As the full significance of the deteriorating military situation dawned on the Soviet leadership, it became clear to them that the time had come to halt the fighting and to take full advantage of the Egyptian achievements to date. Kosygin assured Sadat that the Soviet Union was prepared, if necessary on its own, to guarantee a cease-fire. The Soviets by now realized that the entire gamble was at risk, and that once again they were in danger of facing a total Arab military collapse. It was clear to them that, given a few more days, the Egyptian Third Army would be doomed, and this in turn could have a direct effect on Sadat’s chances of survival. Accordingly, Ambassador Dobrynin of the Soviet Union brought a message from Brezhnev to Kissinger, asking him to fly to Moscow for urgent consultations. During the meeting in Moscow, Kissinger agreed on the necessity for an immediate cease-fire, but insisted that it must, as opposed to previous occasions, be linked to peace talks. At 21.00 hours in the evening of 20 October, the telephone next to Sadat’s chair in the war room rang to advise him that Soviet Ambassador Vladimir Vinogradoff requested an urgent meeting to deliver a message from Brezhnev, meeting at the moment with Kissinger in Moscow. Within half an hour Vinogradoff presented the message to Sadat in which Brezhnev requested him to agree to an immediate cease-fire and attached the resolution that the two superpowers were planning to submit to the Security Council, which was about to be convened. The note included also a reiteration of the Soviet undertaking to guarantee the cease-fire in the event of Israeli violation. Brezhnev clearly undertook to transfer Soviet troops to Egypt in order to maintain the cease-fire, and hints about this undertaking were made but a few days later both by Sadat and Heikal.*
In Israel, there was great scepticism about a cease-fire. Few believed that one was imminent. Addressing the editors of the press whom he met every second day during the war, Dayan on 20 October saw no prospect of a cease-fire. Visiting Sharon’s division on 21 October, Deputy Prime Minister Yigal Allon assured them that they had ample time and that there was no hurry.
Following the agreement on the text of the proposed Security Council resolution to be submitted by the Soviet Union and the United States, Kissinger flew from Moscow to Tel Aviv and obtained Israel’s agreement. The Security Council met at dawn on Monday morning, 22 October, and passed Security Council Resolution No. 338, calling for a cease-fire within twelve hours, and not later than 18.52 hours on the evening of the 22nd. Shortly before the cease-fire was to take effect, the weapon whose introduction to the Middle East had led to the final decision to go to war was activated for the first time anywhere in the world. On that day, according to Sadat, a scud missile was launched against Israel. It landed in the desert of the Sinai.
The Israeli push forward was now becoming urgent. The paratroopers in Sharon’s division ran into very heavy resistance as they moved northward towards Ismailia, sustaining casualties from infantry and artillery forces. The attack was now taking place along the sweet-water canal and along the main Ismailia-Suez road (‘Havit’) to the west. Egyptian commandos blocked the advance, and Reshefs brigade lost tanks in the battle at a sewage farm on the outskirts of the town. As the bridges on the main road and across the sweet-water canal were being taken, the cease-fire came into force and Sharon’s division was ordered to remain in place.
Adan, to the south, launched his forces in a pincer movement in order to clear the shores of the Little Bitter Lake and the routes running alongside it. Amir’s brigade moved along the Geneifa Hills down to the routes along the lake, while Arieh Keren advanced along ‘Asor’ route to the ‘Havit’ road in the-direction of Lituf. A third southerly prong in the form of Nir’s brigade pushed along the main Cairo road (‘Sarag’) in the direction of Suez, turned in a north-easterly direction along the connecting ‘Akal’ road and headed for Mina, half-way along the Canal between the two lakes and Suez. The Egyptian Third Army was now fighting desperately along the two main routes, ‘Asor’ and ‘Sarag’, leading to Suez from Cairo, and mounted counterattacks against Nir’s and Keren’s forces as they advanced. The Israelis enjoyed complete mastery of the air now that the surface-to-air missile danger had to a great degree been removed by the destruction of the sites, so the Israeli Air Force were able to knock out the tanks blocking the advance. On orders from Bar-Lev, Adan concentrated two brigades in an attack on ‘Asor’. In the afternoon, he issued orders to his three brigades to storm the enemy forces and reach the Canal before 18.00 hours. Abandoning caution, the forces charged
* Mohammed Hassanein Heikal, Editor of Al Ahram and Sadat’s principal adviser.
Forward, breaking into the line of camps along the Little Bitter Lake and reaching the Canal. The Egyptian resistance broke, and thousands of their troops withdrew in disorder.
