Allied intelligence reports reflected the euphoria that seemed to fill the Allied command. France was rapidly being overrun. The invasion of southern France had succeeded and Marseilles was in Allied hands. The Luftwaffe appeared to be shot out of the sky and only made intermittent appearances over German cities, not over the battlefields. SHAEF’s estimate for the week ending August 19 summed up what many commanders believed true: “The enemy has lost the war and the defeat of Seven(th) Army and Panzer-gruppe West will hasten the end.”
But how would it end? Eisenhower approved a general campaign plan shortly before the Normandy landings, based on a gradual advance to the Seine, a strong buildup, and a series of major actions that would bring the Allied forces to the German border by D + 330, linking up with the Allied forces in southern France, and clearing France, Holland, Belgium, and Luxembourg.
Four avenues existed for entering Germany: Flanders, Maubeuge— Liege-Aachen, the Ardennes, and Metz—Saarbriicken. The SHAEF “broad front” plan called for advancing on all four, with the main Allied attack being made north of the Ardennes through Aachen, and with a secondary effort going towards the Saar through Metz.
Forces would shift to meet opportunities and concentrate for major attacks, but the intent was to keep the entire front active. When the German Army was destroyed west of the Rhine, a massive double envelopment of the Ruhr would end the war. Using available resources, freeing allies, and tying in with an ongoing aerial campaign against Germany’s economy and population, it was a sound plan. The generals closest to the battlefield, however, developed other plans.
Before the Falaise battle played out, Montgomery designed a campaign plan, which if it could not end the war, at least would restructure strategy for 1944. Briefing Bradley on August 17, he mistakenly believed that his American counterpart was still willing to follow his lead.
Montgomery’s campaign plan focused on the final Overlord objective, the industrial Ruhr, and used all the Allied armies in France, which would go through Belgium entering Germany north of the Ardennes. He planned to keep both Army Groups together, his own 21st clearing the Ghannel coast, Flanders, and seizing Antwerp, while Bradley’s 12th Army Group moved on the prime invasion route into the Ruhr: the Liege-Aachen-Cologne avenue of approach.
Montgomery’s plan was attractive because if it succeeded, it would clear the coast of the V-2 rocket sites, obtain the Channel ports and Antwerp to solve the logistics problem, and place the Allies at the front door of Germany’s industry and population.
Montgomery, however, tied the plan to the issue of command. He demanded total ground command for himself, which the Americans found both irritating and unsupportable as Montgomery began to cannibalize some divisions to replace losses in others. With up to four American divisions arriving monthly, and the planned final American force outnumbering the total British and Canadian divisions by four to one, the Americans no longer saw a need to serve under Montgomery.
Monty’s stock had fallen in many circles, and the American public demanded a change, a feeling also universally held by American generals in Europe. US Chief of Staff, Gen. Marshall, urged Eisenhower to take control. When Eisenhower assumed the ground command at the end of August, Bradley, whose Army Group already was larger than Montgomery’s own, would be fully independent.
By August 20, Bradleys planners published his “Operation Plan Normandy To The Rhine” His succinct mission statement defied Monty’s ideas: “Twelfth Army Group upon completion of present operation will regroup and resume its advance to the northeast in zone, cross the SEINE, encircle PARIS, and continue the advance to seize the crossings of the RHINE River from STRASBOURG to MAINZ inclusive.”
Eisenhower sought to define the next objectives before assuming the ground command in September by meeting Bradley on August 19, and then Montgomery and Bradley separately on the 23rd. Ike still accepted the “broad front” plan advanced in May as the most reasonable course of action for the Allies and with it, granting priority to the Liege-Aachen—Cologne approach with a secondary advance through the Metz approach towards the Saar.
Additionally, he followed the logic of both the size and importance of the avenues of approach, plus their logistical supportability in giving priorities to the Army Groups. Eisenhower ordered Montgomery to take Brussels and Antwerp while clearing the Channel ports along the way. Realizing this would require both Montgomery’s armies, he authorized Montgomery to “coordinate” Hodges’s First Army’s advance to cover his left, Hodges therefore to go to Aachen.
