Since there was also a shortage of manpower here, the German leadership made every effort to make good this lack with fortifications. Plans had been drawn up as early as the end of 1941 for an Atlantic Wall, which would consist of a vast number of fortified positions, bunkers, artillery pieces, anti-aircraft defenses, obstacles and barriers in the immediate vicinity of the coast. Following the model of similar installations already built in Norway, hundreds of thousands of foreign and German workers were employed in the ensuing months and years, under the control of the Organization Todt, in fortifying first the Franco-Belgian coastline, an later all sectors of the coast along the Channel. From November 1942, following the landing of Allied troops in North Africa, fortifications also sprang up in the south of France. According to von Rundstedt and his staff, the sea was to serve as “the best anti tank ditch” before the Atlantic Wall.
The German rate of construction was impressive: by the day of the invasion they had completed 12,247 of the 15,000 fortifications originally planned (with 943 more on the Mediterranean coast), built 500,000 beach obstacles, and laid 6.5 million mines. This was largely thanks to the energetic Field Marshal Rommel, who had made every possible effort to turn the coast into a fearful obstacle to the Allies. There was only one small problem however: like the other German leaders, Rommel’s eyes were fixed on a landing at the Pas de Calais area, and the greatest resources were therefore devoted to the area held by Fifteenth Army. Where the Allies actually did land, opposite Seventh Army, the defenses were less thoroughly prepared. Although Army Headquarters had 74,000 Todt workers and 3,765 vehicles at its disposal, only about half the planned program had been completed by May 1944. There were many problems, particularly with the naval guns which were to have ranged far out to sea. Of the planned second line 12.5-18.5 miles (20-30km) inland only a small part had been completed. Furthermore the lion’s share of the available material and manpower had been swallowed up in fortifying the ports of Cherbourg, St. Malo, Brest, Lorient and St. Nazaire, since the Germans assumed the Allies would land in the immediate vicinity of large ports.
Von Rundstedt and his staff knew of course that the chain of fortifications comprising the Atlantic Wall could only be as strong as its weakest link. He therefore made it clear to his commanders in the coastal fortifications again in February 1944: “There must be no retreat in the west!” In the event of an invasion, they would have to stand firm until motorized reserves arrived to throw the Allies back into the sea. Yet the German leaders, and especially Hitler himself, were not 100 percent convinced by their own plans, otherwise they would not, as early as autumn 1943, have reconnoitred a retrenchment line running from the River Somme via the Rivers Marne and Saone to the Swiss border. This was naturally carried out in strict secrecy, and only a few handpicked staff officers were told of it. After all, nobody wanted to demoralize the Army prematurely.
Still it is astounding that an army created for, and practised in mobility should suddenly decide to plant itself behind a wall. One reason for this may have been that the majority of the divisions under C-in-C West’s control were “static,” i. e. non-motorized divisions. His main objective up to November 1943 had been to form new mobile units. These divisions however were removed from the control of the C-in-C West as soon as they were brought up to strength in men and equipment. Hitler’s Order No. 51 of the same month forbade any further transfers from the west to the south or east because of the new strategy. In reality however, many motorized units still left the west after this time because they were so urgently needed on other fronts.
Against this background it is easy to see why arguments raged for months in the German camp over the few Panzer divisions available. Were they in fact the real linch-pin of the German defense system in the west? Should these divisions be positioned directly behind the Atlantic Wall, to be able to react rapidly to an Allied landing, as Rommel demanded for example, or should they be retained at more central points? After much wrangling a compromise was reached; some Panzer divisions were moved closer to the coast, while others formed a central reserve around Paris. This seemed to be the ideal solution, for now an enemy landing could be opposed immediately, and the reserve deployed when the main Allied thrust had been clearly identified.
Two factors soon become evident: the Germans were clearly hoping for a decisive result in the battle for the Allied bridgehead, since they knew from experience that the Allies would be at their weakest during this initial phase of the invasion. The “Panzer controversy”, however, reveals that it was only Army officers who remained involved in the defense plan. They addressed themselves chiefly to the problem of what was to be done after an enemy landing. The crucial question of where and when the Allied attack would begin, however, received much less attention. It remained a purely hypothetical question as to whether the vast resources invested in the Atlantic Wall might not better serve the Luftwaffe and the Navy. Apart from the technical and organizational feasibility of such a redirection of effort, it must be remembered that Hitler and the majority of his senior officers still persisted in the tradition of being exclusively a land power. They thus developed a “fortress” mentality, out of which they seemed unable to escape.
World History