The cease-fire on the evening of the 22nd found the Egyptian Third Army with its main supply lines cut, with thousands of troops fleeing in disorder, with entire formations and units cut off and with the forces in the bridgehead on the east of the Canal in considerable danger. The Army’s main headquarters was cut off from its rear headquarters; in many places, panic reigned as units tried to flee; in other parts, the local commanders organized their units to breakout. In the 19th Division area, the commander transferred units to the west bank and particularly into the town of Suez, where large numbers who had been cut off were already fleeing. Urgent requests were directed to the Egyptian forces pressing from the direction of Cairo to support the forces cut off in the pocket.
By midday on 22 October, the commander of the 19th Division informed General Wassel, the Third Army commander, that the cutting of the Cairo-Suez road at ‘Kilometre 109’ by the Israeli forces meant in effect that the Army was cut off and isolated. For his part, Wassel made it clear immediately thereafter to the Minister of War that it was surrounded, cut off from supplies, and in danger of complete destruction.
Thus, as opposed to the position along the Egyptian Second Army front, where the cease-fire was being observed, numerous Egyptian units in the Third Army area, who had been cut off one from the other, were endeavouring to join together or break out. As dawn broke, those units on the east bank began to engage the Israeli forces who were facing them from the old Egyptian ramparts on the west bank. The orders to the Israeli forces were to respect the cease-fire, but, if the Egyptians were to break it, then they were to deal with the attacks and continue with their mission. As the Egyptian forces attacked in a desperate effort to escape from the Israeli trap, fighting broke out along the entire front. Gonen issued orders to Adan and Magen to deploy their divisions in such a way as to tighten the noose.
Deploying two brigades, those of Amir and Keren, on a seven-and-a-half-mile front westwards from Mina, Adan’s forces pushed southwards in a concerted armoured attack towards the town of Suez. They passed through an area teeming with large numbers of tanks, thousands of infantry, administrative units and supply trains moving round in confusion, numerous anti-tank missile positions and a very heavy concentration of surface-to-air missile batteries. The shock of the armoured punch broke the Egyptian resistance, and Adan’s force stormed southwards to the town of Suez, cutting it off from Third Army completely. A large number of surface-to-air missile sites were captured, and thousands of prisoners fell into Israeli hands.
Magen moved down towards Suez along Adan’s west flank, leaving a small unit of tanks at ‘Kilometre 101’ on the Cairo-Suez road to protect his west flank in the event of a counterattack from the direction of Cairo. (Kilometre 101 was to be the site of the disengagement talks between the Israeli and Egyptian military leadership, which were ultimately to lead to
The disengagement of Israeli forces from the Egyptian forces and their subsequent withdrawal to the east bank.) Magen’s division moved through Adan’s forces along the main Suez road and then around the slopes of Jebel Ataka, which dominates the entire area southwards to the port of
Adabiah, and charged along the route southwards. Dan Shomron’s brigade led the push to Adabiah and, despite the fact that his brigade strength was now down to seventeen tanks, he covered a distance of 30 miles between 14.00 hours and midnight. As dawn broke, Shomron’s brigade entered the port of Adabiah. Two Egyptian torpedo-boats raced out of the harbour in a desperate attempt to escape. Shomron’s tanks opened fire and sank them.
On the morning of the 24th, with the Egyptian forces still fighting, Adan, following advice from Dayan, asked for permission to attack the town of Suez. Gonen’s reaction was: Tf it is empty, okay. If it is strongly held, no.’ Keren’s brigade advanced along the main boulevard of the Cairo road into Suez, capturing the army camps on the outskirts of the city. He was followed by a battalion of paratroopers and, as the tanks moved into the town, they were fired on from all the buildings. This operation, which had been envisaged as a routine mopping-up against a disintegrating enemy, had not been properly prepared. Somehow or other, the tank force managed to extricate itself from the city along the coastal road, but the two groups of paratroopers became cut off in the centre of the city. One unit comprising 70 men managed to slip out under darkness of night and make its way through the dark alleyways and narrow side streets, trying to move without making a sound and carrying the wounded back to the Israeli lines. One of the wounded in this group was the battalion commander himself. In the second group, the commander of the force was wounded and semi-conscious. His place was taken by a company commander who did not want to evacuate because the Egyptians dominated their position. For four hours through the night, in an incredible exchange, Gonen personally coaxed and cajoled the company commander into leaving his position and making a dash for freedom. At first there was the nerve-racking process of getting the besieged unit to identify on air photographs where it was. After a period of trial and error, Gonen finally identified the actual building. He then planned an artillery box in the centre of which the besieged unit would move until it reached freedom. After hours of planning and urging on the radio, the company commander finally took the plunge and led the besieged forces quietly out, moving from street to street under the directions of Gonen as he read an air photograph, back to the Israeli lines. The attack on Suez proved to be a very grave error indeed, costing some 80 killed.
