Until the end of June, whilst the British Second Army was concentrating its attention on Gaen, the US First Army was occupied in securing the link between the Utah and Omaha beachheads, clearing the Gotentin, and capturing Gherbourg. In order to connea the two beachheads it was essential to capture and secure Carentan. This was difficult, because the approaches to the town were cut by numerous water obstacles, which were crossed by causeways and bridges. The Germans had demolished bridges and zeroed their artillery and mortars on the causeways. Between the causeways were marshes, within which islands of higher ground were covered with bocage.
The use of armor was extremely hazardous, as German 88s in the town could reach out over the marshes 2,000 yds (1,800m) along the causeways. The town had to be taken by infantry using close-combat techniques, clearing defensive positions with grenade, and bayonet. The Germans delayed the progress of the infantry of the 101st Airborne and 29th Divisions by counterattacks.
Whilst the town was being closely invested, the soldiers of the US VIII and VI Corps also maneuvered to seal off the outer approaches. On June 10 the 327th Glider Infantry advancing across the Lower Douve from the west met the 29th Division’s recce troops moving up from the east at Auville-sur-Ie-Vey.
On June 11 Gen. McAuliffe took command of Task Force F, the 501st and 506th Parachute Infantry, and 327th Glider Infantry. In accordance with his plan, Carentan was heavily bombarded during the night of June 11. Early on the 12th, Task Force F made a double pincer attack on Carentan; two battalions of the 327th advanced into the town from the northeast; battalions of the 506th moved to the southwest to forestall attempts at relief or counterattack. The outer arms of the double-pi ncer helped to secure Carentan, but did not meet in sufficient time to prevent the retirement of the survivors of the garrison. The Germans reacted violendy. On June 12 and 13 they launched counterattacks from the southwest. The second of these was made by the 6th Parachute Regiment and elements of 17th SS Panzer Grenadier Division, and was thrown back by a counterstroke by Combat Command ‘A’ of the 2nd Armored Division. The US forces consolidated, and pushed outwards from Carentan; the VII and V Corps were firmly in contact. Subsequently, V Corps expanded southwards, obstructed by the extensive marshes south and east of Carentan, and held back by shortages of ammunition. VII Corps was to advance westwards and northwards, to cut off the Cotentin from the south, and to take Cherbourg. Bradley gave priority of supply to formations in the Cotentin. Despite this, the VII Corps, and also - later — the VIII Corps, had much difficulty and delay in the Cotentin. This was primarily because of the inherent difficulties of operating in the peculiar terrain. The German forces in the Cotentin were heavily outnumbered and exhausted, but knew how to use the ground to maximum advantage. They could probably have made the American advance more slow and costly had they not been subjected to detailed and irrational interference by Hider.
On June 10 VII Corps was held by the Germans on good defensive ground to north and west. The US Army Historical Division, description of the ground to the north remarks, “The ground rises gently giving the defender commanding heights liberally criss-crossed with hedgerows. Fortifications supported the German defense in depth. A back-stop line was anchored to the coast at Quineville, it stretched inland along a high ridge to Montebourg, and then bent southwest. It was part of VII Corps’ D-Day objective, but five infantry regiments took a full week, from June 8-14, to reach and secure it.”
The 4th Division had to take this line by close-quarter fighting, hedgerow by hedgerow, with artillery and air support. On the coast, infantry had to rely on cooperation with sappers to take the fortifications. Some of the batteries in the area of Quineville were still shelling Utah
Beach, hindering reinforcement. But by June 14, the 4th Division was through, breaking the Germans’ main defensive line in the north.
VII Corps also had difficulty moving west, across the Rivers Merderet and Douve. On June 8 the 325th Infantry had attempted an assault along the causeway at la Fiere. The movement was preceded by heavy artillery preparation, and supported by direct fire from tanks. Even so, the attack was too difficult. The Historical Division recorded: “The men had been told that they were to cover the exposed, 500-yard (450m) causeway in one sprint. But the long run in the face of small arms and mortar fire proved to be too much for most only a handful made the initial dash others, who hesitated, were hit; the first casualties induced more hesitation and the causeway became congested with the dead, the wounded and the reluctant.”
Next day, Bradley directed VII Corps to cut off the Cotentin. On June 10 attempts to force the Merderet at la Fiere and Chef-du-Pont had limited success, because of the inherent difficulties of such assaults. However, the American pressure was relentless, and gradually the Germans were forced back from the west bank of the floodplain. But progress was still very slow; a regimental attack could take all day to push a few hundred yards. Every yard was paid for in blood; the 357th Regiment was losing an average of 150 men a day. The attacking troops had to learn to reapply the basic principles of tactics in combat, if they lived long enough to appreciate the lessons of experience.
On June 15 Gen. Collins, Commander of VII Corps, sent the 82nd Airborne and 9th Infantry Divisions into the drive west of the Merderet. At the same time, the Germans had decided to swing back on to an east-west line in order to reduce their commitments. This meant that the 82nd and 9th met only blocking parties and rearguards. The 82nd seized St. Sauveur-le-Vicomte and bridged the Douve on June 16. At once Collins saw and grasped his opportunity. He ordered the 82nd and 9th to form four regimental columns and charge down the main roads westwards to the coast, and not to worry about flank guards. The speed of this movement took the Germans by surprise; the regiments in columns reached the coast during the night of June 17/18. On the northern side of the axis, the 60th Infantry Regiment (9th Division) set up blocking positions, and intercepted columns of the German 77th Division which had been ordered to evacuate the Cotentin.
The Germans attempted no substantial counterattack: their forces were too weak. On June 15, the German LXXXIV Corps had formed two
Kampfgruppen (“battlegroups”) in the Cotentin; “Hellmich,” of elements of the 77th and 91st Divisions, which had been ordered to move south but was not trapped in the peninsula; and “Von Schlieben,” of the remnants of the 709th and 243rd Divisions, intended to defend Cherbourg. Bradley and Collins realized that the German forces were too weak to hold a line all the way across the Cotentin. On June 16 they decided to advance north on a front of three divisions from west to east the 9th, 79th and 4th, with the 4th Cavalry Group covering the gaps with light patrol forces. The important thing was to close in on the fortress of Cherbourg quickly, to minimize the Germans’ chances of reinforcing and strengthening the, defenses.
On June 19 the 4th Division used heavy artillery preparation, followed by an envelopment by armor and infantry to force the German garrison out of Montebourg, and clear the main highway to Cherbourg. Valognes was devastated by heavy air attacks, and was abandoned by the enemy. The advance north by the 4th Division was made in column of route. The 9th and 79th Divisions were impeded only by demolitions; on June 20, the Germans broke contact and moved to occupy the formidable defenses of Cherbourg. They would have done this days earlier had it not been for Hitler’s insistence that every inch of ground must be defended. As it was, the line they attempted to hold before Cherbourg was too long for the
21,000 men available, being 30 miles (48km) from St. Vaast-la-Hougue to Vauville.
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