WITH THEIR CHIEF BACK IN OPERATION following his arrest, Garbo’s agents began explaining away the changes to FUSAG since they had last been on the air. The formations leaving for Normandy were being replaced by the arrival of the Fourteenth United States Army in Liverpool. This new formation was earmarked for FUSAG along with the British Fourth Army, which had been used in Fortitude North, but had now been notionally redeployed to the south. With the exception of a few units in the latter formation, both these armies were largely imaginary. To bolster the volume of radio chatter and give more credence to the threat posed by FUSAG, the very real Ninth United States Army was temporarily added to the order of battle while it waited to be deployed in Normandy.
More complex still, Patton assumed command of the Third United States Army now that it was in Normandy. This made Patton a subordinate of General Bradley, and certainly inferior to Montgomery. Quite how Patton was supposed to go from Army Group commander to subordinate general required some explaining to the Germans, but again, Garbo was up to the task. On 20 July he explained that Eisenhower had begun siphoning off troops from FUSAG to reinforce Montgomery, because the going in Normandy was slower than predicted. This had made Patton furious and he had exploded, making an angry outburst aimed at the Supreme Commander. Having supported Patton through his previous indiscretions this time Eisenhower demoted him on the spot. Once tempers cooled, Patton was offered a subordinate command and given the opportunity to restore his tarnished reputation. To back up Garbo, the circumstances of Patton’s apparent demotion were also reported by the letter-writing socialite spies, Gelatine and Bronx.1
To maintain a credible threat, Patton would have to be replaced by an equally senior US general. The choice candidate was Lieutenant General McNair, then Commander-in-Chief of Land Forces USA. He was ordered to Europe to assume an important command in the field and given FUSAG. Unfortunately, before anything could be made of McNair’s appointment, tragedy struck. Soon after he arrived in Britain, McNair asked if he might visit Normandy and see how the troops were performing in action. On 24 July,
While visiting troops near the front line, McNair was caught up in an air raid. The USAAF had been called in to soften up a German defensive line but they accidentally bombed their own troops instead. McNair received a direct hit and was killed instantly.
Undeterred, the deceivers turned McNair’s demise to their profit. Before news of the accident was made public, Brutus leaked the whole McNair story to the Germans. He explained that McNair had gone over to France to have a closer look at German defensive techniques in preparation for FUSAG’s attack across the Channel. When the news of McNair’s death was eventually made public, it confirmed exactly what Brutus had already said.
To continue the deception, an equally senior figure had to be found to replace McNair. Such a person was found in General John DeWitt, Director of the Army and Navy Joint Staff College in Washington. On 9 August news of DeWitt’s appointment was mentioned in an intercepted German report. The appointment was seen by the Germans as vindication of the importance of FUSAG, which they now believed to consist of ‘thirty-two large formations’.2 Actually, by then von Rundstedt had already realized that the Allies would be content with their gains in Normandy and would probably not require any further large-scale landings. On 27 July the German High Command had at last authorized the Fifteenth Army to release two infantry divisions for Normandy. Two more followed on 31 July and 1 August respectively. By then it was far too late for them to stem the tide.
Fortitude now moved into a new stage. No one had seriously believed that the hoax would last as long as it had thus far, and it was even more unbelievable that none of the double agents had yet been blown. All the indications were that although FUSAG was now unlikely to be used against the Pas de Calais, the Germans still considered it an important threat. When the Ninth United States Army crossed over to invest the port of Brest, the composition of FUSAG was changed. Garbo reported that it now consisted of the British Fourth Army and the First Allied Airborne Army. Both armies were fictitious, but were portrayed as being made ready rapidly to exploit any sudden German withdrawals, or to make a combined operations assault somewhere along Europe’s North Sea coast.
