If we remember that the R. A.F.’s defeat of the Luftwaffe in 1940 caused the abandonment of Operation "Sea Lion”, it is pertinent to ask what was the state of the Italian Air Force at this time. On June 14, 1943, in the presence of General
Ambrosio, Chief of the Italian General Staff, and of the Commanders-in-Chief of the three armed forces, Mussolini had stated unequivocally: "We have neither a powerful bombing force nor the fighters to protect it.”
No doubt things would tend to improve in the second half of 1944, but at first it would merely be a drop in the ocean. That is why, Mussolini went on, "it is absolutely essential for Germany to supply our needs for A. A. defence in our homeland, that is planes and guns.” In calling blithely on the services of his Axis partner, Mussolini was relying on the good will of the Fiihrer, and quite properly. But did he know that the Luftwaffe was then in very dire straits and likely to remain so? On the one hand the Germans had lost all air superiority in the East; on the other they were having to fight off increasing air attacks by Anglo-American bombers on their war industries. There was thus little that could be done to make good the deficiencies in the Italian air strength. Moreover, the aerodromes of Sicily, Sardinia, and southern Italy were regularly being hammered by the Allies.
World History
