The war erupted as a series of city riots, bloody urban encounters, hit-and-run operations that left scores of dead, maimed and wounded civilians on both sides, attacks on the Jewish urban transport systems and major attempts to cut communications between the various Jewish centres. Many outlying Jewish settlements were cut off. Despite the fact that military logic would have called for the shortening of lines of communication by abandoning such settlements, a decision in principle was taken by the Haganah that none would be voluntarily abandoned. It was appreciated by the Jewish leadership that abandoning villages, even for sound strategic reasons, could have very serious consequences of a far-reaching nature, for it was obvious that the final borders of the new Jewish state would be decided above all by the actual physical presence and location of a Jewish population. Thus, despite the heavy risk involved, until the entry of regular Arab armies into the war not a single Jewish settlement was abandoned.
The first major Arab attempt to capture a Jewish settlement was made in January 1948, when the Arab Liberation Army attacked Kfar Szold, a village in the eastern part of upper Galilee, a few hundred yards from the Syrian border. The Arabs controlled the entire area from the high ground, and threw their 1st ‘Yarmuk’ Battalion against the village. The British, who could not condone this blatant invasion of British-controlled territory from a neighbouring country, sent an armoured unit to the aid of the hard-pressed settlers and the invading Arab force withdrew.
In the same month, a force of 1,000 men under Abd el Kader el-Husseini mounted an attack against Kfar Etzion, the principal village of a
Group of four Jewish villages, fourteen miles south of Jerusalem. The main supply routes to this area from the city had been closed by Arab units, and the only form of communication was by means of Piper Cub light aircraft landing on a makeshift airstrip. The main attack was mounted against Kfar Etzion by some 300 Arab fighters, while diversionary attacks were mounted against Massuot Yitzhak and Ein Zurim. The preparations for the attack had been observed in advance by the Jewish forces and, accordingly, the reserve company of Palmach fighters stationed there was deployed in ambush along the probable Arab line of approach towards the village of Ein Zurim. The Arab attack on Kfar Etzion was blunted by the settlers, who held their fire until the main Arab force was within close range. At that point, the Palmach force ambushed one of the Arab contingents following up, and this suffered very heavy casualties. The entire Arab force broke and withdrew. Meanwhile, the Haganah in Jerusalem had organized a Palmach platoon of 35 men to rush to the aid of the beleaguered villages. While making their way across the Hebron Hills they were engaged and surrounded by Arab forces and, in a desperate struggle, fought until they were wiped out to the last man.
Similar attacks were mounted by Kaukji’s force against the isolated village of Yehiam in western Galilee and against Kibbutz Tirat Tzvi in the Beisan valley. In an effort to impress the Palestinian Arab population, Kaukji proclaimed his forthcoming victory against Tirat Tzvi with a considerable fanfare, and threw the 1st ‘Yarmuk’ Battalion into the attack. But the defenders had been alerted and were ready. Once again, a mobile Jewish force moved out in a wide circle and hit the attacking Arab force in the flank, causing it to withdraw in disarray, leaving behind 60 dead and a large amount of equipment.
Parallel to these attacks on the villages, the Arabs intensified their terrorist attacks using Europeans (British deserters, Poles, Germans and Yugoslavs) to drive vehicles loaded with bombs into Jewish populated areas. Thus they spread destruction and death in the main cities, particularly in Jerusalem. Jewish forces were not slow to react and in one action destroyed the Arab Headquarters in Jaffa.
The main Arab effort was meanwhile directed towards disrupting the Jewish lines of communication, and a number of main axes throughout the country were by now completely closed to Jewish traffic. The main thrust of the Arab effort was directed towards cutting the road link between Jerusalem and the coast, while by mid-March the Jewish settlements in the Negev had been completely cut off on land, and the only communication with them was maintained by two Piper Cub aircraft. Gradually, Jewish forces developed a system of convoys with home-made armoured vehicles, but the nature of the tortuous winding main road to Jerusalem, rising up to a height of almost 3,000 feet in the Judean Hills, rendered the task of defending the slow-moving convoys increasingly difficult. (The logical solution to such a situation, namely that of capturing and holding high ground covering both sides of the route, was not possible in the early stages because the British forces would have intervened in force against such Jewish moves.) The burned-out wrecks of the primitive
Armoured vehicles and trucks have been preserved. They lie to this day on both sides of the route leading to Jerusalem through the hills, in mute testimony to the bitter and bloody struggle that raged there and the inordinately high sacrifices incurred in the battle to keep open the lifeline of the Jewish population in Jerusalem.
Similar battles were taking place simultaneously on all the main supply routes to the outlying Jewish settlements. By late March, the Etzion group of villages in the Hebron Hills had finally been cut off, while in Galilee 42 members of a convoy trying to supply the isolated village of Yehiam were wiped out. It too was cut off. And, at the end of the month, seventeen people were killed in a major convoy en route to Jerusalem. The Negev, Jerusalem, and parts of western Galilee were now isolated from the main Jewish centres of Palestine. The Jewish population was desperately fighting — against heavy and seemingly hopeless odds — for its existence. The triumphant Arab forces had won the first round; they were on the offensive. Jewish losses in this first phase included 1,200 dead.
But the struggle against odds in this first phase had not been in vain. For, at considerable sacrifice and by fighting-off repeated Arab attempts to capture Jewish settlements, the Jewish community had gained one of the most precious assets, namely time: time in which to organize order out of the chaos; time in which to mobilize; time in which to train; and time in which to mount a major effort to smuggle into the country the arms so vital to continue the struggle. Gradually, the plans for moving over to the offensive were being laid.
Main Convoy Route to Jerusalem Secondary Convoy Routes to Jerusalem -:
7o M
The Road to Jerusalem (to 15 May 1948)
;.Ss="' =
Jewish
World History
