On the morning of 17 October — after the Israelis had been on the west bank of the Canal for one full day and two nights — the bridgehead came under artillery fire. Matt’s headquarters received a direct hit and his deputy was wounded. From this moment until the cease-fire, the bridgehead and the area of the bridge were under constant heavy artillery fire as guns, mortars and Katyushas combined to pour tens of thousands of shells into the area of the crossing. Aircraft attempted to bomb every afternoon, but large numbers were shot down both by the Israeli Air Force, which was now patrolling over the bridgehead, and by the ground forces. Egyptian helicopters came in on suicide missions to drop barrels of napalm on the bridge and the bridgehead; large numbers were shot down, frog surface-to-surface missiles were employed, but the Israeli forces soon learned how to bring them down with anti-aircraft fire.
Matt’s paratroopers were now under heavy attack from Egyptian commandos thrown into the battle. An Israeli force was cut off from the main body of the force, and the Egyptians closed in on them in a bitter hand-to-hand struggle. For four hours the battle raged. One Israeli captain, Asa Kadmoni, single-handed held off the attacks, v/ith a rifle, a grenade and a LAW anti-tank weapon. Kadmoni was finally relieved by a fresh Israeli force when he was down to seven bullets.
Haim Erez a regular officer, who as a small boy had fled to the Soviet Union when the Germans invaded Poland and finally arrived in Palestine via Teheran in 1943, had been raised in a harsh world. After his force — numbering twenty tanks and seven armoured personnel carriers — had crossed the Canal on the 15th, it moved westwards, destroying two surface-to-surface missile bases, a large number of Egyptian vehicles and, by midday on the 16th, had reached a distance of some fifteen miles west of the Canal. His force had taken the Egyptians by surprise, and was moving about freely and with impunity, destroying four surface-to-air missile positions, twenty tanks and twelve armoured personnel carriers, for the loss of one man wounded. On the morning of the 17th, however, the first Egyptian counterattack was mounted by the 23rd Armoured Brigade. Erez’s brigade suffered casualties, but the counterattack was broken and the Egyptians withdrew, leaving ten tanks in the field.
The last of Erez’s forces had crossed on the 16th at 11.30 hours and, for 37 hours thereafter, no more tanks crossed. This fact was to be heavily criticized by Sharon. At this point, the preconstructed bridge, a 190-yard-long construction on rollers, was being inched forward by a dozen tanks under a concentrated artillery barrage, with Egyptian aircraft bombing and strafing the bridge and Israeli aircraft shooting down the attacking Egyptians. With a continuous artillery barrage bracketing the slow convoy, it creaked and strained into the setting sun towards the Canal, which it reached on the evening of the 18th; shortly after midnight it was operational; one day later a third bridge made up of pontoons would also be in position. The bridging organization under Colonel Even had performed heroically. A total of 100 men of Even’s task force — 41 in one night alone — were killed and many hundreds wounded in the course of the operation.
Meanwhile, the reports received by the Egyptian High Command persisted in a considerable measure of wishful thinking, repeating the initial story about small number of amphibious tanks, playing down the scope of the operation, emphasizing that it was purely to boost the morale of the Israeli people and army; a general impression was given that the matter was well in hand, and that the Israeli forces would soon be seen off the west bank. General Shazli describes how, in the afternoon of 18 October, President Sadat came to General Headquarters and asked him to go to Second Army in order to try to raise morale. On his return, on 19 October, Shazli had a fairly clear picture of the situation, estimating that to the west of the Canal were four armoured brigades, a mechanized infantry brigade and a paratroop brigade. The most disturbing element of all as far as the Egyptians were concerned, according to Shazli, was the fact that the Israeli forces had succeeded in neutralizing or destroying the concentrations of SAM missiles west of the Canal to a depth of nine miles and that the Israeli superiority in the air was now coming to full expression in close ground-support. Because of what Shazli claims were the unfortunate decisions of President Sadat, the deployment of the Egyptian forces was widely spread out, and lacked the necessary concentration in order to mount a proper counterattack. He maintains that he pressed again for a redeployment of the Egyptian forces, but was unable to convince either the President or the Minister of War. The increase in Israeli armoured forces on the west bank of the Canal augured ill, particularly for the Third Army, and Shazli again pressed for withdrawal of four brigades from the east to the west bank within 24 hours. He insisted that Sadat come to the general headquarters. The Minister of War, Ahmed Ismail Ali, tried to dissuade him from this move,‘but Shazli insisted. At 01.00 hours on the morning of 20 October, Shazli again presented his case; after he had finished, the President replied that not one soldier would be withdrawn from the east bank.
According to some reports, Shazli14 was by now in a state of total collapse, maintaining that a catastrophe was impending and that the Egyptians must withdraw from Sinai. At this point Sadat, in fact, relieved Shazli of his duties (although the formal changeover took place some weeks later) and appointed General Abdel Ghani Gamasy in his place. Sadat, however, did realize the seriousness of the situation and activated the Soviet Premier, Alexei Kosygin, who had been in Cairo from 16 October, to convene the United Nations Security Council in order to obtain a cease-fire.
Bar-Lev now changed the plan on the east bank, ordering Magen’s division to push southwards to the west of, and parallel to, Adan’s division towards Suez. The Israeli sweep southwards would therefore be in the form of a fan, with Adan to his east and Magen to his west and rear, thus giving depth to his attack and providing a firm base in the event of any mishap to his front. Sharon would remain at the bridgehead and push northwards towards the Egyptian Second Army.
