The long-planned German offensive in the Ardennes began December 16. It was designed to cut off the northern Allied armies and retake Antwerp. Hitler hoped that this would cause the Western allies to make peace. The offensive and bad weather largely halted American strategic air operations from Britain for nearly a month, although the Fifteenth Air Force kept up the fight. The Eighth Air Force turned to helping the tactical air forces keep control of the air over the battle area and attacking supply routes in the enemy’s immediate rear.
Bad weather prevented either side from flying much for several days. When the weather cleared on December 23, the gigantic Allied air concentration stopped German planes from attacking Allied troops. But when the Ninth Air Force’s medium bombers flew to their targets that day despite the failure of their fighter escort to rendezvous, German fighters tore into them, downing 35 bombers. It was by far the Ninth’s worst bomber loss of the war.
On December 24 the Eighth mounted its greatest mission of the whole war. Joined by 500 RAF bombers, it launched a maximum effort to insure control of the air. Even war-weary planes were sent up, as the Eighth dispatched 2,046 bombers, of which 1,884 reached their targets; escorted by 813 fighters. In one day the Eighth dropped 5,052 tons of bombs. Most fell on eleven airfields beyond the Rhine; the rest on transportation targets west of the river. More bombers were hitting a single German airfield than the Eighth had been able to send up on any one day before May 1943. There was tough opposition; 12 heavies and 10 fighters failed to return, and 23 bombers and 2 fighters were junked after the mission. The fighters alone claimed 74 German planes.
The Luftwaffe effort subsided for a time and was restricted, during the day, to the area behind the German lines. The Eighth reverted to attacking rail centers, shifting its emphasis to the targets in an “outer” line of interdiction partly beyond the Rhine, while the mediums operated nearer home. On the last day of 1944 the Eighth managed to mount a strategic mission; the 3rd Division sent 526 bombers to attack the oil refineries at Hambutg and Misburg.
On January 1 perhaps as many as 1,100 German fighters carried out a low-level attack on Allied forward air bases in Belgium and the Netherlands. The Germans achieved surprise, and destroyed about 300 planes, mostly on the ground. But their flying and shooting were bad, and Allied fighters took a heavy toll. The Germans lost about 300 planes themselves; 151 pilots were killed or wounded and 63 captured. Allied operations were not much affected, and the losses were quickly replaced. The “success” was just another nail in the Luftwaffe’s coffin.
The results of the heavy bomber attacks on marshalling yards and bridges are hard to distinguish from those of attacks by the tactical air forces, but all
Air operations together had a terrific impact. Air power did not, of itself, defeat the Ardennes offensive. The German plans had been too optimistic, and went awry in the first 48 hours, at a time when both German and Allied planes were mostly grounded because of delays imposed by small American ground units. But aircraft wrecked the German supply arrangements and helped insure that the Germans were halted and driven back relatively quickly. Peter Elstob later concluded, “It was the almost complete disruption of communication which did most to halt the Ardennes offensive.” The localized transportation attack caused the collapse of the German railroads just behind the battle front. This soon spread to the rest of the system.’*
World History
