In the afternoon of November 12, 1916, the 2nd Company, with a heavy machine-gun platoon attached, was ordered to move down the east slope of the Lesului and take the village of Valarii. At the same time the remainder of the battalion was to move down the western slope in two columns and attack the same objective. There was plenty of sunshine on the Lesului, but on our way down we ran into a heavy fog; I was obliged to feel my way down a valley-bound path by means of a compass. It was not long before we began to hear voices coming from the valley; we did not know if they were commands or merely conversation.
Not far below and to the left a Rumanian battery was firing at the Vulcan Pass. Our position was such that we might bump into the enemy in the fog at any moment. With strong advance, flank and rear guards, we felt our way down the grassy slope. All talking was forbidden.
By the time the fog lifted it was getting dark. Some thousand yards ahead in the valley we could see a long, narrow village consisting of single houses. Valarii or Kurpenul? Field glasses allowed us to distinguish small groups at various places, probably soldiers. Sentries were apparently stationed at the entrances to the village which lay within ten minutes' march of our halting place.
I considered it inadvisable to continue the march or to attack before establishing contact on both flanks or without awaiting the arrival of supporting units. My decision was to prepare to attack the village while awaiting the establishment of more complete flank liaison. To avoid giving our position to the enemy, I withheld all reconnaissance forward and decided to rely on keen visual observation.
I kept my outfit ready for an attack on the village in case our support came up before dark. We remained concealed in small depressions and clumps of bushes until dark when I ordered the organization of a hedgehog defensive position, sent out my security elements and sat down to await developments. All sentries were instructed to alert us as soon as the other units came up or whenever they heard any suspicious sounds. In this manner we got a few hours' sleep by lying on our arms.
Shortly before midnight we heard the flank units of our battalion coming down the slope. I alerted my men and, in the bright moonlight, we slipped through the underbrush toward the village of Kurpenul-Valarii with the heavy machine-gun platoon disposed on the left to give us fire support. The forward elements reached the edge of the village without difficulty, and reported that they could find neither hide nor hair of the enemy. On the other hand, shots occasionally rang out on the right near the neighbouring column. We moved cautiously into the village and then brought up the machine-gun platoon.
The various farmhouses were inhabited, with all members of a family sleeping around their fireplaces covered with blankets and furs. The air in those rooms was thick enough to cut with a knife. We had considerable trouble in making ourselves understood by the natives. There were no signs of the enemy. A brief reconnaissance showed that we could convert the school-house and the two adjacent farm buildings into a good strong point. We got to work, and after sending out the necessary security elements, I took two runners and went to the western part of the village to find Major Sproesser and report. Other battalion units were settling down in the western part of the village from which the enemy had fled after the first exchange of rifle shots.
Major Sproesser divided the place into company sectors and we drew the eastern part of the village. We faced south with the 3rd Company on our right. Liaison to the left was to be established with the 156th Infantry after daybreak. We were still ignorant of the enemy location and dispositions. (Sketch 16)
I returned to my company around 0300. It was a coal-black night. My men were sleeping in the school-house. I awoke the subordinate commanders and we made a reconnaissance of our sector. Just east of our area a wooden bridge ran across the shallow Kurpenul, a brook some 150 feet wide, whose banks were lined with poplars and weeping willows. There were roads leading south on both sides of the stream. The map showed the eastern one to be the better of the two. There were some farmhouses near the bridge and the village extended some hundred yards west of the brook. A dense fog, similar to the ones we had encountered during the preceding days, enveloped us before we had posted our security details, which consisted of an NCO just west of the bridge and on the road leading through the village, and combat outposts to the east of the Kurpenul. I also dispatched liaison detachments to establish contact with the 3rd Company on our right and with the 156th Infantry on our left. When it finally grew light we found visibility restricted to sixty yards.
Before contact with our neighbours was established, Lance Corporal Bruckner reported that he had run into a company of Rumanians about half a mile southeast of our combat outpost. The Rumanians were closed up and had bayonets fixed, but had not discovered Bruckner's squad. Scarcely had I telephoned this report to the battalion when I received another report from the outpost at the bridge: “A Rumanian scout squad of six or eight men is in the fog some fifty yards to the rear of the outpost. Shall we open fire?”
While the company prepared for action, I hurried to the combat outpost. The high Rumanian fur cap made it easy to ascertain that we had enemy units roving in the area back of our outposts and I ordered a few company sharpshooters to open fire. We saw several drop with the first volley and the rest disappeared into the murk. A few minutes later lively rifle fire broke out to our left rear.
Other scout squads from the south reported that a strong Rumanian detachment was marching on the combat outpost east of the brook with its column head only a few hundred yards away. I quickly advanced one of my heavy machine guns toward the combat outpost and ordered it to sweep both sides of the road. This drew a few shots from the enemy and then all became quiet again.
