In reviewing the operations during the ten days of fighting in July, one notes a marked advance in the Israel Defence Forces, as the Air Force grew with the acquisition of some Messerschmitt fighters from Czechoslovakia and three B-17 Flying Fortresses (which, during this period of fighting, bombed Cairo and Damascus). Gradually, the Israeli infantry were beginning to learn how to fight with armoured and artillery support. An army was gradually being forged out of a partisan force, in the very heat of battle.
Meanwhile, Count Bernadotte, the United Nations mediator, was actively pushing his proposals, which would have removed the Negev from Israel, giving it western Galilee in return; would have passed Ramie and Lod back to Arab rule; and would have placed Jerusalem and the international airport at Lod under United Nations control. The Israeli Government realized that, as long as the Negev was cut off from the centre of Israel, it would be impossible to fight these political proposals. It was clear that the ring closing the Negev (which was, however, not tight enough to prevent Israeli units infiltrating each night past the Egyptian positions) must be broken and the region firmly linked back to Israel. Then, on 17 September, after signing the report to the Security Council in which he put forward new proposals that included granting ‘enforcement ability’ to the United Nations representatives. Count Bernadotte was
Driving through Jerusalem to Government House, which was in an area recognized by both sides as a demilitarized zone, as declared by the United Nations, when his convoy was halted in the Katamon quarter. A jeep blocked the road, three men jumped out and opened fire, killing Bernadotte and a French assistant. The assailants, who were generally assumed to be Jewish, escaped and were never apprehended, but David Ben-Gurion decided to take advantage of the shock brought about by the murder, and to act forcefully. The Irgun, which had continued to exist independently in Jerusalem (unlike in other parts of Israel), was ordered to disband within 24 hours and to hand over its arms to the Israel Defence Forces. Some 200 members of Lehi, including its leaders and commanders, were detained.
The international reaction to the murder of Count Bernadotte placed Israel in a very difficult position politically. What were recommendations in his report now became a political testament, with added emphasis. Israel faced a delicate situation. Indeed, Israel’s hands might have been tied by fear of the international reaction to the murder had the Egyptians not intervened in a manner that solved Israel’s Negev problem. They persisted in an obstinate refusal to allow Israeli convoys free passage into the Negev, contrary to the conditions of the truce — hence, Israeli military operations became justified. So the lack of appreciation on the part of the Egyptians of the very difficult situation in which the murder of Bernadotte had placed the Israelis opened the way for the Israeli operations that were finally to dislodge and defeat the Egyptian Army.
The Israel Defence Forces had, in the meantime, been reorganized into four regional commands: the northern front under Brigadier-General Moshe Carmel; the central fronc under Brigadier-General Dan Even; Jerusalem and the Corridor under Brigadier-General Zvi Ayalon; and the southern region under Brigadier-General Yigal Allon.