The precarious situation of Hitler’s Germany could not be kept secret from the ordinary soldier forever, in spite of all the Nazi propaganda which was showered on him. Allied air superiority over Germany and in the west was enough on its own to show the overwhelming materiel superiority already enjoyed by the Allies. The confidence in victory and the spirit of the earlier years were gone, as is revealed by the tenor of many soldiers’ letters home. The troops could also notice the colder atmosphere in the occupied territories, where a passive attitude, changing to disdain and outright disobedience were encountered more frequently. Whether the fight against supposed or actual Resistance members, in which an ever-growing number of Wehrmacht troops were employed, served to raise morale, must remain undecided. In any event, the German measures against Allied “commando troops” (teams of national or Allied troops engaged in reconnaissance or sabotage) seemed likely to put their own side in the wrong: they must be granted no quarter, even if they surrendered without a fight, were the orders from above. Such orders were of course to be acknowledged, but the written record of the orders was to be immediately destroyed. Many soldiers may have asked themselves how this was to be reconciled with the idea of the “ethical and moral superiority” and the “nobility” of German aims, as their leaders characterized them.
It appeared to be difficult, for many reasons, to turn the soldier in the west into such a fanatical fighter as his comrades on the Eastern Front. The long sojourn away from an active front had led here to typical “instances of malingering.” Many troops adopted an increasingly careless and sloppy attitude: they lost their weapons and other equipment, became involved with local women and, especially in France, fell victim to a fascination with the country and the people. Rigorous punishments imposed by military courts and superior officers had little effect on these tendencies.
Another battle fought almost in vain, was that over the attitude towards the Alhes in the coming conflict. In contrast to the Eastern Front, where many men believed they were engaged in a crusade against Bolshevism and the “sub-human” Slavs, the British and Americans were viewed much less negatively. The Army High Command summed up the feelings of many soldiers in the west by saying that they held the regrettable but appropriate “assumption of facing a more humane opponent.” One event from the end of 1943 may serve as a good example of this attitude: an Allied “terror flier” parachuted from his shot-down aircraft over France and was soon taken prisoner by a troop of German soldiers. The NCO in charge offered the pilot a cigarette, in full view of some French civilians. Von Rundstedt practically foamed at the mouth with anger when he heard of this and ordered shordy afterwards that any similar cases of “completely misplaced sentimentality” must in future be punished. No less a figure than Goebbels, the Reich Propaganda Minister, strove to reverse this attitude and attacked the bombing of German cities as an uncultured act of barbarity.
Senior officers again emphasized that in the event of a landing, it would be a fight “to the death.” Jodi made the following prognosis: “Then we shall see who fights harder and dies easier, the German soldier faced with the destruction of his homeland, or the Americans and English, who don’t even know any longer what they are fighting for in Europe.” At the end of 1943 he even invoked history in front of senior military men and officials in the hope of encouraging the more lethargic types: “We will be victorious, because we must be victorious, for otherwise there would be no sense anymore to world history.”
It was on the “wonder weapons” that the Germans, at home and the front, now pinned their remaining hopes. Many letters home from the front show that they continued to have faith that these weapons would change the course of the war at the eleventh hour.
In view of the Allied superiority, this applied especially to the troops in the west. Where a cohesive group of soldiers with previous combat experience could be found, or where a unit with a tradition or a reputation still existed, the Allies could certainly count on stiff opposition. This was the case for most of the motorized divisions and also some of the infantry and paratroop divisions. Other units, however, bad been cobbled together out of diverse groups from all branches of the service, of differing age groups and often varying degrees of fitness. Amongst this latter category were many of the “static”, security and reserve divisions, from whom a lot less heroism could be expected.
World History