So far we had not succeeded in establishing contact with the 3rd Company (to the right), and to all appearances a several-hundred-yard gap yawned between the companies. We could hear lively shouting to our right which indicated that the enemy was advancing on a broad front toward Valarii-Kurpenul.
In order to close the broad gap between ourselves and the 3rd Company, I started the company south along the west bank of the Kurpenul leaving the combat outpost and one heavy machine gun on the east bank at the bridge to protect our flank and rear. I
Sketch 16
The situation at Kurpenul-Valarii. View from the north.
Wanted to reach the south edge of Kurpenul where I hoped to find a favourable field of fire, and to use the open ground to establish contact with my neighbour on the right.
I went with the advance guard, consisting of one squad, and the remainder of the company followed 160 yards to the rear. The fog swirled hither and yon and the visibility varied between a hundred and three hundred feet. Shortly before the head of the column reached the south end of the village, it ran into a closed column of advancing Rumanians. In a few seconds we were engaged in a violent fight at fifty yards range. Our opening volley was delivered from a standing position and then we hit the dirt and looked for cover from the heavy enemy fire. The Rumanians outnumbered us at least ten to one. Rapid fire pinned them down, but a new enemy loomed on both flanks. He was creeping up behind bushes and hedges and firing as he approached. The advance guard was getting into a dangerous situation. It was holding a farmhouse to the right of the road, while the remainder of the company appeared to have taken cover in the farms some five hundred feet to the rear. The fog prevented it from supporting the advance guard. Should the company move forward, or should the advance guard retire? Since it was a question of asserting ourselves against a powerful superiority, the latter appeared to be the best thing to do, especially in view of the extremely limited visibility.
I ordered the advance guard to hold the farmhouse for an additional five minutes, and then to retire on the right side of the road through the farms and reach the company, which would furnish fire support from its position a hundred yards to the rear. I ran back down the road to the company; dense fog soon concealed me from aimed fire by the Rumanians. I quickly ordered a platoon of the company and a heavy machine gun to open fire on the area to the left and the advance guard began to drop back under this fire protection. The men were compelled to leave Private Kentner, who had been severely wounded, behind.
Figures loomed in the brook on our left and the stream was soon teeming with Rumanians. At the same time the combat outpost on the left became engaged in violent combat; its left flank was open and could be easily turned. On the right, at a considerable distance, another violent fire fight was in progress. We had not established contact with the 3rd Company. If the enemy attacked on the right, the company would be completely surrounded. The tales the Bavarian soldiers told us during our ascent of Hill 1794 came to mind. It must have been the same way with them!
My orders were: “1st Platoon holds the position under all conditions, 2nd Platoon remains under my control behind the right flank of the 1st Platoon!” With a few runners, I rushed off to the right to establish personal contact with the 3rd Company. For some two hundred yards we ran behind hedges and across open fields. Just as we were crossing a freshly ploughed plot of land we were fired on from a knoll some fifty to ninety yards to our right. The sharp reports were those of a carbine and that meant they were German. The furrows gave scant shelter and no amount of shouting and arm waving could convince them of the errors of their way. Luckily, their marksmanship was very poor. After a few anxious moments, a dense fog shrouded us and released us from this unhappy situation and allowed us to hurry back to the company. I gave up making further attempts at establishing contact with the 3rd Company; I now knew where some of its elements were located and I hoped to be able to close the 280 yard gap with my reserve platoon. But as is frequently the case in war, things turned out differently.
On my return to the village street I discovered that, contrary to orders, the 1st Platoon and the heavy machine gun had attacked the enemy. Judging from the sound of battle, they had fought their way to the southern edge of the town. However praiseworthy the initiative of the platoon commander and his men might be, a defence of the southern edge of Kurpenul in the fog and against a superior enemy seemed hopeless without first establishing contact with the right or left. It was a good thing the reserve platoon remained in its assigned area.
The noise of battle increased and, suspecting the worst, I hastened forward to the 1st Platoon. Halfway there I met the platoon commander, who breathlessly reported: “1st Platoon has driven the Rumanians back three hundred yards south of the village and shot up two Rumanian guns. At the moment the platoon is very hard pressed by a strong enemy who is but a few yards away. The platoon is nearly encircled, the heavy machine gun is shot up, the crew dead or wounded. Help must come immediately, or the platoon is finished.”
I was none too elated with this course of events. Why did the platoon fail to stay in its place as ordered? Should I commit my last reserves, as requested by the platoon leader? Under these conditions all of us might have been surrounded and crushed by superior numbers. Would such a loss have crippled the left flank of the Wurttemberg Mountain Battalion? No, as little as I liked it, I could not help the 1st Platoon.
