Shortly before midnight, Major Sproesser summoned me to headquarters where I found a large number of officers. Major Sproesser told me that the situation was most unfavourable. Reports from isolated units of the Hungarian 70th Honved Division (3rd Troop Imperial and Royal Uhlans, 1st Troop, Imperial and Royal Dragoons, and 1st Honved Company) informed us that during the afternoon strong Russian and Rumanian forces had broken through the division in and to the north of the Slanic valley and were preparing to move south against the Mount Cosna-Ungureana ridge. We had to reckon with the assumption that, under certain conditions, the Sproesser Group would be cut off, for we had no troops to our rear short of the Ungureana. I was asked to express my views.
My opinion was that a night attack against the Mount Cosna-Ungureana line was most unlikely, and that the earliest attack would come at dawn which was only four hours away. With the group's five battalions I considered it possible to hold the Mount Cosna-Ungureana line against all comers, for the retention of this position was vital to the general situation. Under no circumstances would I surrender supinely the territory taken with so much resourcefulness, skill and blood, simply because of alarming reports.
I proposed the following regrouping be effected without delay:
—The mountain battalion assumes the defence of Mount Cosna, Headquarters Knoll, and the ridge as far as Hill 674. The other battalions of the group seize and hold the ridge between 674 and Ungureana. All units push through reconnaissance and security elements toward the Slanic valley.”
For the deployment of the mountain battalion I proposed:
—Combat outposts, a rifle platoon reinforced by machine guns, occupy the south portion of Mount Cosna. The crater-field on the summit is not occupied. Reconnaissance to the southeast and east. A platoon and a heavy machine-gun platoon occupy the Headquarters Knoll and prevent the enemy from occupying Mount Cosna summit. A rifle company occupies each of the two ridges descending to the north between Mount Cosna and Elevation 674. Reconnaissance and security to the north. All remaining companies are assembled just southwest of Headquarters Knoll and held at the commander's disposal.”
Major Sproesser accepted my recommendations and urged me, since I took the terrain by attack, to defend the Wurttemberg Mountain Battalion sector. The seriousness of the situation, concern for my mountain soldiers, and last but not least, the stimulation of the difficult task, led me to shoulder this new burden.
Oral group orders initiated the regrouping which was executed without further delay. I had the following for the defence of Mount Cosna sector: 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 5th, and 6th Rifle Companies, and the 3rd Machine-Gun Company of the Wurttemberg Mountain Battalion, and the 3rd Company of the 11th Infantry Reserve Regiment with six heavy machine guns.
The group staff now retired to the oak woods by the ridge road bend a mile northeast of Ungureana. With my company commanders, I discussed in detail both the situation in general and the tasks of the Wurttemberg Mountain Battalion in particular. I then issued the following orders in rapid succession:
—The 3rd Company moves immediately from Mount Cosna to Headquarters Knoll and sends a platoon without packs, but reinforced by six light machine guns of the 3rd Company of the 11th Infantry Reserve Regiment, to relieve the 1st Company on Mount Cosna. This platoon (reinforced) occupies the wooded southern ridge and reconnoitres toward the hostile position east of Mount Cosna. In case of attack, the platoon holds its position as long as possible and retires on Headquarters Knoll only if threatened by encirclement. I shall give oral instructions to the platoon commander at a later time.
—Another platoon of the 3rd Company, as well as Albrecht's heavy machine-gun platoon, dig in on Headquarters Knoll so as to cover the crater-field on Mount Cosna and the west slope with fire. They will prevent the enemy from crossing the bare part of Mount Cosna and threatening the combat outposts on the left flank by day.
—The 2nd Company occupies the small knoll seven hundred yards north of the Headquarters Knoll (later called the Russian Knoll), reconnoitres toward the Slanic valley, maintains night contact with the combat outposts on Mount Cosna by scout squads. The company will build large camp-fires on Mount Cosna's northwest slope in order to deceive the enemy and divert his artillery fire. These fires will be kept going all night.
—The 5th Company, reinforced by a heavy machine-gun platoon occupies the knoll half a mile northeast of Hill 674, and prepares for all-around defence. It will reconnoitre toward the Slanic valley and maintain contact with the 2nd Company and the neighbouring troops in the region of Hill 674, and Piciorul. To deceive the enemy and divert his artillery fire, the company builds large fires in the hollow half a mile northwest of the Headquarters Knoll and keeps them burning all night.