This was to prove the last important coup delivered by Garbo. The killer blow came from a Spanish associate of the Abwehr named Roberto Buenaga. Seeking a cash reward, Buenaga contacted the British SIS and told them he knew the name of the top German radio agent in England. This put the British in a pickle. They were certain the name would be Garbo, but they had to be sure and so asked Buenaga to name him. It was Garbo.
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If Garbo was not arrested, Buenaga would suspect the truth about Garbo’s allegiances. On the other hand, if Garbo was arrested it would spell the end of the whole network. Although there were some calling for the double cross system to be wound down after the success of Overlord, others like Masterman were not so sure, and thought the system ought to be kept running for as long as the Germans appeared to believe in it. The agreed solution was for Garbo to be tipped off and for him to go into hiding. This would allow the network to maintain contact under the leadership of Agent 3(1) Pedro, whose identity was unknown to the Germans and could not be checked because he did not exist.
On 12 September Garbo explained that ‘the Courier’ had warned him that an individual named Buenaga had betrayed him to the British SIS. Garbo instructed the Germans to suspend all correspondence and money transfers and informed them that he was going to take refuge in a safe house in south Wales with Agent 4, who was on the run after going AWOL the night before D-Day. From there, Garbo would do his best to watch over the organization while his wife would tell the British he had fled back to Spain. At first the Germans were slightly puzzled as to why a British SIS officer would have told the crooked courier about Buenaga in the first place, but they failed to push the enquiry very far. Thus Garbo’s war came to an effective end.
There was one last hurrah still in the bag for FUSAG. Picking up where Garbo had left off, Brutus was still in place to deliver. On 10 September Montgomery had set out his plan to use paratroopers to seize a crossing over the Rhine at Arnhem and cut off the retreating German Fifteenth Army. That same day Brutus followed up Garbo’s report on the First Allied Airborne Army, revealing that it consisted of four airborne divisions. In his estimation these, along with the British Fourth Army, were being prepared for what seemed to be an attack against the north-west German coast. Somewhat cryptically he mentioned that a second force was also being prepared for action, but he could not find out where and had little detail on the subject. This second force was in fact the real airborne troops being prepared for Montgomery’s Operation Market Garden, the plan to seize a bridge over the Rhine at Arnhem.
In essence it was a re-run of the Pas de Calais story. It was hoped that once the real airborne landing took place in Holland, the Germans would remain cautious of committing their reserves lest the Allies pounce with FUSAG in their rear. From the point of view of the deception planners, the plan was a success in the sense that the Germans took notice of it and were alive to the possibility of a second attack. Unfortunately, from the point of
View of the average soldier parachuted into Holland the mission was a total disaster. Faulty British intelligence underestimated German strength in the Arnhem area, so although tactical surprise was achieved, the battle for Arnhem was lost with heavy casualties sustained. In that sense, the German Fifteenth Army gained some small measure of revenge for having sat on its hands through the battle for France.
It also proved the last time Brutus could be safely used. As France was liberated, many of his former colleagues and enemies in the Resistance started to come out of the shadows. It was surely only a question of time before he was denounced as a German stooge or otherwise investigated. After the Arnhem deception his case was allowed to peter out. There was, however, almost a reprieve for the case at the end of the year. At the end of 1944 Noel Wild asked for one of the double agents to pull off a deception to counter the German Ardennes offensive. This deception plan was going to be so drastic the agent’s cover would quickly be blown. Brutus therefore appeared to be the perfect choice. In the end, he was not required and his last message was sent on 2 January 1945. He was awarded the OBE by the British for his secret service.
Garbo also received an award around this time. On 21 December 1944, the day before Noel Wild asked for an agent to sacrifice on his deception plan, Garbo was awarded the MBE. It was presented by the Director General of MI5 in the presence ofTommy Harris, Robertson, John Marriott, Masterman and others.3The party then went off to enjoy lunch at the Savoy, during which Garbo made a heartfelt acceptance speech in English. He had come a long way since his early ridiculous messages about Glaswegian dockers drinking wine. He truly was one of the most remarkable characters of the war.
World History
