Stark USS, incident (1987). On May 17 1987 the frigate I’ss Stark, engaged in escorting Kuwaiti tankers in the Persian Gulf during the Iran-Iraq War, was attacked in international waters off Bahrain by an Iraqi Air Force jet. Two Exocet missiles badly damaged Stark, killing 37 crewmen and wounding 21. The USA accepted an Iraqi apology and offer of compensation for the “unintentional accident” - but censure of Stark’s captain for being taken by surprise contributed to an incident in July 1988, when the cruiser uss Vincennes destroyed an Iranian airliner (290 killed) mistaken for an attacking aircraft.
Stavka. Term generally used to denote the high command and headquarters of the Imperial Russian, and later the Soviet, Army.
Stealth. Careful shaping to minimize reflective surfaces and use of non-reflective materials can greatly reduce the radar cross section of aircraft and cruise missiles, making detection difficult or impossible. The USA, sometimes in great secrecy, is developing “stealth” aircraft and missiles using these characteristics. These include a subsonic Lockheed strike fighter, now officially designated the F117, the B-2 strategic bomber; the Navy’s Advanced Tactical Aircraft and the Advanced Cruise Missile.
Sten gun. The standard British sub-machine gun of World War 11: robust, cheap and easily manufactured, and affectionately known to its users as the “tin tommy-gun”. Its name derived from the initial letters of the surnames of its principal developers - Shepherd and Turpin of the Birmingham Small Arms Company (BSA) - and the first letters of the location of the Royal Small Arms Factory, Enfield. Many thousand Stens in a number of Marks were made; it was briefly produced in Australia (the “Austen”) and was even copied by the Germans for use by the Volkssturm (home guard) in 1945. The Mark V Sten, which remained in British service until replaced by the Sterling in the mid-1950s, was of 9mm calibre, fed by a 32-round box magazine, with a cyclic rate of fire of 550rpm. Accurate only at short range, it had fixed sights.
Stephenson, Sir William (1896
1989). Br. Fighter pilot in France in World War I, commanded 194046 all British secret operations west of the Atlantic.
“Vinegar Joe” in the field, Burma, 1942
Stilwell, Gen Joseph Warren (“Vinegar Joe”) (1883-1946). US. During World War I, Assistant Chief of Staff, 4th Army Corps in France. Following extensive Far East service, appointed cos to Chiang Kai-shek and commander of American forces in China-Burma-India Theatre, March
1942. On formation of seac, appointed Mountbatten’s deputy, but was virtually independent in Northern Combat Area Command (ncac) whose main task was to build the Ledo Road in order to boost support for China, limited to air supply over “The Hump”. There were 40,000 US troops in India; the major combat unit, 5307 Composite Unit (Provisional) (“Merrill’s Marauders”), made Chindit-style patrols, and on May 17 1944 took Myitkyina airfield. In October 1944, after repeated demands by Chiang Kai-shek, Stilwell was recalled to Washington. The cbi Theatre was split up with Lt Gen Dan Sultan taking over ncac. In January 1945 the first convoy passed up the Ledo Road to the China border. Stilwell was sent to command US Tenth Army in Okinawa, where he took the Japanese surrender in August 1945. HT.
Stirling, Short S29 (Br, WWII). Heavy bomber. Prototype flew May 14 1939; first production May 7 1940. First squadron (No. 7) deliveries December 1940; first operation February 10/11 1941. Less successful than Halifax and Lancaster, but service as glider tug and transport to war’s end. Production, 2,374 to November 1945.
Four l,500hp Bristol Hercules XI engines; max. speed 260mph (418kph); 17,0001b (7,710kg)
Bombs, eight 0.303in machine guns.
Stirling, Col David (b. l915). Br. Responsible for initial formation of raiding and deep penetration force in North Africa, 1942, which grew into the sas.
Stockwell, Gen Sir Hugh (19031987). Br. See suez crisis.