—A platoon of the 3rd Company, Aldinger's machine-gun platoon, 1st and 6th Companies of the Wurttemberg Mountain Battalion, and the 3rd Company of the 11th Infantry Reserve Regiment go into reserve areas between Headquarters Knoll and the descending slope a quarter of a mile to the southwest. Security and reconnaissance in the direction of Grozesti. More detailed orders will be issued later. (Sketch 31)
—Detachment command post sixty yards west of Headquarters Knoll. Communications platoon lays wire connection to the combat outposts and to the 2nd and 5th Companies.”
While the leaders repeated their orders much activity began. The Bavarians and Honveds moved back followed by the companies of the Wurttemberg Mountain Battalion. Sleeping was out of the question, for individual orders had to be issued on the spot to meet particular situations. It took three hours to get the companies in their new positions. The camp-fires on Mount Cosna and in the
Sketch 31
Positions at Mount Cosna, August 13, 1917. View from the west.
Hollow northwest of Headquarters Knoll were burning, and contact with the various units had been established. The reserve units rested while those in position dug themselves in. The reconnaissance detachments made no alarming reports.
My staff consisted of Lieutenant Schuster as adjutant and Lieutenant Werner as administrative officer. Toward 0500, some artillery observers (including the Hungarian First Lieutenant Zeidler) arrived, and I went with them to the combat outpost on Mount Cosna. We reached Allgauer's platoon (3rd Company) just as the sun was rising above the horizon. In accordance with orders, Allgauer had located his platoon on the sharp ridge leading south from Mount Cosna summit. The position was so organized as to have its flank on the edge of the thick forest some two hundred yards south of the summit. The Rumanian positions were visible through the haze, and were on a bare ridge some 350 feet wide and about a half mile away. We saw the sun's rays reflected from the helmets of the large garrison, but there was no firing and our men who had had no rest, were asleep in their freshly dug foxholes, leaving only the sentries to keep sharp watch in the enemy's direction. The slope in front of the platoon position fell sharply to the east and was covered with short shrubbery. The ridge itself as well as its western slope, was covered with large trees and had little or no protective undergrowth.
While discussing emergency barrages and harassing fire with the artillery observers, the various sentries reported: “The Rumanians are leaving their positions in a skirmish line and are advancing toward Mount Cosna.” Shortly thereafter violent Rumanian machine-gun fire was directed at the Mount Cosna ridge line, and heavy artillery began to fire on Headquarters Knoll. I got through to our artillery and requested harassing fire on the Rumanian positions east of Mount Cosna, from which increasing numbers of troops were coming. In the meantime this report arrived: “Strong enemy has been located just in front of the line of combat outposts and is climbing the ridge from the right.” The bursting of numerous hand grenades, lively carbine and machine-gun fire confirmed this report. Retribution was being exacted for inadequate security measures on the steep eastern slope. By telephone I ordered the reserve platoon of the 3rd Company and Aldinger's machine-gun platoon forward at the double to reinforce the combat outposts. This order was followed by a request to the group for emergency barrages. I made a tour of the front lines and found that the Rumanians had secured a foothold on the ridge and were delivering flanking fire on our combat outposts. All frontal attacks had been beaten off and our artillery was smashing up the many Rumanian reinforcements on the bare slope. On the left the heavy machine-gun and rifle fire from Headquarters Knoll prevented the Rumanians from crossing either summit or the northwest slope of Mount Cosna. This fire also protected our combat outposts on the left flank. (Sketch 32)
I ordered Technical Sergeant Allgauer to hold the position at all costs until the arrival of reinforcements, and I ran back to speed the reinforcements on their way. Heavy shells were still hitting Headquarters Knoll, where I met the two platoons preparing to get under way and we hurried forward at the double. The noise of battle had increased considerably and we hoped that Allgauer was holding on!
In the saddle between Headquarters Knoll and Mount Cosna we encountered several light machine-gun crews of the 3rd Company, 11th Infantry Reserve Regiment, who were part of Allgauer's platoon. Apparently it had become too hot for them, up front, and I treated them with scant consideration and took them along with me.
A hundred yards east of the saddle we saw Allgauer's entire platoon coming toward us; Allgauer reported that large Rumanian bodies had pushed up the slope and that these and the strong fire from below on the right had compelled him to give up the position.