ReshePs force, which had crossed the Canal on the 19th, moved forward on Sharon’s instructions to the west of Matt’s forces at Serafeum with orders to attack the position known as ‘Orcha’. An armoured infantry company attacked an Egyptian platoon here and, when the ‘Orcha’ position was finally taken, over 300 dead Egyptian troops were found in the trenches of the fortification, testimony to their extremely obstinate and brave stand. ReshePs forces, together with the paratroopers, reached the outskirts of Ismailia, where an infantry brigade and commando units faced Sharon’s forces. To the west, on the Ismailia-Cairo road, a mechanized division was positioned to defend Cairo.
Sharon now pressed for a wide, flanking operation in depth towards Damiette-Balatin on the Mediterranean coast which would cut off the entire Second Army from Egypt. Southern Command insisted on the east-bank ‘Missouri’ position being taken first, because it was still endangering the corridor to the Israeli bridgehead. Sharon dragged his feet on this order. In the fighting launched by Raviv’s brigade, one-third of ‘Missouri’ was taken.
Adan’s division, from the morning of 18 October, attacked southwards along two brigade axes. Facing his forces were an Egyptian mechanized division and the 4th Armoured Division. With Nir’s brigade attacking due westwards and Amir’s brigade to the south, the Israeli forces advanced. Meanwhile both brigades assigned a battalion each to fan out and destroy surface-to-air missile batteries. On the morning of 19 October, Adan attacked with the full support of the air force, which was no longer hampered by the surface-to-air missiles, and captured the area of the Fayid airfield, which was rapidly established as an air bridgehead for the resupply of the advancing Israeli forces.
In the area between Ismailia and Suez, there were three principal north-south roads and six major east-west roads. Close to the Canal, and running parallel both to the sweet-water canal and the railway was the road codenamed by the Israelis ‘Test’. Farther west and running through Fayid and Geneifa was the main road known to the Israelis as ‘Havit’. About six miles to the west of this was the road codenamed ‘Vadaut’. Due west from Ismailia was a road parallel to the main railway and the Canal, which went to Cairo by way of the Nile Delta. The main Ismailia-Cairo road extended in a south-westerly direction from Ismailia across the desert. Running due west from Deversoir was a road codenamed ‘Sakranut’ by the Israelis, intersecting the main Ismailia-Cairo road about twenty miles west of Deversoir. Seven miles farther south ran an east-west road from Fayid called ‘Vitamin’ and, another twelve miles to the south was a road called ‘Asor’, the northernmost of the two principal routes from Suez to Cairo; ‘Asor’ intersected ‘Havit’ about midway between Geneifa and Shallufa. Five or ten miles farther south was the road the Israelis called ‘Sarag’, the main Suez-Cairo road. The six hills or hill masses of major importance in this general area were codenamed by the Israelis ‘Tsach’, ‘Arel’, ‘Maktzera’, Mitznefet’, and the region known as the Geneifa Hills; south of the ‘Sarag’ road and west of Suez was Jebel Ataka.
Adan was now located on the Geneifa Hills. Amir was deployed to the east of ‘Mitznefet’, and Nir and Keren were ordered to move along the Geneifa Hills. They knocked out a number of surface-to-air missile sites on these heights and reached the secondary ‘Vitamin’ road leading to the lake. Nir’s brigade continued southwards crossing the main road, ‘Asor’, and clearing missile sites as they went, while Keren’s brigade continued along the eastern Geneifa Hills.
On the 19th, Magen’s division moved through Adan’s division and headed westwards towards ‘Maktzera’. Along the main Cairo-Bitter Lake road it overcame the ‘Tsach’ crossroads position from the rear and moved on to relieve Amir’s forces facing ‘Mitznefet’, while Amir moved eastwards along ‘Vitamin’ to open the main Ismailia-Suez road (‘Havit’). Heavy Egyptian resistance broke this attack and Amir’s forces sustained losses. Adan received under command a battalion of infantry and a battalion of engineers, which moved down in parallel lines along ‘Test’, the sweet-water canal road and ‘Havit’. The vital airfield of Fayid fell, thus affording the Israeli forces a very important air bridgehead, which could now supply the forces on the west bank.
Adan’s move in rushing to the Geneifa Hills was an important element in guaranteeing the success of the southward dash of the Israeli forces. Had these heights been ignored and been occupied by Egyptian commando units, any further advance by the Israeli forces would have been extremely difficult and very questionable. Keren was encountering heavy fighting on the eastern Geneifa Hills, while Amir was moving slowly southwards along the three parallel roads by the lakeside. The Egyptian
Third Army moved the 22nd Tank Brigade of the 6th Mechanized Division back to the west bank. Meanwhile, on Adan’s left flank a task force comprising an armoured battalion, an armoured infantry battalion, a paratroop battalion and a battalion of engineers was making its way slowly southwards along ‘Test’ through successive concentrations of army camps, fighting against Egyptian, Palestinian and Kuwaiti forces.
To the west, Magen was pushing down as planned towards the Cairo-Suez road, having placed Shomron’s brigade to protect his west flank at Jebel Um Katib to the south of Mitznefet. By noon on the 19th, Shomron was seventeen miles west of the Canal. On the next day, he moved south to Jebel Um Katib and took up positions facing ‘Mitznefet’, where for three days his brigade conducted a battle with an Egyptian brigade of tanks, inflicting heavy losses on them.
Meanwhile, elements of the Egyptian 4th Armoured Division were fighting back desperately and attacking Nir’s brigade south of the ‘Asor’ road. On the 21st, this brigade was already a mile north of the main Suez-Cairo road (‘Sarag’) and controlled it by fire. Thus, from midday on the 21st, the Egyptian Third Army — apart from the southerly road leading south along the Gulf of Suez — was in effect cut off from its rear headquarters and its main supply bases.
World History
