It was early October in the magnificent countryside of Carinthia —where the Wurttemberg Mountain Infantry Battalion had been sent by the roundabout way of Macedonia — when I again assumed command of my detachment. The casualties suffered on Mount Cosna had now been made good by replacements; moreover, the fire-power of the rifle companies had been significantly increased by the introduction of a new light machine gun. Our short time in this rest camp was given over to thorough training in the use of this new weapon.
We had no idea what the Army High Command had in store for us. The Isonzo front?
Since Italy's entry into the war in May of 1915, the chief operational objective of the Italian army had been the capture of Trieste. In the course of two years of warfare, ten battles had taken place along the lower course of the Isonzo, during which the Austrian forces had slowly but persistently been pushed backwards. In the sixth battle the Italians had gained a foothold on the east bank of the river near Gorizia and had taken the city itself. (Sketch 36)
For the eleventh Isonzo battle, which began in August, 1917, General Luigi Cadorna patterned his offensive on the Western Front model. Supported by 500 guns, 50 divisions attacked on the narrow front between Gorizia and the sea. By fine fighting the worthy Austrian troops nullified the Italians' initial success, but in the second part of the battle the Italians crossed the middle reaches of the Isonzo and took the high plateau of Bainsizza where, by exerting their supreme efforts, our allies succeeded in halting the attack. This all-out attack lasted until the beginning of September when things quieted down and Cadorna began to get ready for the Twelfth Isonzo Battle. The newly won territory east of the middle reaches of the Isonzo materially improved the Italian prospects for the next battle and their objective, Trieste, was finally within reach. The Austrians did not feel equal to meeting this new attack and they were obliged to ask for German help. In spite of the tremendous expenditure of forces in the battles in the west (Flanders and Verdun), the German High Command sent an army consisting of seven battle-tried divisions. A combined German and Austrian offensive on the upper Isonzo front was to effect the desired relief. The objective was to throw the Italians back across the imperial boundary, and, if possible, across the Tagliamento. (Sketch 37)
The Wurttemberg Mountain Battalion joined the newly created Fourteenth Army and was attached to the Alpine Corps. On October 18 we began our approach march to the front from assembly areas in the vicinity of Krainburg. In pitch-dark nights, often in streaming rains, Major Sproesser's Group (Wurttemberg Mountain Battalion and the Wurttemberg Mountain Howitzer Detachment No. 4) moved via Bischoflak, Salilog, and Podbordo to Kneza, which was reached on October 21. Because of enemy aerial reconnaissance each prescribed march objective had to be reached before daybreak, at which time all men and animals had to be concealed in the most uncomfortable and inadequate accommodations imaginable. These night marches made great demands on the poorly fed troops.
My detachment consisted of three mountain companies and a machine-gun company, and I usually marched on foot with my staff at the head of the long column. Kneza was about five miles east of the battle-front near Tolmein. In the afternoon of October 21, Major Sproesser and his detachment commanders reconnoitred the assigned assembly area for the attack. This area was on the north slope of the Buzenika mountain (509) a mile south of Tol-mein. The slope itself dropped sharply down to the Isonzo.
A very strong and lively harassing fire from several Italian batteries situated in elevated and commanding positions was ranging far and wide behind our front. It appeared that the Italians had
Sketch 36
11th Battle of the Isonzo, August, 1917.
Ammunition to spare. The deployment of the battalion — now eleven companies strong — in this rugged, nearly impassable terrain allotted to us, would be extremely difficult. Only the scree-covered talus slopes and a few gullies falling off precipitously to the Isonzo offered any possibilities for troop concentrations. It was disquieting to note that the enemy, from his commanding position on Mrzli peak northwest of Tolmein, could observe the entire northern slope of the Buzenika nearly straight-on. Also, we had to reckon with rocks cascading down the slope from artillery hits. The battalion would have to remain deployed in this area for some thirty hours. Would this be inviting trouble?
Sketch 37
Strategic Attack Plan of the 14th Army.
We would have to put up with these unfavourable conditions— there was no alternative — since the mass of troops now concentrating in the Tolmein basin was simply too great. We turned back toward battalion headquarters from this dismal reconnaissance — skirting some lively Italian artillery fire directed principally on the ravines near St. Luzia and Baza di Medreja. Our knowledge of the overall operational plan was considerably less than that of a Czech traitor who deserted to the enemy on this day, taking with him a collection of maps and orders pertaining to the Tolmein offensive.
The battalion moved into this final assembly area during the night of October 22-23. Huge searchlights from the Italian positions on the heights of the Kolovrat and Jeza illuminated our way. Heavy artillery fire frequently struck among us and the powerful and dazzling searchlight beams forced us to lie motionless for minutes at a time. As soon as they swept past, we hurried through the endangered area. During this advance we all received the impression of having come into the effective range of an exceptionally active and well equipped enemy.