I was in no frame of mind to surrender Mount Cosna at so cheap a price, and organized my forces for a counter thrust. Lieutenant Aldinger took two heavy machine guns and went into position in the woods on the right and kept the ridge, hitherto occupied by Allgauer's platoon, under steady fire. Simultaneously we climbed the ridge and passed through dense bushes before reaching the ridge line. Having arrived there, we charged ahead and swept the surprised enemy from the ridge and drove him down to the east; we also seized the promontory down on the right. (Sketch 32)
But the Rumanians were tenacious and did not let go. We clearly heard the commands of the enemy leaders down below us on the arched slope, and soon bitter hand-grenade battles began at various places. The slope was so steep that our hand grenades did not burst among the Rumanians lying in readiness 125 yards below us, but actually fell even farther before detonating. To reach him with a carbine meant exposure of head and shoulders, a procedure most disadvantageous at our short ranges. Losses began to increase and Dr. Lenz had much work to do in the front line.
The mountain troopers fought with exemplary bravery; many wounded returned to the firing line after having their wounds bandaged. All Rumanian footholds on the ridge were immediately wiped out by counterattacks, mounted by the nearest group of mountain soldiers. The hard battle, replete with casualties, lasted for several hours and ammunition and hand grenades gradually became scarce while hostile artillery fire against Headquarters Knoll increased. Telephone connection between Headquarters Knoll and the combat outpost position was shot away. If I wanted to hold on to my combat outpost positions, then the time had come to reinforce them with additional forces, ammunition and hand grenades. In order to expedite matters (telephone communication was lacking), I put Lieutenant Stellrecht, the 3rd Company Commander, in command and ordered him to hold at all costs while I hurried back to Headquarters Knoll, where I found the following situation: The platoon of the 3rd Company and Allbrecht's heavy machine-gun platoon had used up nearly all their ammunition against the enemy, who was threatening the left flank of the combat outposts from the
Sketch 32
Defence of Mount Cosna, August 13, 1917.
Crater field on Mount Cosna. My reserve companies (1st and 6th Companies of the Wurttemberg Mountain Battalion, as well as the 3rd Company, 11th Infantry Reserve Regiment), had occupied the south slope of Headquarters Knoll on their own initiative because strong enemy forces were reported ascending toward Headquarters Knoll through the ravines from Grozesti.
Before I had units of these companies ready for use, we had reports that strong Rumanian forces were advancing both from the south and from the north against the saddle between Headquarters Knoll and Mount Cosna, and that the combat outposts had abandoned Mount Cosna and were retiring on Headquarters Knoll. In the next few minutes (I still had no men at my disposal), the noise of battle approached dangerously near to Headquarters Knoll and the riflemen of the 3rd Company were retiring on the Knoll hard pressed by a superior and aggressive enemy. They brought their dead and wounded (including Lieutenant Hummel) back with them, for they had no intention of allowing anyone living or dead to fall into enemy hands. Hand grenades and machine-gun ammunition had given out, carbine ammunition had become short and they were threatened with encirclement from either flank.
The lack of ammunition and hand grenades made it most difficult to stop the attack of the Rumanian masses against Headquarters Knoll. The heavy machine gunners had to defend their positions with pistols and hand grenades, and the few runners of my staff were used at threatened places. Violent fighting raged along the entire front. At that moment I discovered large numbers of Rumanians in the wooded part of the depression, seven hundred yards northwest of Headquarters Knoll. I informed the 2nd and 5th Companies by telephone regarding the new danger which threatened their flanks and rear.
In all parts of the sector violent fighting was going on and a withdrawal was out of the question. What would happen on Headquarters Knoll when the ammunition was completely expended? With the dominant position in enemy hands, the entire battalion would be in a most precarious predicament and our entire defence would collapse. We could not allow that to happen. Telephone connection with the group still existed and I described our current crisis and urgently requested immediate reinforcements including small arms and ammunition. I stressed the fact that time was not to be wasted. The worries of the next half hour were indescribable, but at our eleventh hour the 11th and 12th Companies, 18th Bavarian Infantry Reserve Regiment, and a heavy machine-gun platoon came to our assistance. The 12th Company with the heavy machine-gun platoon, went into position on Headquarters Knoll and I kept the 11th Company in reserve on the slope three hundred yards west of Headquarters Knoll, where I also located the detachment command post. From there I had an excellent view of the whole battleground.
I used the reserve company to re-supply the forward positions with ammunition and hand grenades. All troops not actually firing at the enemy plied their spades with great vigour. The machine-gun fire from dominating positions on Mount Cosna was most annoying to those on Headquarters Knoll and the ridge. I withdrew Aldinger's heavy machine-gun platoon from the front line and put it in a defence zone in the neighbourhood of the detachment command post. Furthermore, I established ammunition supply points and put my supply system in order.