Stopford, Lt Gen the Hon Sir Frederick (1854-1929). Br. Commander IX Corps in the landing at Suvla, 1915. See Gallipoli (i915-16).
Storable liquid fuel. In order to allow storage of ballistic missiles in an operational state, rapid-launch liquid fuels were developed that could be kept in missiles for extended periods. These have been particularly important in the Soviet Union which had problems developing reliable solid fuels. Typical storable fuels are forms of hydrazine (a compound of hydrogen and nitrogen) oxidized by dinitrogen tetroxide (N2O4). Even storable fuels are highly volatile, and the USSR has lost at least one submarine to missile explosion.
Storm troops. World War I name for elite German shock troops. (Stosstruppen). Specially trained in infiltration tactics, they sought out weak spots in opposing defences and then caused maximum confusion in the enemy rear by deep penetration and envelopment. They were employed with considerable success at Caporetto and Cambrai in 1917 and in the German 1918 offensives. PJS.
Stossel, Gen A M see russo-
JAPANESE WAR.
Strafe. World War I slang: a bombardment (from the German slogan Gott strafe England!: “God punish England!”). Later used mainly as a verb: to attack with an aircraft’s machine guns or cannon.
“Strangle” Operation. Air interdiction operation against the North Korean transportation network begun in July 1951. The planners underestimated the capacity of the enemy to repair bomb damage and the attrition imposed by flak. The supply requirements of enemy divisions were low, so they could not be decisively weakened by bombing. By summer 1952, planners were looking for more effective ways to employ air power in Korea. See
Also AIR PRESSURE STRATEGY AND TARGETING SYSTEM.
Strategic Air Command (SAC).
SAC was set up in 1946 to command all the usaaf’s long-range striking forces designed to carry out direct attacks on the enemy’s war industry, economy and population with both nuclear annd conventional weapons, sac also carries out long-range reconnaissance and tanker missions. Originally equipped with bombers armed with free-fall bombs, SAC now operates intercontinental ballistic missiles and bombers equipped with a range of weapons including long-range cruise missiles. The most important SAC commander was Gen Curtis E Lemay who built the force up from 52,000 personnel and 837 aircraft in 1948 to 224,000 personnel and 2,711 aircraft in 1957. Since then sac has had to share the strategic strike role with the US Navy and has come down in size to 104,000 personnel operating 1,000 iCBMS, 373 bombers, 93 reconnaissance and command aircraft and 696 tankers. EJG.
Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT). In 1969 the USA and the Soviet Union began negotiations to agree on mutual limits on both sides’ strategic nuclear forces, both offensive and defensive. It was decided to limit discussion of offensive forces to icbms and slbms, and in 1972, when a treaty was signed on ABM systems, a companion interim agreement was arrived at that created rough parity by balancing America’s lead in MiRved missiles against larger Soviet totals of missile launchers. The agreement also mandated that old ICBMS should be replaced by new SLBMS to enhance stability. The rapid development of Soviet MiRved systems in the 1970s undermined the premises of salt-1 and a new treaty was negotiated on the principle of parity in numbers and “no perceived advantage”; 2,400 strategic systems, including long-range bombers, of which 1,320 could be MiRved. A salt-2 Treaty was signed in 1979 but never ratified by the US Congress. It thus never went completely into effect, but most of its provisions, notably the limits on mirvs, were kept informally until the USA announced it would no longer be bound by them in 1986. EJG.
Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START). US-Soviet talks on Strategic Arms Reduction began in 1982, but were broken off at the end of the following year. They were resumed along with the inf negotiations and the Defense and Space Talks at Geneva in 1985. Agreement has been reached on the principle of a 50 percent cut in strategic offensive arms and ceilings of 1,600 on strategic nuclear delivery vehicles and 6,000 warheads. There is still disagreement over sea-launched cruise missiles and linkage to an agreement on space weapons.
