The February airborne plan tasked the 101st Airborne Division to seize the western exits to Utah Beach, help expedite VII Corps’ moves to cut the peninsula, and then swing northwards to Cherbourg. When additional aircraft gave the Americans a second drop division, the 82nd Airborne planned its drop west of the Douve River, to seize St. Sauveur-le-Vicomte and control the roads from the coast.
Hitler’s intuition saw a threat to Cherbourg. Rommel did too, personally traversing the peninsula energizing local commanders to improve defenses in every potential Allied landing area. Rommel saw the Cotentin as a prime airborne objective. His response soon dotted numerous fields. “Rommelsspargel” “Rommel’s Asparagus,” were poles roughly a foot (.3m) in diameter and six feet (1.8m) high placed vertically in fields to disrupt parachute drop zones or to block glider landing zones. Rommel wanted 1,000 per square kilometer (about 3,000 per square mile) with wire linking the stakes, which would be topped by mines or artillery shells rigged to detonate when the wires were hit.
Hitler sent the 91st Airlanding Division to occupy the Cotentin’s center. As Seventh Army’s reserve, it backstopped the beach defenses as a counterattack force. Additionally, the 6th Parachute Regiment and a Panzer battalion were added south of Carentan, both threatening the planned American landings.
At Mays end, with the 91sts presence confirmed and thousands of Rommelsspargel appearing on air photos of the 82nds drop zones, the airborne plan appeared to be compromised. Gen. Bradley felt the airborne was essential for the Utah landing and Montgomery agreed. Air commander Sir Trafford Leigh-Mallory predicted catastrophic losses recommending cancelling the drops behind Utah. Eisenhower disagreed. The American air drops would go ahead.
The 82nd s drop zones moved east astride the Merderet River, with Ste. Mere-Eglise the east end of the objective area. The 1 Gist’s drop was compressed, easing its D-Day mission to assist the VII Corps.
The 101st would get the invasion off the beaches. The division would capture the four exits and causeways leading from the beach, and the lock and bridges controlling the water obstacles and traverses throughout the invasion area. Its three parachute infantry regiments (PIRs), one airborne field artillery battalion, and one airborne engineer company planned to begin their drops between 01:15 and 01:30 on D-Day. Small fields and Rommelsspargel limited the use of gliders in darkness; but two glider lifts would come in at 04:00 and 21:00.
The 82nd’s drops would begin a few minutes later, with two PIRs west of the Merderet and one northwest of its objective at Ste. Mere-Eglise. Its gliders were scheduled for three group landings, one after the lOlsfs 04:00 lift, one following the 21:00 lift, and one in twilight at 23:00.
All American aircraft approached from the west, dropping the pathfinder troops about 00:15 hours and the main body one hour later. The drops were scattered. Pilots evading anti-aircraft fire flew erratic courses or dived below prescribed drop altitudes. Many mis-identified drop zones. Some pathfinders were mis-dropped and, with only minutes to light their drop zones, opted to bring in the arriving lifts where they were. The 101st estimated that about 1,500 of its 6,600 paratroopers fell outside the division’s battle area.
By 01:30, the German Seventh Army had received reports of airborne drops stretching from Caen to the Cherbourg Peninsula. But, with most of its troops sticking to their defenses and hesitant to root out the invaders, no coherent pattern appeared. As dawn approached, the German commander estimated that the paratroop plan was “to tie off the Cotentin Peninsula at its narrowest point.”
In the north, the 502nd PIR and a supporting artillery battalion planned to land on Drop Zone (DZ) “A” just west of the high ground between its objectives, exits 3 and 4 at St. Martin-de-Varreville. Every plane load missed the DZ, scattering troopers to the north and south or onto Drop Zone “C.” One battalion was so scattered that it was not heard from on D-Day. The 502nds 3rd Battalion, landed near the 82nd s objective, Ste. Mere-Eglise, and had to reform and fight its way towards its objective. Finding the northern causeways exits undefended, a small group under Lt. Col. Robert G. Cole ambushed fleeing Germans late in the morning and by 13:00 had established contact with the 4th Divisions 8th Infantry moving in from the landing areas.
Meanwhile, the 2nd Battalion which was also scattered gathered enough men to move towards the German battery positions behind exit 4 and to establish road blocks throughout area. Exit 4 was clear but skirmishes were frequent throughout the day with elements of A Company attacking the small village of Foucarville.
