Manstein a defeatist?

In Manstein’s dispute with Hitler, are there grounds for accusing the former-as has been alleged from time to time-of having been obsessed with withdrawal in the face of any build-up in enemy strength or else of having been unjustifiably alarmed by the spectre of encirclement?

It is clear that at this juncture Manstein no longer displayed the genius for bold moves that had characterised his performance between 1941 and 1943; yet it is also abundantly clear that he was no longer in a position where he could act boldly. Apart from XLVI Panzer Corps, which had recently been assigned to him, he knew that he could expect no further reinforcements from the west and that on the Eastern Front it was a case of robbing Peter to pay Paul. The liquidation of a pocket containing half a dozen divisions would mean not only the loss of some

60,000 men and most of their materiel, but, further, a breach of 75 to 90 miles in his now dangerously reduced defensive system. The battle of Korsun’-Shevchen-

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A Russian peasant women greet the arrival of liberating Soviet armour, complete with tank-riders.

Kovskiy would show that his appreciation of the situation-and he had vainly tried to prevail on Hitler to accept it-was the correct one.

On January 25, Marshal Zhukov, who had been delegated by Stavka to co-ordinate operations, threw the troops of the 1st and 2nd Ukrainian Fronts into an assault on the Kanev salient. General Vatutin brought his 40th Army (Lieutenant-General E. F. Zhmachenko) and 27th Army (Lieutenant-General S. G. Tro-fimenko) to bear on the western front of the salient. They had a considerable job in overcoming German resistance so as to open a breach for brigades of the 6th Tank Army (Lieutenant-General A. G. Kravchenko) to move south-eastwards. The 2nd Ukrainian Front, under General Konev, seems to have had an easier task; delivering its attack at the point of junction of XLVII Panzer Corps and XI Corps, the 4th Guards Army (Major-General A. I. Ryzhov) and 53rd Army (Major-General I. V. Galanin) swiftly broke through the lines held by the 389th Infantry Division, thus enabling the 5th Guards Tank Army, under the command of General P. A. Rotmistrov, to be unleashed without further ado.

"There could be no other adequate analogy. The sea-dikes had given and the tide, interminable and vast, spread across the plain, passing either side of our tanks which, with packets of infantry round them, had the appearance of reefs rising from the swell. Our amazement was at its peak when in the afternoon cavalry units, galloping westwards, broke through our screen of fire in close formation. It was a sight long-forgotten, almost a mirage-V Guards Cavalry Corps, with the 11th, 12th, and 63rd Cavalry Divisions under the command of Selimanov.” Thus, in a monograph dealing with this episode, the former commander of XLVII Panzer Corps describes the breakthrough at Kras-nosilka (30 miles north-west of Kirovograd). In these conditions, it is not surprising that Vatutin’s and Konev’s tanks effected a meeting on January 28 in the region of Zvenigorodka. XI Corps, which formed the left of the German 8th Army, and XLII Corps, on the right of the 1st Panzerarfnee, were caught in the trap along with four infantry divisions (the 57th, 72nd, 88th, and 389th), the 5th S. S. Panzer grenadier Division "Wiking” and the S. S. Freiwilligen Sturmbrigade "Wal-lonie”, which Himmler had recruited in the French-speaking provinces of Belgium.

By virtue of seniority over his comrade Lieutenant-General T. Lieb, General W. Stemmermann, commander of XI Corps, assumed command of those encircled.