Viewed from the Egyptian point of view, the situation now was desperate. The Israeli forces had completed the isolation of Third Army units on the east bank of the Canal, and had cut them off from the Army Command Headquarters located on the west bank — indeed, Israeli tanks attacked and destroyed the HQ of General Abd al Moneim Wassel, who saved himself in the nick of time. In all, a force of some 45,000 officers and men, and 250 tanks, together with the city of Suez, were completely cut off. Furthermore, all the forces no longer enjoyed the protection of the surface-to-air missile system, and were easy prey for the continued attacks mounted by the Israeli Air Force. The Egyptian Chief of Staff, General Shazli, describes how massive concentrated attacks by the Israeli Air Force on 24 October, mounted against Third Army, destroyed all the crossing equipment left in the army area on the Canal, thus preventing any effective withdrawal of the forces from the east bank to the west.
The elements of Third Army under siege included the 7th Infantry Division commanded by Brigadier-General Ahmed Badawy, holding the northern portion of the east bank bridgehead, and the 19th Infantry Division commanded by Brigadier-General Yussef Afifi, holding the southern half of the bridgehead and also responsible for the city of Suez. Also in the bridgehead were two independent tank brigades and miscellaneous other units. In Suez itself there was a mixture of units, including elements of the 4th Armoured Division and the 6th Mechanized Division. General Badawy, commanding the 7th Division, assumed command of the isolated portion of Third Army on the east bank. He organized the forces under his command for defence and, indeed, repulsed a number of Israeli attacks between 20 and 23 October. He even managed to organize a tenuous supply route across the upper Suez Gulf. However, his supply situation, particularly concerning ammunition, water and food, was very serious indeed. (Badawy was confirmed later as an army commander, and became ultimately the Egyptian Minister of War, replacing General Gamasy, who was to assume the position after the death of General Ismail Ali. In 1981, General Badawy was killed in a tragic helicopter crash while inspecting troops along the Libyan border.)
The Israelis prepared for an all-out assault on the two components of Third Army, particularly on the elements on the east bank. While the Egyptian forces would doubtless have fought a stubborn and effective battle in defence, it is quite clear that, given their desperate situation as far as supplies were concerned, and the total Israeli superiority in the air, the destruction of Third Army could have been achieved by the Israeli forces within a matter of days.
The situation was now assessed by the Russians and the Americans, and both came to a similar conclusion, although not for the same reasons. The Soviets realized that the destruction of the Egyptian Third Army would mean a clear-cut defeat for a country they had supported. Russian prestige would suffer if such a client country, armed with Soviet weapons and equipment, were again to suffer a decisive military defeat. Kissinger, for his part, now appreciated that rescuing the army could be an important bargaining factor in achieving an ultimate arrangement between the sides, with each having a trump card of its own: the Israelis, the besieged Third Army and a presence on the west bank; the Egyptians, a bridgehead on the east bank. Kissinger exerted pressure on Israel through the Israeli Ambassador in Washington and, on the 24th, a second Security Council Resolution was passed, again calling for a cease-fire. Thus, on 24 October, with Sharon’s division on the outskirts of Ismailia, threatening its links with Cairo; with Adan’s and Magen’s divisions completely sealing off the Egyptian Third Army; and with the Israeli forces holding a corridor to the east bank with three bridges across it, and occupying an area of 1,000 square miles inside Egypt down to the port of Adabiah on the Gulf of Suez, a second cease-fire came into effect.
After being caught in circumstances that could well have been fatal, the forces of the Israeli Southern Command had succeeded in turning the tables by carrying out a most daring operation against tremendous odds and in the face of great adversity. They had achieved a major victory by any military standards and had manoeuvred themselves into a position to destroy the Egyptian Third Army, whose saviour was the United Nations Security Council. The Soviet Union had not only made available all the necessary prerequisites for the Egyptian attack, it had also guaranteed against a total debacle: indeed, as the Egyptian Third Army had turned to Sadat in desperation for supplies, the Soviet Union had moved ominously to the brink and readied its airborne divisions for a move to the Middle East.
World History