Strategic bombing offensive against Germany (1939-45). It was carried out by raf Bomber Command 1939-45, US Eighth Air Force 1943-45 and US Fifteenth Air Force 1944-45. After the American intervention, it was generally known as the Combined Bomber Offensive. From Bomber Command’s initial capacity of under 2,000 tons a month, the Combined Bomber Offensive built up to one of over 100,000 tons a month. At the beginning of the war. Bomber Command had under 300 bombers with crews available for operations. By the end, this had grown to more than 1,500 and, in the Eighth and Fifteenth Air Forces, more than 2,000. The campaign resulted in destruction in most of Germany’s major cities and the deaths of between 750,000 and
1,000,000 of their inhabitants. It also culminated in the virtual elimination of oil production, the disruption of the transport system and severe damage to many other industries. It cost the lives of about
50,000 aircrew in Bomber Command, including more than 8,000 RCAF, over 3,400 raaf and about 1,400 RNZAF. The American sacrifice, compressed into a shorter period, was approximately the same. Precise statistics are misleading due to the tactical operations which were also carried out by the crews taking part in the strategic air offensive.
In the first phase (September 1939—May 1940) the German bombing of Warsaw in September 1939 and Rotterdam in May 1940 was held to justify British attacks on German towns but the policy of Bomber Command was to avoid provocation until it was stronger. Little was therefore attempted beyond attacks on the German fleet and other undeniably “military” targets and the spreading of propaganda leaflets. The concept of daylight bombing was largely abandoned due to very heavy casualties incurred in attempts to carry it out.
In the second phase (May 1940-February 1942) Bomber Command gradually abandoned the plan of attacking precise targets, such as oil plants, at night due to the difficulty of hitting them. The policy of area attack upon the main cities was adopted as an indirect way of achieving the same aims.
In the third phase (February 1942-March 1944) Bomber Command mounted a sustained and increasingly destructive general area assault signalized by the Battles of the Ruhr, Hamburg and Berlin. A great expansion of the force in quantity and quality took place. Lancasters and Mosquitoes came into service, radar aids were introduced, the Pathfinder Force was created and bombing tactics were greatly improved. In addition, specialist squadrons achieved exceptions to the rule in such feats as the daylight attack on Augsburg and the Dams raid. From January 1943, the US Eighth Air Force joined in the attack on Germany with a policy of high-level daylight precision attack upon key targets, but this had to be substantially broken off after the severe casualties incurred in the Schweinfurt raid on October 14
1943. Bomber Command’s night casualties also became alarmingly high, especially in the Battle of Berlin which ended with the attack on Nuremberg on the night of March 30-31 1944. The main cause of these casualties was the German fighter force and in February 1944, in the “Big Week” operations, the Eighth Air Force took the offensive against this threat.
In the final phase (April 1944-
May 1945) the German fighter force was worn down and defeated in the air through the related use of bombers, to bring it up, and long-range fighters, to shoot it down. The destructive power of the British and American bombers was then released and the greater part of all the damage done to Germany throughout the war was achieved. Her cities were massively destroyed, especially Dresden, her oil production was virtually halted and her transport was rendered chaotic.
That the decisive effects of bombing were delayed until the last year of the war was due to the extraordinary resilience of the German people under a harsh regime, the ingenuity of Speer in organizing industry and the crippling effect upon the bombers of the German fighter force by day and night. Ultimately, however, the centre of the German war economy was decisively smashed but even then the Allied armies had to conquer the ground to enforce the surrender. ANF.
Strategic bombing offensive, Japan (1944-1945). The seizure of the Marianas Islands from mid-1944 provided bases within 1,500 miles (2,415km) of Japan from which a strategic bombing offensive could destroy military defences and industrial power in the Japanese home islands, preparatory to (or, possibly, even removing the need for) their invasion.
