Yet how was this to be achieved? There were basically two alternatives: the Germans must either try to defeat a landing during its very execution, entailing the defeat of the combined sea and air operations, or force the issue on the ground following the actual invasion. At first it seemed that the German leadership would decide on the former option, as Hider himself declared in May 1943 that, “The Adantic is my western perimeter, and even if I must fight a defensive batde there, that’s still better than having to defend myself on the coast of Europe.” In this he agreed with Grand-Adm. Doenitz, who was still convinced a sea power such as England could only properly be defeated at sea. Despite the great slaughter of the U-boats in the spring of 1943, Doenitz repeatedly tried to persuade Hitler to continue the war at sea. Although the Navy had been unable to discover the causes behind the loss of so many U-boats, Doenitz resumed the tonnage war against the Allied convoys in aummn 1943, only to be heavily defeated once again.
In the meantime matters had been firmly settled in favor of the second option — defeating the Allies on the European mainland. Doenitz’s plan could anyway only have worked with the cooperation of a strong Luftwaffe. Unfortunately Goering, the Supreme Gommander of the Luftwaffe lacked not only the means, but also the conceptual vision for such a campaign. The Army too was stUl very reserved about the concept of a combined defense: “The soldier is somehow anxious and nervous about having water in front of his own positions. He wants to get away from the coast,” commented the Navy in August 1944, not entirely without justification.
It is hardly surprising then that Hitler’s Order No. 51 of November 1943 allocated only minor operational tasks to the Luftwaffe and the Navy in the west. Essentially, they were only to act if a landing took place. Hardly any facet now remained of the idea of a comprehensive strategy to engage the enemy before he reached the coast. The only such means still available was the intended bombardment of England by the V-weapons. Their introduction was planned for June 1944. With these weapons Hitler and his generals hoped to destroy the morale of the British population; delaying the invasion plans, if not putting an end to them entirely. Otherwise the main burden of the defense would fall on the Army.
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