In comparing German defence measures in the west with Allied preparations for the invasion, we are struck at once by the fact that the two sides were working under very different conditions. First and foremost, the Germans were operating in occupied territory, while the Allies were preparing their offensive on home ground or in a friendly country. But the conditions for future military operations in western Europe were also very different. The Allies had gradually given OVERLORD priority, whereas Hitler, despite various declarations of intent, never concentrated his military resources in the west. The immense pressure of the Soviet armies prevented any significant withdrawal of German divisions from the eastern front. The difference in priority accorded to the coming battle in the west further increased the Allies’ lead in available resources. The longer the war lasted, the more overwhelming their material superiority. Weakened by the air war and the gradual loss of major sources of raw materials, Germany was prone to ever greater shortages. In these circumstances, heavy losses in the east and the consequent assignment of priority to the needs of the army soon led to a reduction in the arming of the navy and Luftwaffe. As a result, the plans and measures for defence against a landing were mainly decided by army staffs and army commanders. Since the weakness of German naval and air forces in the west meant that an Allied invasion could probably no longer be prevented, the army officers banked everything on making the Atlantic Wall into a huge defensive bulwark. If the Allies nevertheless succeeded in gaining a foothold on the continent, they would already have incurred heavy losses, and would then face a land war in which the German military leaders felt themselves to be superior.
From the outset, however, the British and Americans had attached great importance to building up their air and sea forces. As a result, two battles had been won before the landing even began: the Allies had achieved both air and sea supremacy. This not only helped them begin the invasion in favourable conditions, but also hindered the enemy’s defence preparations to a considerable extent before the landing.
There were also major differences between the Allies and the Germans in terms of military planning and organization. On the Allied side there was a body of experts (the COSSAC staff) that had years of experience of landing operations, and a joint command authority (SHAEF) that was able to take advantage of all that groundwork. There was nothing comparable on the
German side.1724 In accordance with the long-standing German tradition of multiple command structures, many people were responsible for many things, but no one person was responsible for everything. This must have been painfully clear to many German soldiers in the west when they looked back on the way military intelligence had been conducted. Here too, the relevant departments worked in parallel, and sometimes even against each other. Moreover, the Germans relied mainly on military personnel for their information and analysis, ignoring other aspects of modern intelligence work. This gave rise to a very distorted picture of the enemy and his plans and resources.
The Allies developed a completely different approach. They started off by asking themselves who could be of use to them in achieving their goals. Information about the enemy was analysed by bodies composed of people from all walks of life, both military and civilian. It was clear from early on that the Allied planners regarded military factors as only one aspect of warfare: they saw their own role as multifaceted, rather than a purely military activity.1725
On its own admission, however, the German top brass was reluctant to get involved in politics. Politics were a matter for the political leadership, that is, Hitler and his National Socialist entourage. This attitude may well have helped many officers keep unpleasant thoughts at bay. By transferring responsibility to the political leadership, they could to some extent turn a blind eye to the shooting of hostages, the brutal treatment of prisoners and people of other nations and races, and other practices that were totally at odds with military honour and chivalry. They were also able to avoid the question of the moral justification for a war that the Germans had begun. But the Allied military leaders’ great interest in and understanding of political issues also raised problems. In late April 1944, for example, Gen. Douglas MacArthur’s behaviour in the Pacific prompted the American war ministry to warn SHAEF about publicity-seeking generals,1726 whose statements it apparently saw as a threat to the primacy of the political authorities. As we have already seen from the discussion of Patton’s statements on the post-war role of the United States, Britain, and the Soviet Union, such fears were by no means unfounded. In general, however, senior American officers knew where to draw the line. Marshall and Eisenhower are excellent examples, and that is surely one of the reasons why they in particular, who had always worked in an area of tension between politics and warfare, later played major roles in American public life.
All this meant that German measures to counter the invasion were determined essentially by military factors, and often only by internal army considerations. As problems arose, the military commanders frequently resorted to improvisation. The Allies, on the other hand, endeavoured to plan and organize everything, and to establish long-term forecasts of the feasibility of their planned operations, the risks involved, and the resources needed to carry them out.
The emphasis on comprehensive planning was primarily attributable to the aim of achieving military goals with minimum loss of life. It was, of course, a very time-consuming process, and Allied military procedures sometimes appear quite laborious. The frequent postponements of the landing date were part of this cautious approach. The Allies had no doubt of ultimate victory, and they were prepared to wait a little longer for it rather than increase the risk to the troops, which was already high enough. Circumspect planning of this kind had undoubted advantages in preparing the landing, but it remained to be seen whether it would also prove effective in the ensuing military operations. In contrast, even before the invasion certain German commanders displayed a tendency to risk everything. They saw an Allied landing in western Europe as their last chance to inflict a decisive defeat on the British and Americans. For many of them, Hitler first and foremost, it was a unique opportunity to turn the tide of war in Germany’s favour.1727
Despite all these important differences, an analysis of the opposing structures reveals certain similarities. Both GOCs, Rundstedt and Eisenhower, had to contend with subordinates who, because of their military achievements, had a higher standing with their own propaganda organs—and sometimes with those of the enemy—than they themselves. The men in question were Rommel and Montgomery, who were also closer to their respective supreme commanders, Hitler and Churchill. This was bound to have a negative impact on relations with their immediate superiors, Rundstedt and Eisenhower, as well as on their work in the military high command. Standing, as they did, at the centre of things, it was no wonder that Montgomery and Rommel often thought they knew better than anyone else (Montgomery, in particular, made many American officers feel this, as well as his British subordinates). Both were increasingly unwilling to listen to other opinions or admit mistakes.1728 All this boded no good for co-operation on future operations in western Europe. The appointment of such successful but difficult officers to subordinate posts had generated considerable tension: who could be sure it would pay off in the end?
Ordinary soldiers on both sides had other things to worry about. For them the main question was whether they would survive. The war against Nazi Germany was often elevated to a crusade in the Allied camp, but the lowest ranks were mainly busy doing their jobs and hoping the war would soon be over.1729
For the German troops, a posting in the west, compared with other fronts, was a form of life insurance—as long as the Allies had not yet landed. Up to the invasion many of them felt their families and dependants in the Reich were in a worse position because of the increasing air raids. Yet they knew that, once the landing began, their fate would be in the hands of their immediate superiors. Would their commanders really demand the ultimate sacrifice—as they had said they would time and again—or would they give up the fight if it appeared hopeless?1730
World History
