However, not even the British Chiefs-of-Staff believed that an advance to the Alps and beyond that year was practical, while President Roosevelt and the American Chiefs-of-Staff remained adamant that Operation "Dragoon” (formerly "Anvil”), the landing in the south of France, must, as formally agreed, now take precedence over any other operations in the Mediterranean theatre now that "Overlord” was so close, and all effort had to be concentrated.
Marshall, it would appear, was merely obeying the dictates of high strategy. It was clear to him, in effect, that an Anglo-American drive towards Vienna, and out of line with the main thrust, would contribute less to the success of Operation "Overlord” than would a landing in Provence, which would open up the ports of Marseilles and Toulon to Allied men and materiel, whilst a strong Franco-American force, operating first up the Rhone, then the Saone, would give a right wing to Eisenhower when he broke out into Champagne. To him this reasoning respected the principle of the convergence of effort, so dear to American military doctrine. It can easily be seen how Marshall froze at Churchill’s passionate arguments.
In any case, it is highly doubtful on military grounds whether an advance to the Alps or into Yugoslavia in 1944 was practicable, even if Alexander’s armies had not been weakened for the sake of "Dragoon”. The German comihanders had proved themselves masters of defensive warfare in mountain regions, and they were to continue giving the Allies immense problems even when operating with minimal resources and under pressure from all sides.
World History