The battle for the Headquarters Knoll and Russian Knoll continued for hours without pause. The enemy repeatedly hurled new forces against our thin lines, and Rumanian artillery concentrations on the slope just west of Headquarters Knoll prevented contact with the front line and tore up our telephone connections. But the Bavarians and Wurttembergers up front held their positions, and our own artillery did a good job during the course of the day in giving us emergency barrages at all threatened points. Its shells thinned the ranks of the Rumanians who were lying in dense masses on their lines of departure.
To counter the strong enemy force now milling around in the depression a half-mile northwest of Headquarters Knoll, I arranged for the co-operation of several batteries to prepare saturation barrages, hold them at the ready, and fire them on signal—which could be done within minutes. In spite of the excellent artillery cooperation, I still lacked observers up forward and was also in need of wire communication with the artillery command posts.
By noon there were mountains of dead and wounded Rumanians in front of Headquarters Knoll, but the 12th Company of the 18th Infantry had also suffered heavily and had to be reinforced with elements of the 11th Company. Later still more elements of the 11th Company had to be used to fill gaps in the 2nd Mountain Company.
The defence arrangements on Headquarters and Russian Knolls included light front-line garrisons, with strong counterattack groups assembled under cover in the vicinity of the more threatened portions of the position, with the mission of immediately ejecting the enemy from any point where he managed to effect a breakthrough. This type of defence lent itself to our particular terrain.
In the afternoon, the 10th Company of the 18th Infantry arrived as additional support and I ordered it to dig a communication trench from Headquarters Knoll to the detachment command post.
The Rumanians switched their main attack against Russian Knoll. There Hugel's platoon had organized itself for all-around defence in some old Rumanian positions, and was hit hard from the north and east by an enemy who outnumbered him ten to one. The enemy tried repeatedly to regain positions whose installation had cost him weeks of work. Aldinger's heavy machine-gun platoon at the detachment command post spoiled all enemy attacks from the west against Hugel's platoon, and the 2nd Company gallantly held its ground.
The battle raged in undiminished fury and almost without interruption into the late afternoon. For the third time I ordered ammunition and hand grenades replenished in the front line. Through the smoke clouds of our heavy shells (calibres up to 305mm were used in the defensive fire), we saw more and more fresh Rumanian troops descending the slopes of Mount Cosna in our direction. When the 2nd Company reported that it had melted away to such an extent that it was obliged to retire from Russian Knoll, I sent the remaining elements of the 11th Company, 18th Infantry to its support. At the same time I ordered two heavy machine-gun platoons to prepare for destruction fire on Russian Knoll. When these preparations were completed, I ordered the 2nd Company to vacate Russian Knoll rapidly. As expected, the hostile forces stormed up on the bare knoll in a dense mass; at the same moment the destruction fire of the heavy machine-gun platoons struck among them and mowed them down like ripe wheat. In full flight, the survivors fled the dangerous knoll and shortly thereafter the reinforced 2nd Company was again in possession and was allowed a brief respite.
Somewhat later the Rumanian forces, which we had observed for hours in the depression half a mile northwest of Headquarters Knoll, started moving up the slope to the south. The previously prepared artillery fire was requested and had excellent effect; it drove the enemy back into the lower woods. Thus the rifle and machine-gun fire prepared for the reception of this enemy by the 2nd, 12th, and 5th Companies and the three heavy machine-gun platoons was unnecessary.
During the battle, message after message came from the front line. The adjutant and the administration officer had their hands full in executing hasty requests for protective fire, keeping up the flow of ammunition, combat supplies and rations as well as informing Sproesser Group as to the state of the battle. Double wire lines were laid to the more threatened points and to Major Sproesser's command post and kept in repair by the untiring communications men, a most dangerous job in view of the almost continuous machine-gun and artillery fire which kept searching the area.
In spite of the heaviest losses, the Rumanians continued their attacks into the night, but failed to gain a foot of ground. When the noise of battle died down in the night, we heard the groans and laments of the wounded all along the front. Our stretcher-bearers were fired on as they attempted to help some of the unfortunate men, and had to return without accomplishing their mission.
