At the time of the landing, von Rundstedt’s staff disposed altogether over 60 divisions. This represented an increase of 10 major units since mid-1943. What might at first sight seem an imposing array can easily be put into better perspective on closer examination. Over the same period, the proportion of still-incomplete divisions increased correspondingly. About 20 “static” units, and many of the Panzer divisions had only arrived in France and Belgium during the course of spring 1944, Their equipment and manpower states were particularly problematical for the C-in-C West, as was the transfer to the Eastern Front in March 1944 of the II SS Panzer corps and its two combat-ready units. Even later, when all indications pointed to an imminent invasion, the German leadership continued to withdraw motorized units from the west, some units stationed northwest of Orleans leaving C-in-C West s control as late as June 4. The would have been particularly useful only two days later when they could have been employed in attacking Allied troops in Normandy. These events only go to show that Hitler’s vision of an enemy airborne landing in the Normandy region was nothing more than a passing fancy.
Yet although motorized units were still leaving the west up to the last moment, the Germans were still able to field about 1,600 tanks, all at least equal to those of the Allies in firepower and mobility.
Most of the 10 motorized units in the region were stationed close to the Channel, mainly in the central area between Holland and the Seine. South of the Seine, however, there was only the 21st Panzer Division around Caen and two further units (12th SS Panzer and Panzer Lehr) at least 62 miles (100km) from the Normandy coast. Here, where the Allies would soon land, the LXXXIV Army Corps would have to put up the best defense it could with six divisions and numerous independent anti-tank, tank, air landing, artillery and “Ost” battalions (battalions composed of eastern European nationalities).
World History
