By early August the German commanders in France realized that the game was up and were convinced that only a withdrawal to the Seine could save them from annihilation. The Allies were present in the theater in a great superiority of numbers and material, and could prevent German reserves and supplies from moving into the area. After Cobra, the Americans had ample room in which to use these advantages to decisive effect. Once again, Hitler disagreed. He perceived a great opportunity. On August 2 he ordered von Kluge to allow the Americans to pour into Brittany unchecked, then assemble every Panzer unit in Normandy to make a counterattack intended to retake Avranches and cut the lifelines to Patton’s forces. In vain the German commanders argued that if they took all the Panzers away from the area south of Caen, they would lose Falaise. Hitler was adamant. Only the battered 12th SS Panzer Division remained facing the British and Canadians before Falaise. In an area east of Mortain the Germans assembled the Fifth Panzer Army, consisting of the 1st, 2nd and 9th SS Panzers, and the 2nd and 116th Panzer Divisions, which, in total, had only 250 tanks. The German forces not involved in the attack on Avranches must, as always, stand firm and not retreat, relying on willpower to resist the enemy when materiel means were insufficient.
The preparations of Fifth Panzer Army were spotted by Allied aircraft, and Bradley reacted. He deployed five infantry divisions between Vire and Mortain, backed up by two armored combat commands and three more divisions around St. Hilaire. Driven by Hitler’s insistence, protesting at the lack of time to prepare, and of materiel, the Fifth Panzer Army attacked on August 7. On the northern flanks 116th Panzer was checked by the US VII Corps pushing south from Vire and St. Sever. The 2nd Panzer Division advanced between Sourdeval and Mortain, gaining seven miles (11km) before it was stopped by encountering Combat Command B of the 3rd Armored Division. The 1st and 2nd SS Panzer Divisions to the south made less progress, because the 30th Division, deployed around Mortain, held on to hilltop positions which gave them good observation. The infantry of the SS Panzer divisions made repeated attempts to seize the hilltops, but the 30th Division would not be dislodged.
On August 7 the advance of FiftJi Panzer Army had been covered by mist, but on the 8th the weather was clear. Allied tactical aircraft slaughtered the tanks and half-tracks of the Fifth Panzer Army as it struggled to move westwards. The VII Corps applied such pressure from the north that 116th Panzer was unable to advance at all. On the southern flank, Combat Commands of the 2nd and 3rd Armored Divisions moved northeast towards Ger and Domfront, to menace the rear of 1st and 2nd SS Panzer. By dusk on August 8 it was obvious to the German commanders in Normandy that the counteroffensive had failed, and that Fifth Panzer Army was in grave danger. But Hitler insisted on exerting control of his armies, and ordered a renewed attack on Avranches, oblivious of the danger.
Even as Fifth Panzer Army attacked westwards, the jaws of the pocket were developing. Part of Patton’s Third Army was moving north on Eisenhower’s orders, to advance in the direction of Alen9on, the main supply depot of Seventh Army, Argentan and Falaise. By August 9 leading elements of the US XV Corps were only five miles (8km) from Falaise. In the north, the First Canadian Army, south of Caen, made an ingenious attack on the night of August 7. The plan for Operation Totalize W2s drawn by Gen. Simonds, commander of II Canadian Corps. He decided that the attack must be made without any artillery preparation, to gain surprize. The advance would be at night, in order to deprive the enemy of the advantage of the superior range of the 88s. For the first three miles (5km), all movement would be in vehicles, formed up in close columns four tanks wide. The infantry would travel in the hulls of self-propelled guns with the artillery pieces removed; anyone on foot was to be regarded as hostile. After three miles (5km), the infantry would dismount and attack the second line of enemy defenses.
