bases for armoured patrols. As part of the defences along the Canal, Gavish initiated a system of oil installations, which could be activated from inside the fortifications to set the Canal alight.* It was always Gavish’s opinion that, if the Canal was to be considered a physical barrier, there was no option but to establish a physical presence along it. In his view, one of the main dangers that Israel would have to face would be a sudden Egyptian move to gain a foothold, however narrow, along the east bank, followed by an attempt to achieve an immediate cease-fire by international agreement. Furthermore, since the Israeli concept invariably called for mounting a counter-offensive into the enemy’s territory, it was important for them to be sited in force along the Canal itself, rather than to be in a position that would require fighting before they reached it.
In the ensuing debate there was no suggestion of leaving the Canal, but there was an argument as to the mode of deployment, with General Sharon supporting the system of mobile defence along the Canal. General Bar-Lev decided in favour of the fortifications, and the team headed by Adan proceeded to supervise the construction of the line, which was finished on 15 March 1969.
Thus the so-called ‘Bar-Lev Line’ came into being. The creation of this line was the largest engineering operation ever undertaken in Israel. Every effort was made to take advantage of the lull that the Israeli raids in depth in Egypt had forced on the Egyptians. Already, before the completion of this line (which included fortifications built to accommodate battle teams of all arms, enabling them to withstand the heaviest possible artillery barrages and at the same time to control the eastern bank of the Canal), the Egyptians began to appreciate its significance. Accordingly, they began to interfere with the work on the Israeli side by sniping, patrolling, mining and other hostile activities. In March 1969, it became obvious that the Egyptians were preparing to renew the battle along the Canal and, in midMarch, the artillery barrages increased in frequency. Nasser announced with a fanfare the opening of the ‘liberation’ phase of the ‘War of Attrition’. It was to continue almost without let-up for a year and a half until the cease-fire in August 1970.
World History