In my opinion, the enemy would repeat his attacks on August 14 with still stronger use of artillery and fresh infantry forces. Such serious losses as we suffered on August 13 could not be repeated. Therefore, I ordered the short hours of the night employed in fortifying our positions and reorganized the defence at various places. With the company and platoon leaders, some of whom had little experience in this type of combat, I traced out the main line of resistance on the ground and prescribed the type of construction to be used in the defence installations. During the night fields of fire had to be cleared at various points; furthermore, in the arrangement of the rifle and heavy machine-gun nests, it must be remembered that the enemy was able to cover them from dominant positions on Mount Cosna. The 233rd Pioneer Company, which was brought up and assigned to me just before dark, was given the extensive work on Headquarters Knoll.
Only just before midnight were all portions of the extended sector assigned to units which began work immediately. I was exhausted when I reached my command post, but a warm meal refreshed me. Sleep was out of the question. The wounded had to be attended to, ammunition and hand grenades had to be supplied to the companies in the front line and to the depots before daybreak; provisions had to be brought up to the individual companies; the communications platoon had to lay a double line to the artillery fire direction centre, and then the combat report for August 13 had to be forwarded to the Sproesser group.
We finally finished all this work and at 0400 I tried to get some sleep, but it was so cold that I gave up the idea; so I took Lieutenant Werner and inspected the night's work in the early dawn light. I had not had a chance to remove my shoes for more than five days and, as a result, my feet were badly swollen; also, I had had no opportunity to renew the bandage on my left arm or to change the blood-stained overcoat hung around my shoulders and my likewise bloodstained trousers. I felt very debilitated, but the weight
Of responsibility was such that I did not consider going back to the hospital.
At daybreak on August 14, a Honved infantry company with light machine guns arrived and I ordered it to relieve the 1st and 3rd Companies; I put these two companies in reserve just west of my command post. The 11th and 12th Companies of the 18th Infantry had taken over respectively the Headquarters Knoll position and the position astride the ridge road. I left the 10th Company of the 18th Infantry in its position in the woods three hundred yards west of Russian Knoll. It had pushed its security elements to the north and northwest in the direction of the Slanic valley. We were ready and felt the battle could recommence.
During the whole forenoon, the Rumanian artillery bombarded our positions on Headquarters Knoll, the ridge road and Russian Knoll very actively, but caused little damage. In all sectors work was carried on busily and the positions were further improved, so that a strong Rumanian attack on the whole front at noon was easily repulsed.
The 2nd Company on Russian Knoll suffered heavily from the fire of a Rumanian battery, located in an open position about a mile away. Since we had not one single artillery observer in our sector, our corrections were telephoned to artillery control in the oak woods. All our efforts to silence this battery went for naught. The enemy strengthened his positions on the west slope of Mount Cosna, and the hostile wounded continued to groan and moan in front of our lines. Our own losses on August 14 were slight and August 15 was also a quiet day. I took advantage of this respite to have two draftsmen reproduce and grid a sketch-map of the Mount Cosna terrain, which I had drawn to the scale of 1:5,000. The group artillery commander and the artillery observers received copies; the artillery made sufficient copies so that distribution was made to include all batteries. A grid or sketch greatly facilitates adjustment of fire in mountainous or wooded terrain, where it is often difficult to select visible aiming points or targets by map study alone. For example, I notified the artillery: —Request emergency barrage in squares 65 and 66.” If now the requested fire was outside them, then it sufficed to say: —Emergency barrage requested in squares 65 and 66 is in squares 74 and 75,” in order to bring the fire quickly into the desired region. Combat information within one's own unit and group was considerably simplified. For example: —Rumanian battery located in square 234a.”
In the night of August 15, the mortar company under Lieutenant Wohler arrived, made a night reconnaissance and began emplacing its mortars. Captain Gossler came forward to spell me, for I had not had any rest for a week. Command remained in my hands. In the afternoon the 4th Company arrived as additional reinforcements, and I found my force had grown to sixteen and a half companies, more strength than an entire regiment.
The 11th Infantry Reserve Regiment was on our right, but our left was up in the air. Brigade was trying hard to establish a continuous front, but insufficient troops were available for the task. The defence of the steep, wooded slopes of the Slanic valley required an enormous force.
Following a period of oppressive heat a heavy thunderstorm broke on August 16, and the thunder echoed and re-echoed in the mountains, accompanied by pouring rain from the low-hanging clouds. The covered Rumanian positions west of the command post gave shelter to the staff and the detachment reserves, but not for long, for they soon filled and had to be vacated. With lightning flashing all around we lay in the open, sopping wet, when a sudden hail of artillery of all calibres drowned out the noise of thunder. Violent rifle and machine-gun fire began up front accompanied by hand-grenade bursts. —No doubt about it!” The Rumanians hoped to surprise us in the storm! I began to wonder if the front still held or had been overrun. The rain beat into our faces so sharply that visibility was down to a few yards. Should I wait for reports? No! Action!
