The immediate grand tactical question was how to secure control of the St. L6—Coutances road. Bradley wanted to avoid a direct attack on St. L6, because it was so strongly held. An advance across the Carentan marshes was uninviting; the use a skillful defender could make of such ground had been demonstrated in the Cotentin. Initially, the moorlands, hills and woods of Normandy’s far west seemed an avenue of attack. Accordingly, early in July, Bradley’s plan was for V and XIX Corps to hold, whilst VII crossed the marshes and VIII advanced down the west coast. However, the ground, weather, and enemy defeated this plan. Wet weather not only spread the marshes, but made all movement difficult. The VII Corps managed to cross the Vire and numerous other water obstacles and advance southwards, but much more slowly than anticipated. Attempts to boost the advance by pushing the 3rd Armored Division through the 30th Division (of XIX Corps) immediately west of the Vire led to congestion and confusion. The Germans responded to the advance west of the Vire by counterattacking on July 9, with the 17th SS Panzer Grenadier and 2nd SS Panzer Division. On the 11th, they mounted a major counterattack by the Panzer Lehr Division, newly arrived from south of Bayeux. These German attacks ran into exactly the same difficulties of movement, communication, and coordination as the American assaults had, and did not have the desired effect. But they did limit the VII Corps advance, so that by July 17 the forward elements were just by Pont-Hebert, still over 3 miles (6km) from the St. L6-Coutances road.
Further west VIII Corps also ran into difficulty. The Mont Castre hills, thickly wooded and stoutly defended, could not be penetrated quickly. The advance was slow; by July 14 the corps had gained 12,000 yards (13km) in 12 days, and at a very high cost in life; in the fighting from July 3/10 the 90th Division had taken 5,000 casualties.
By July 10 Bradley had changed his mind, and decided he must grasp the nettle and attack St. L6. This was partly because VIII and VII Corps were not moving as fast as he had hoped, and also because there was political pressure on him to get on. But it was also due to the realization that he would need the road-net east of the Vire to sustain an advance southwest from his favored line of departure, and St. L6 was the center of that system.
The immediate question for the US First Army was, how to take St. L6? The enemy in the area consisted of the II Parachute Corps. In the east stood the 3rd Parachute Division, consisting of two strong regiments of parachute infantry (Fallschirmjager) - dite troops of great skill and determination. To the west of them were Kampfgruppen (“battle groups”) of the 353rd, 352nd, and 266th Divisions. In support were the 12th Assault Gun Brigade, a nebelwerfer battalion, two batteries of 88s, plus 105mm and 150mm howitzers, and many heavy mortars. There were very few German soldiers in St. L6 itself, which lies in a depression; the defense of the town was based on the hills to the north and east. The II Parachute Corps could not man a continuous line of defense. Instead they occupied a number of intervisible mutually-supporting strongpoints covering all the approaches to the town. These strongpoints were not always on the higher ground, but were capable of denying such ground to the enemy by use of fire. Such posts were effective and unobtrusive, and extremely difficult for aircraft or artillery spotters to locate. Facing these positions stood the American V and XIX Corps. The 2nd Division of V Corps was on the eastern flank, opposite Hill 192, mistakenly believed to be the highest point in the area. To the west of 2nd Division was the 29th Division.
Gen. Gerhardt, commander of the 29th Division, believed that the key ground was Hill 122, which looms directly to the north of St. L6, surmounted by the Church of St Georges de Montcoq. But Hill 122 was very strongly held and protected by a strong hedgerow position to the north at le Carillon, and a hilltop strongpoint at le Cauchais to the east. Therefore it would be advantageous to evade an assault on Hill 122, and to make an indirect approach by moving from east to west along the Mart-inville Ridge. According to Gerhardt, such a maneuver would threaten the line of retreat from Hill 122 and make it untenable. However, an attack on the Martinville Ridge could not succeed whilst Hill 122, to the east, remained in enemy hands. Gen. Corlett, commanding XIX Corps, agreed with Gerhardt s analysis. Accordingly, on July 11 the 2nd Division attacked Hill 192, and 29th Division advanced up onto the Martinville Ridge. Hill 192 had been attacked in regimental strength on July 16 and 19, but was still in enemy hands. The feature was a sugarloaf promontory about 150 feet (45m) higher than its surroundings. Lt-Col. Little recalled: “The Germans had built a tower in the trees on its summit, and from this tower on a clear day, one could see the shipping off Omaha Beach, 20 odd miles (32km) to the north.” The hill was held by two parachute battalions, who had done much to develop its defensive possibilities: according to the history of the 2nd Division: “The base of Hill 192 was zeroed-in by the Germans at every gap in the hedgerows. In dugouts tunneled under them a handful of men with machine guns could hold off a regiment simply by crossing each field with deadly close-range fire. They cut boxed-in apertures in the hedgerows at ground level through which their 88s and machine guns could sweep the fields, while remaining unobserved.” The use of prepared hedgerows in an elastic system of defense in depth was reinforced by the construction of strongpoints in the four hamlets of Cloville, le Soulaire, St. Georges-d’Elle and la Croix-Rouge. The parachutists were very aggressive in defense, patrolling and raiding vigorously, especially at night. American reconnaissance patrols found it difficult to explore the German positions. The men of the 2nd Division felt dominated by the hill and the strong German defenses on it; one man remarked; “Every time I clean my teeth I feel some German is looking dovm my throat.”
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