Though this decision kept Hodges under Bradley’s command and gave Bradley responsibility for the key avenue of approach to Germany, Bradley viewed the decision as losing an army to Montgomery, and attempted to get Eisenhower to limit Montgomery’s “coordinating” to a single corps, calling Montgomery “cautious.”
As theater commander, Eisenhower realized that any future plans rode on logistics. He therefore directed Bradley to clear the Brittany ports, his real lifeline until Antwerp and Marseilles could be fully developed and the European rail net rebuilt. Eisenhower authorized Bradley to buildup east of Paris, which Bradley interpreted as tacit approval to continue Patton’s advance. But in every guidance message to the army groups or summary to the Combined Chiefs, nowhere did Eisenhower place a priority on Patton’s lunge to the Saar as anything but behind Montgomery’s clearing the Channel coast and taking Antwerp and Bradley’s opening the Brittany ports.
Eisenhower’s decision was hotly decried by both his Army Group commanders, each believing that victory was within grasp if all the priorities for advance were to be given to his Army Group. The loudest protests came from the army commander on what Eisenhower, essentially, had designated the least decisive avenue of approach for the immediate future.
Patton filmed, claiming that given the gas and supplies, he could be in Germany with his Third Army in ten days. With one corps tied to capturing the Brittany ports, his other three corps mustered only seven divisions, which even if they made the Rhine at Mannheim, would suddenly find themselves stranded without gas, and minus the airfields needed to maintain essential close air support. Finally, Mannheim is about 175 miles (280km) south of the Ruhr and double that distance from Berlin.
Pattons plan of attack held a problem which summarized the drawback of every offensive plan advanced during that late August. Momentum was admirable, but a decisive-sized force able to fight the remainder of the German Army in a critical area with adequate supplies was a necessity, not a toehold or a force stranded from its own supplies.
The Allied front was too large for the forces available, even when logistically supported. This fact explains why Eisenhower’s original plans concentrated forces in the north, leaving the southern flank thinly held. Until the Channel ports, Brittany ports, or Antwerp opened to ease the logistics problem, and rail and pipe lines were built to carry the required tonnages, supporting unlimited advances on all fronts was not possible.
The race to the Rhine, however, was still not over. Montgomery strained to drag every mile of advance before the predicted gasoline famine halted his forces.
Not able to move with “40 divisions,” Montgomery still aimed to have a bridgehead across the Rhine before the German defense solidified, which would require a future river crossing to be an over-water assault approaching a miniature invasion. Spurred on by increasingly optimistic intelligence reports, Montgomery among others, might have hoped that with the Allies at the front door, perhaps German resolve would crumble as it did in 1918, sparing Britain another war winter.
Nor was Bradley convinced he should curb his advance to support Monty’s left. He gave Patton equal gasoline rations and directed one of First Army’s corps south to maintain linkage with Patton and to support Third Army’s advance.
The advance continued with September promising ground gains for perhaps two weeks - gains which could complete France and Belgium’s liberation while tightening the grip on Hitler’s borders. With no apparent operational decision obtainable, Eisenhower approved Montgomerys thrust to the Rhine, but realistically did not see the move as being able to topple Germany or even reach Berlin.
Yet Monty’s Rhine thrust did serve critical needs that Bradleys favored Saar line of operations neglected. Most importantly, it would end the immediate V-weapon threat to England, a threat that if turned against her ports instead of her cities could have severely curbed Allied supplies and disrupted the Allies’ logistics.
Antwerp was a key and an obvious objective, but if 21st Army Group were to continue beyond, the Netherlands could be freed and the entire German Fifteenth Army could be bagged like the Seventh had been at Falaise. In the fall of 1944, geography, logistics, and politics ensured that Montgomery’s advance would be supported.
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