Headquarters Knoll was the focal point, and in a few minutes I reached a point just to the west of the Knoll. With me was the 6th Company, bayonets fixed and ready to counterattack. Our emergency barrage ploughed up the region in which the Rumanian masses were attacking; a combat telephone line connected us with my staff and thus with all points in the sector. The Rumanian attack collapsed everywhere and night put an end to the confusion of battle in the streaming rain. Only after suffering heavy losses in dead and wounded did the enemy retire from the area in front of our positions.
Upon return to my command post at the conclusion of fighting, I found the place on which we had pitched our tents ploughed up by heavy shells. Under these conditions I moved the command post three hundred yards to the right. We dried our wet clothing on our bodies by the heat of a fire tended by Rumanian prisoners. We were in fine spirits!
Observations: The task of the Wurttemberg Mountain Battalion on August 13, to defend parts of Mount Cosna and the high ground immediately to the west, was exceptionally difficult. With no contact on either flank, the battalion had to prepare for strong hostile attacks not only on the front but also on both flanks. Then, too, the very irregular, thickly wooded terrain on both sides of the bare ridge favoured hostile approach to within attacking distance. Furthermore, the Rumanian artillery was in a position in a semicircle around the Wurttemberg Mountain Battalion.
Under these circumstances a defence in great depth and a retention of strong reserves was desirable.
Active combat reconnaissance toward the south, east and north was necessary even before daylight, in order to determine the hostile offensive intentions. Further, the un-surveyable terrain out in front of our own positions had to be kept under constant and sharp observation. Where that was not done, as at the combat outposts, unwelcome surprises were experienced.
The fighting at the combat outposts was very difficult. To be sure, they had a field offire fTom the sharp ridge of Mount Cosna far into the open hostile territory, but the arched, steep and densely covered slope in the immediate foreground could not be covered with fire. Their security measures were inadequate. It was here that the Rumanians made preparations for a daylight attack with strong force. Their attack was a complete surprise for the combat outposts.
Machine-gun and rifle fire from Headquarters Knoll against the bare summit and lightly wooded west slope of Mount Cosna managed to protect the left flank of the combat outposts for a considerable time, and it was only when ammunition gave out on Headquarters Knoll that the enemy managed to set foot on Mount Cosna.
Under the quickly organized fire support of a heavy machine-gun platoon, it was possible to regain the last line of the combat outposts without suffering much in the way of casualties. The fire and movement of the assault squads were in complete unison here.
The fighting along the outpost line and for Headquarters Knoll are excellent examples of the rapidity with which ammunition becomes exhausted at the focal points of combat. In such cases (especially in the mountains), resupply must be established at the earliest possible moment. Besides that, a reserve of ammunition and close-combat weapons must be on hand in the battalion. The battalion supply point must be constantly informed as to the amounts of ammunition on hand in the forward line and must get res up ply started. Supply worked well in the course of the fighting on August 13.
Reserves were urgently needed during the heavy fighting on August 13; without them the position could not have been held; again and again, losses in the principal combat zone had to be replaced by reserves. The supply of ammunition and close-combat weapons was brought to the front line by the reserves. During the battle, a communication trench had to be dug by a reserve company from the battalion command post to Headquarters Knoll, the focal point of the fighting. Without the trench, supply would have been brought up only with heavy losses in the face of hostile fire from the dominant Mount Cosna position.
Even at the beginning of the defensive battle, the Wurttemberg Mountain Battalion was deeply echeloned in the main area of combat. The 3rd and 2nd Companies and the forces disposed on Headquarters Knoll could support each other with fire. During the battle, reserves at the foci of the fighting (Headquarters Knoll and Russian Knoll), deepened the defence area. It would have been a mistake to put everything in the front line of nests; the losses were heaviest there, and they would have been still greater if the garrison had been stronger. It is easy to break a line.
The cooperation with the artillery was very satisfactory on August 16. Of course, an artillery liaison party or forward observers in the battalion sector would have accomplished still more advantageous results. The grid sketch prepared during the defence was very valuable; it corresponded to the plane table or plotting board of the present day.
World History