The flanks of the main axis, which ran along the Caen-Falaise road, would be bombed by strategic aircraft of RAF Bomber Command. Tracer fire, star-shells, searchlights and radio beams were to give directional guidance. The 2nd Canadian Division would attack west of the road, and the 51st Highland Division to the east. At dawn American heavy and medium bombers would attack enemy positions to assist a further advance by the 4th Canadian and 1st Polish Armoured Divisions. Facing the attack were the 272nd Division, the 89th Division, recently arrived from Norway, and, in reserve, the 12th SS Panzer Division. The advance began at 00:30 on August 8, and, inevitably, there was apprehension and confusion, as described by Ian Hammerton, who was there commanding a troop of flail tanks: “To say that we were apprehensive is an understatement. Tanks are almost blind at night... there were more dry mouths and butterfly stomachs than at any time previously including D-Day. We trundled forward, all eyes straining to see. As we reached the near edge of the German positions, our visibility was reduced to zero - so much smoke and dust that it was impossible to see even the pin-point red rear lights of the tank in front. We proceeded by fits and starts, the radio filled with messages of bewilderment. I found there were no tanks in front of me. The next moment we plunged into a giant crater.”
But despite the obvious difficulties, the tempo of the advance was maintained. The German position was broken, the 272nd and 89th Divisions had collapsed. The 12th SS Panzer sent forward two Kampfgruppen which delayed the 4th Canadian and 1st Polish Divisions, whilst their comrades fell back to a new line on the River Laison, seven miles (11km) north of Falaise.
The Canadians forced the Laison on August 14. On this occasion they used smoke to blind the German anti-tank guns, and attacked in phalanxes of tanks and tracked infantry carriers. Strong tactical air support, helped them close in to within 3 miles (5km) of Falaise.
To the west of the Canadian sector, the British Second Army was pushing southeastwards through the tangled hills of the Suisse Normande. The pocket was forming. By August 16 when the Canadians captured Falaise, most of the Seventh Army was still west of the Orne. On the following day Hitler authorized a withdrawal to a new defensive line on the east bank of the Orne, but it was too late. On the same day the 4th Canadian and 1st Polish Divisions swung wide to the eastern flank and crossed the Dives. The US V Corps moved north through the XV and attacked towards Chambois and Trun on the Dives. The German Seventh Army and Fifth Panzer Army were trapped in a pocket 20 miles by 20 miles (32km x 32km), surrounded by higher ground: 100,000 soldiers, the remains of 20 divisions, were caught in an arena overlooked from all sides.
The Germans did not give up easily. To the south they used the Foret de la Grande Goufifern to delay the advance north of the Americans. They attempted to break out of the pocket eastwards by forcing a way across the Dives and through the Auge Hills beyond. The II SS Panzer Corps made two attempts to break into the pocket from Vimoutiers, to establish a safe exit. But the 4th Canadian Division had seized the crossing over the Dives. The Poles had occupied high ground on Mont Ormel, and could not be driven off it, even when reduced to fighting armor with bayonets and bare hands because they were out of ammunition. South of the Poles, near Exmes, were the tanks of the Tactical Group de Langlade, part of the French 2nd Division. They too enjoyed commanding views of the pocket, its exits and the retreating German forces.
Eventually only one ford and narrow track was still open to the Germans evacuating the area, and it was under concentrated artillery and air attack. By August 19 this route was so choked with wrecked vehicles, corpses and dead horses that it was impassable. Ever since that day it has been known as the “Couloir de Mort”, the corridor of death. In the evening of the 19th the Poles, Americans and Canadians met in Cham-bois. For three more days the Germans inside and outside the pocket continued the fight, then they gave up. On August 22 the II SS Panzer Corps was ordered to join a general retirement towards the Seine. By that time the leading elements of US Third Army had already crossed that river in two places.
The Falaise pocket completed the ruin of the German Army in Normandy. The Allies took 50,000 prisoners and estimated they had destroyed 5,000 armored vehicles and tanks in the area. The German Army had lost 400,000 men in the campaign, and was in full retreat. They did not stop running until they reached the Vosges hills in the east and the canals east of Antwerp in the north.
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