In late November 1944, B-29 Superfortresses from Saipan began to make high-altitude precision attacks against industrial targets in Japan. LeMay, who took command of XXI Bomber Command in January 1945, believed that area fire-bombing of major industrial cities would be more effective against Japan’s many small, well-dispersed factories. The first major low-level incendiary attack was made on the night of March 9-10 1945, when 325 B-29s from
Saipan, Tinian and Guam struck at Tokyo, creating a fire storm that burned out 15.8 sq miles (40.9 sq km) of the city, destroyed or damaged 23 key industrial targets, killed some 84,000 persons, injured c41,000 and left more than
1,000,000 homeless. In the following ten days, US bombers destroyed 31.81 sq miles (82.39 sq km) of Japan’s four major industrial cities: Nagoya, Osaka, Kobe and Tokyo. A shortage of incendiary ordnance, and the diversion of B-29s to aerial minelaying and tactical missions against kamikaze bases, subsequently forced LeMay to alternate urban area attacks with ordinary bombing of industrial and military targets.
Between April 1944-August 1945, XX and XXI Bomber Commands, Twentieth Air Force, flew more than 15,000 sorties (losing around 400 B-29s in combat) and dropped 104,000 tons of bombs, causing 806,000 casualties (including 330,000 dead) and destroying or damaging 169 sq miles (437.7 sq km) (42 percent of the total area) of the urban industrial area of 66 Japanese cities. However, enormous effort by ground and naval forces was required to position and maintain the bombers within striking distance, and their successes were achieved by massive and indiscriminate destruction rather than by the surgical strikes of precision bombing.
Strategic bombing had substantially destroyed Japan’s industrial capabilities (although not, perhaps, weakening morale to the point where invasion became unnecessary) well before the atomic bomb attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki precipitated her surrender. However, its concentration on industrial and military targets was subsequently criticized by the United States Strategic Bombing Survey, Far East, which pointed out that submarine and air interdiction had already crippled Japan’s industries by denying them access to raw materials, and that greater emphasis on aerial mining and the destruction of transportation facilities would have had more rapid and conclusive results. CRS.
Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). In 1983 President Reagan announced a research programme into advanced anti-ballistic missile defences and a Strategic Defense Initiative office was set up in the Pentagon to supervise research into a range of suitable technologies. The main emphasis in sdi has been on the development of space-based weapons to destroy missiles during the boost phase of their flight before they can deploy their warheads and “penetration aids” such as decoys. This gave the programme its nickname “Star Wars”. SDI has been controversial, as it is seen by many to undermine the stability of nuclear deterrence. Its purpose has been confused; President Reagan expressed the hope that sdi would make nuclear weapons “impotent and obsolete” but the British Prime Minister obtained an assurance that it would instead help sustain deterrence. The SDI office themselves admit that they only conceive of a partial rather than a total defence. The exotic systems using directed energy technologies and electrically propelled railguns are no longer seen as near-term possibilities and instead, missile-based abm “architectures”, both ground - and space-based, are being concentrated upon. Congress has opposed too much emphasis on sdi research and has also opposed the “broad interpretation” of the abm Treaty which the Administration claims allows testing of new abm technologies. The Reagan administration’s commitment to sdi has complicated the progress of negotiations to limit offensive arms. It remains to be seen how sdi will survive the departure of its main supporter. President Reagan. EJG.
Strategic Hamlet Program. Launched by President Ngo Dinh Diem of South Vietnam in March 1962 with the aim of severing the link between communist insurgents and the rural population. For design, the programme drew upon the failed “agrovilles” and the advice of British experts under Sir Robert Thompson who had run a successful counterinsurgency in Malaya. The idea was to gather the population into fortified communities, depriving the revolution of food, intelligence and recruits. Ignoring advice to restrict the scope. Diem set a goal of reorganizing virtually all of the South’s hamlets. By forcing people to provide the free labour to build the hamlets, often far from their fields, the programme alienated rural support. Nor could it separate the revolutionaries from the population of which they were an integral part. Although the programme initially created some difficulties for the communists, in the long run it increased their popular support
World History