The pack animals had to be left behind on the east slope of Buzenika mountain. It was shortly after midnight that my detachment, heavily laden with machine guns and ammunition, reached its assembly area on the scree slope. It had been an exhausting climb. We dropped our loads and everyone rejoiced in having come through unscathed. Rest was out of the question for the remaining hours of darkness had to be used in digging and finding concealment. I assigned the companies their sectors. The staff and two rifle companies dug in on the western edge of the twenty to forty yard wide scree slope which was bisected by a narrow path and had some defilade from the northwest. The two remaining companies occupied a narrow gully a hundred yards to the east. Everyone, officers and men, worked feverishly and dawn presented a lifeless slope. The soldiers tried to make up lost sleep in foxholes covered with shrubbery and branches.
But this peaceful quiet did not last long. The Italian heavy artillery soon paid us a visit and sent rocks rumbling past us on their way to the Isonzo. Sleep was again out of the question and we began to wonder if the enemy had perceived our preparation and was adjusting his fire. Heavy artillery fire on this roof-steep slope would have had a devastating effect.
The fire lasted a few minutes and then quieted down only to come to life fifteen minutes later in a different place. Then we had quiet for a while.
The Italian artillery shifted its main activity to the Isonzo valley. In the course of the day we observed the powerful effect of heavy calibre guns against the installations and approach roads near Tolmein. In contrast to the Italians, our artillery fired at rare intervals. I was much concerned regarding the welfare of the men entrusted to me and the day passed very slowly.
A few steps to the west, off the sheltered path that ran through our position, we had an excellent view of the enemy front line in the valley. It crossed the Isonzo a mile and a half west of Tolmein and then ran south of the river just east of St. Daniel to the easternmost edge of Woltschach. The line, and particularly the wire entanglements, appeared to be well constructed. The murky weather precluded our studying the other hostile positions.
The second Italian line supposedly crossed the Isonzo in the region of Selisce—six miles northwest of Tolmein—and ran south of the river across the Hevnik height toward Jeza. The third and probably the strongest enemy line had been established upon the heights south of the Isonzo following the line Matajur (1641), Mrzli (1356), Golobi, Kuk (1243), Hill 1192, Hill 1114, then bending sharply southwest over Clabuzzaro toward Mount Hum. These positions were known from aerial photographs. On the terrain between these defensive lines, there were said to be isolated strong points. (Sketches 38 and 39)
Sketch 38
Attack of the 14th Army. View from the northeast.
The forces of the Fourteenth Army were disposed as follows:
The Kraus Group ready at Flitsch (22nd Imperial and Royal Infantry Division; Edelweiss Division; 55th Imperial and Royal Division; and the German Jager Division) with the thrust point above Saga on the Stol.
The Stein Group near Tolmein and in the bridgehead position south of Tolmein (12th Infantry Division; Alpine Corps; 117th Infantry Division) was to execute the main attack. The 12th Division was to break through to Karfreit in the valley on both sides
Sketch 39
Attack objectives of the 14th Army in the Tolmein Sector.
Of the Isonzo; the Alpine Corps was to capture the positions on the heights south of the Isonzo—especially Hill 1114, Kuk, and Matajur.
Adjoining on the south, the Berrer group (200th and 26th Infantry Divisions) was disposed against Cividale via Jeza and St. Martino.
Still farther south the Scotti group (1st Imperial and Royal Division and 5th Infantry Division) was to take the positions south of Jeza, and later Globocak and Mount Hum.
In the Alpine Corps sector in the bridgehead position north of the Isonzo, the Bavarian Infantry Life Guards and the 1st Jager Regiment had relieved the Austrians in the front line.
The attack objective of the Life Guards: The road leading to Golobi, Luico and Matajur via Kovak, Hevnik, Hill 1114 and Kolovrat Ridge.
Attack objective of the 1st Jager Regiment: Heights west of Woltschach, Knoll 732, Hill 1114 from the southeast.
The Wurttemberg Mountain Battalion had the mission of protecting the right flank of the Life Guards, of taking the hostile batteries near Foni, and of following the Life Guards to the Matajur.
Towards evening on October 23, the weather became overcast and hazy. As soon as darkness fell, the pack animals brought up rations to the assembly area. When we had eaten our fill, everyone retired to the foxholes and sought to store up some sleep for the coming days on the attack. A fine rain set in after midnight and forced us to draw our shelter halves over our heads. Attack weather!
Observations: Even the approach march and the preparation for the attack at Tolmein made great demands on the troops. In strenuous night marches, usually in pouring rain, the Karawanken mountains were traversed, a total air line distance of sixty-three miles. By day the troops lay concealed from hostile aviation in very restricted shelter. Rations were scanty and monotonous, but despite all that, morale was high. In three years of war the troops had learned to endure hardships without losing their resiliency.
In the advance to the assembly area in the night of October 22-23, a reserve of machine-gun ammunition in belts was carried by the machine-gun company and units of the mountain companies. The Mount Cosna fighting had made the difficulty of ammunition supply in the mountains very clear.
Since strong enemy fire attacks had to be coped with in the assembly area, the troops dug in during the night and camouflaged the new installations carefully before daybreak.
It was impossible to supply the troops in the assembly area by day and hot food was brought up after dark.
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