At this stage the Arab political policy towards Israel was established at the Khartoum Summit Conference. On 1 September 1967, this Conference laid down the basis for Arab policy in ‘the “three noes” resolution’: no recognition of Israel, no negotiations with Israel and no peace with Israel. Addressing a mass demonstration in the square before the People’s Assembly in Cairo, President Nasser declared that all that had been taken by force could only be returned by force, and added an additional ‘no’ to the three of Khartoum: ‘no concessions on the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people’. He formulated Egyptian military policy as one based on three phases: the ‘defensive rehabilitation’ phase, the ‘offensive defence’ phase and, finally, the ‘liberation’ phase. He made it perfectly clear for all who would listen, that the lull along the Canal was a temporary one and that the hostilities would be resumed when it suited the Egyptians.
The second major outbreak of hostilities began in September 1967, when the Egyptians opened fire from the fortified Green Island in the north of the Gulf of Suez on Israeli shipping traversing the waters within the Israeli sector. The Egyptians wanted to emphasize their adherence to the decisions of the Khartoum Conference and to symbolize Nasser’s determination to maintain this policy. The fire spread, and heavy artillery battles developed along the Suez Canal as far north as Kantara, which, together with Ismailia and Suez, came directly under fire. Thousands of citizens abandoned their homes and, as the fighting developed over the months, a major refugee problem was created for Egypt, reaching proportions of some 750,000 people.
Again, a lull set in. After this brief outbreak, the guns fell silent until, in the autumn of 1967, an event once more focused world attention on the
Egyptian front. On 21 October 1967, the Israeli flagship, the destroyer Eilat, was patrolling at a distance of 141/2 nautical miles off Port Said. At 17.32 hours, a Styx surface-to-surface missile was fired from a Komar-class Egyptian missile-boat anchored inside Port Said harbour. Eilat's radar had not revealed any suspicious activity or movement because the attacking missile-boat was in fact anchored inside the harbour and, despite evasive action ordered by the captain of the vessel when the missile was sighted, the missile hit the ship in the area of the boiler, killing and wounding officers and crewmen and cutting-off the electric current. The ship began to list. Two minutes later, a second missile hit Eilat, causing additional damage and casualties. With the ship listing heavily, the survivors amongst the crew tended to their wounded comrades and engaged in rescue and repair activities while they awaited ships of the Israeli Navy, which were speeding to the rescue. Some two hours after the first missile had hit the ship, a third missile was fired in the midst of the rescue operations, and this struck amidships. Fire broke out and a series of explosions shook the ship, causing heavy casualties. Shortly thereafter she sank.
Eilat, previously hms Zealous of the Royal Navy, a destroyer displacing 1,710 tons, had seen active service in the Second World War before being sold to Israel in 1956. Of 199 crew members aboard Eilat, 47 were listed as killed or missing and 90 were wounded. The incident aroused world-wide interest, because it was the first occasion in history in which a warship had been sunk by missile fire. The age of naval missiles had dawned. This encounter foreshadowed the first naval missile battles in history between the Israeli Navy and the Egyptian and Syrian Navies in the 1973 War. More significance than this should not be read into the incident, however, because the Egyptian missile-boats, by virtue of remaining static inside Port Said harbour, had not been detected on Eilat's radar; nevertheless, much interest was aroused at the time, for this was the shape of naval things to come.
This had been a planned, premeditated attack. Its significance was not lost on Israel both because of losses incurred and also because of the departure in military policy that it obviously reflected. The Egyptian move must have taken into account a massive Israeli reaction and presumably assumed a renewed outbreak of intense fighting along the cease-fire line. Israeli reaction to this event was indeed fierce, but unexpected. The Egyptians had prepared themselves for a reaction in the area of Port Said at the northern end of the Canal. Acting on this assumption, the Israeli Command reacted at the other extremity. Four days later, on 25 October 1967, a heavy concentration of Israeli artillery opened up along the southern end of the Suez Canal: the Egyptian refineries in Suez, petrol depots and petrochemical installations came under fire and went up in flames. For a period of days, all attempts to extinguish the fire failed, as benzine and asphalt burned, destroying plant, buildings and factories. The Egyptians themselves estimated the loss in the region of over ?36 million ($100 million) and announced that 11 people had been killed and 92 wounded. The Israeli retaliation had been a heavy one, greater apparently
Than the Egyptians had bargained for. The cost was considered by the Egyptians to be excessive, so a period of comparative calm descended along the Suez Canal —a period that lasted with sporadic outbreaks of artillery and patrol activity and occasional air battles, for almost a year into the summer of 1968.
September 1968 saw the conclusion of the first phase proclaimed by Nasser, namely that of ‘defensive rehabilitation’. During this period, the Soviets succeeded in reorganizing the Egyptian Army and in completing its re-equipment. Within a comparatively short period, the Egyptian Army regained the total strength it had enjoyed before the outbreak of war in June 1967. Now, however, because of the more modern equipment which had been supplied, it was much stronger, for it had improved considerably its military posture by absorbing MiG-21 fighters in place of the MiG-17s and MiG-19s, and T-54 and T-55 tanks in place of the T-34 and T-54 tanks that had been lost to Israel in the Six Day War. This resupply of the Egyptian Army was paralleled by a larger Soviet involvement in Egypt. Initially, hundreds of military advisers were assigned to the Egyptian Army, but their numbers gradually ascended to thousands. At the outset, they limited their attention mainly to advice on organization and training, but they soon became involved in all aspects of the Egyptian armed forces — including that of operations. Mindful of the shortcomings of the Egyptian Air Force, and anxious to involve the Soviet military command as deeply as possible in the defence of Egypt, Nasser even proposed to the Russians that a Soviet Air Force general assume command of the air defences of Egypt. However, aware of the complications from an international point of view to which such a move could give rise, the Russians turned down the proposal. Meanwhile, considerable quantities of Soviet aid continued to flow to Egypt as the Egyptian Army recovered physically, and from an equipment point of view, from the setbacks of the 1967 War. The stage was set now for the opening of the next phase in Nasser’s plan.
World History