Exits 1 and 2 in the south were assigned to the two battalions of the 506th PIR and one from the 501st landing in DZ “C” in the division’s center. Two battalions of the 501st Regiment and the remaining battalion of the 506th would land north of Carentan and east of the Douve River and marshes in DZ “D” to capture the la Barquette lock and the nearby bridges, while destroying the rail bridge northwest of Carentan to seal the southern part of Utah’s landing area.
The southern exit forces were luckier than those in the north. More than half of the 506th dropped east of its DZ but gathered forces and began moving on exit 1 with orders to ignore the second objective.
Simultaneously, 101st commander Maj. Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor, lacking reports from any of his units, also ordered a battalion from the division reserve to move towards exit 1 and accompanied the force himself The division reserve commanded by Lt. Col. Julian J. Ewell captured Pouppeville by noon, establishing a road block while awaiting the landing force, which soon arrived making the first airborne and seaborne linkup. The battalion originally sent to capture the exit fought several engagements en route and arrived after Ewell’s battalion’s success. With all four beach exits under control, Taylor focused his attention on capturing the southern bridgehead.
DZ “D” s force was likewise scattered. The lock fell without a fight, but the scramble to capture and destroy the bridges reflected the haphazard attempts of mixed forces, assembled from individuals separated by misplaced drops, the darkness, and the bocage.
The only real opposition met in the German 709th Divisions sector was towards the Douve River at St. C6me-du-Mont and at Carentan then held by one of the divisions battalions and the 6th Parachute Regiment. By nightfall on D-Day, lOlst’s southern line consisted of groups from three companies, not the planned full regimental defense of three battalions.
The 101st glider Landing Zone (LZ) “E” was southwest of DZ “C.” Rommel’s asparagus and the hedgerows restricted the 52 gliders taking in troops from the 327th Glider Infantry, some anti-tank guns, and supplies in their pre-dawn landing. The first glider crashed, killing Assistant Division Commander, Brig. Gen. Donald E Pratt, D-Day’s senior Allied casualty. About 30 troopers were killed, injured or missing in mishaps when most of the gliders missed their LZs. A second lift of 32 gliders landed at 21:00 but due to Leigh-Mallory’s protests, and a lack of glider pilots, most of the lOlst’s glider troops arrived by sea on Utah Beach.
By day’s end, the 101st Airborne had suffered at least 1,200 casualties and could account for slightly more than a third of its total strength, but its missions of clearing the beach exits and protecting the invasion were accomplished.
The 82nd Airborne’s three drop zones placed the division on the edge of the German 91st Division’s concentration area in a distorted triangular configuration astride the Merderet River west and northwest of Ste. Mere-Eglise. Even more badly scattered than the 101st, Maj. Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway’s division lost the use of two of its regiments in its D-Day missions. The division successfully captured Ste. Mere-Eglise due to a fortuitously good drop of the 505th PIR. Taken in a hasty attack in darkness using grenades and knives but little gunfire, Ste. Mere was the first town liberated by the Allies. The enemy reacted immediately. Soon German forces appeared from different directions all to be held up and driven off
The 507th and 508th Regiments whose missions were to hold the west banks of the Merderet, found no lighted DZs. Their pathfinders found German positions in the fields and marked no landing areas. The resulting confusion and the individual decisions of scores of transport pilots put troopers all over the division sector, dropping many into flooded fields and swamps. Surprised by the flooded areas and laden with equipment, many drowned in waist-deep water. Much of the divisions equipment was lost in the swamps, and with few troops to hold a wide perimeter, the division was forced into a small bridgehead between the two roads running west of Ste. Mere-Eglise and the Merderet with two small pockets at the opposite end of the swamp. The airborne was holding its own, but no contact was made with either the 101st division to the east or the invading forces moving inland from the sea.
The 82nd’s 04:00 lift used 52 gliders carrying guns from an airborne anti-aircraft battalion plus forward parties for signals, artillery, and the division headquarters landing on DZ “O.” Additional elements followed, with 76 gliders landing on LZ “W” after 21:00 and a further 100 at 23:00. Nearly 300 pilots and troopers were casualties due to flak or crashes. The 82nd suffered about 1,200 D-Day casualties, and by nightfall reported that it had less than 40 percent of its infantry under division control.
While the 82nd formed the outer perimeter of VII Corps’ landing, Gen. Dollman commanding the German Seventh Army ordered concentric attacks from the 91st and the 709th Divisions west of the Merderet and the 6th Parachute Regiment south in Carentan. Totally uncoordinated, none of these attacks gained ground. By nightfall, one German division commander lay dead from an ambush, while the other commanders and the corps headquarters generally felt the same “fog of war” that descended over the entire airborne battlefield.
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