I ordered the 1st Platoon to disengage immediately and fall back along the village road. The remainder of the company was disposed to cover the retirement of the platoon. Conditions for the disengagement from combat became more difficult for the sun was burning its way through the fog and visibility had increased to a hundred yards. Those were exciting moments. The 2nd Platoon went into position in the middle of the village on the double and fired on the dense masses of Rumanians who were attacking from the left front. Soon the remnants of the 1st Platoon began to shoot their way back, followed by a black mass of Rumanians. Rapid fire from the entire line brought part of the on-rushing foe to a standstill, but on the right and left the hostile mass swirled closer. We now felt the lack of the heavy machine gun which had been lost up forward.
The remnants of the 1st Platoon were rushed into the firing line. I hastened to the combat outpost on the other side of the bridge, found everything in order, took their available heavy machine gun and emplaced it in the most endangered place in the village (Sketch 17)
But the Rumanians did not give way. In spite of great losses they attacked repeatedly. Company headquarters was put in the firing line. Its leader, Sergeant Dallinger, went down with a bullet in the head. The fog continued to dissipate and we had our first opportunity to judge the enemy strength. Our next worry was ammunition supply. The left flank was wide open.
I reported the situation by telephone to Major Sproesser and urged the immediate dispatch of additional forces. A few minutes later Lieutenant Hohl arrived on the double with about fifty men. I moved this platoon behind the left flank with the mission of defending the left flank with a few squads, leaving the bulk under my control. Soon afterward the 6th Company came up and was held at my disposal, echeloned to the left rear. There was nothing more to fear.
Meanwhile, the 2nd Company had dug in under fire. The enemy withdrew slowly under our well-aimed carbine and heavy machine-gun fire. I probed his front with scouts. We had good visibility and reached the southern edge of the village again where we found the severely wounded men of the 1st Platoon. They had been robbed by the enemy of their few belongings, such as pocket watches and knives, but otherwise nothing had happened to them.
The improved visibility showed the southern edge of the villages to be a splendid commanding position. I moved the company there, reorganized it, and began to dig in. Another heavy machine-gun platoon arrived.
The enemy had disappeared but we continued to receive rifle fire from the far left. On the right lay the battery which the 1st Platoon had destroyed. As it turned out later, other battalion units had also fired on it.
Since no enemy was in the forward area, I went up with a small patrol and took a look at the battery. Krupp guns! German workmanship!
Soon Rumanian skirmish lines reappeared in the south and approached our position. They were still over two thousand yards away as wave after wave rose out of the ground. All sections of the company now had good cover so we waited in quiet concealment as the enemy advanced. When the first wave came within five hundred yards range, I gave the order to fire at will. This stopped the attack cold and we suffered no losses in the ensuing fire fight. The heavy machine guns had many excellent targets. As night fell the enemy retreated. Company patrols took a few dozen captives in the
Sketch 17
Fighting in Kurpenul Village.
Forward area and the company prepared for the night. Advance scout squads failed to locate the enemy. The company dug trenches, and some soldiers looked around for a fat roast.
We were sad about the losses in the company which totalled seventeen wounded and three dead.
Like the 2nd Company, the other units of the Wurttemberg Mountain Battalion stood fast at Valarii-Kurpenul, on the right wing of
The Kuhne group. They had had much to do with the complete success of this thrust across the mountain. On the Rumanian side hundreds of dead covered the field including a Rumanian divisional commander. This battle opened the road into Wallachia and we pounded on the heels of the beaten enemy. Two days later the Wurttemberg Mountain Battalion entered Targiu Jiu.
Observations: In a dense fog the re-formed 2nd Company, on the afternoon of November 12, made the descent with security elements on all sides (advance guard, flank guards, and rear guard). The situation was most obscure, and the enemy might have been encountered at any moment. To spare the troops, an evening rest in combat formation (hedgehog defence, rifle at hand, scouts out front) was permitted.
The importance of combat reconnaissance and establishment of contact with neighbours is impressively demonstrated by the events on November 13. Without the prompt knowledge of the advance of strong Rumanian forces, the reinforced 2nd Company would have been crushed by the hostile mass in the fog.
The first combat outpost opened up with machine-gun fire in the direction of the advancing enemy. This clarified the situation rapidly and gave the 2nd Company time to close the large gap on the right.
In the encounter of the advance guard with the hostile forces in the dense fog on the southern edge of Kurpenul, a bayonet fight did not develop, but a fire fight did. Why? With our inferiority in numbers a bayonet fight would have been inadvisable. We would have been cut and shot to pieces by the superior manpower of the enemy. But the rapid fire of a few riflemen hindered the attack of the tenfold superior enemy.
Both the advance guard and later the 1st Platoon shot their way through the fog back to units in position. In this they were very strongly supported by the fire these units delivered into the fog in the area between the village street and the Kurpenul brook which swept along close beside the line of retreat.
It is very easy to be fired on by one's own troops in combat in a fog. Here, as once before on the Briere farm, neither shouts nor signals managed to stop the fire.
The extremely difficult situation in the village battle against a very superior enemy was overcome by committing the last men at the focal point of the defence and by moving up forces from other less endangered places. The leader must be very active in such situations.
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