On January 23, II Corps, still under the command of General G. de Monsabert, forced a second wedge into the German line. This was achieved with more ease than the first, even though General Rasp had got wind of the French plans.
On the right, the American 3rd Division had taken Ostheim. On the left, the 1st Free French Division had fought bitterly to capture the village of Illhausern and had formed a bridgehead on the right bank of the 111, thus preparing to outflank Colmar to the north. But LXIV Corps stiffened its resistance and counterattacked, preventing Monsabert from any swift exploitation of his success towards Neuf-Brisach. LXIII Corps was likewise preventing Bethouart from moving on. Hidden in the woods, or even inside houses, the Panzers exacted a heavy toll from the men of the 2nd and 5th Armoured Divisions, supporting the infantry. However, on January 27, the U. S. 3rd Division reached the Colmar Canal, while General Garbay’s 1st Free French Division, reinforced by Colonel Faure’s paratroops, took the villages of Jebsheim and Grussen-heim. Seeing how serious the situation had become, O. K.W. authorised Rasp to pull the 198th Division back over the Rhine, i. e. to give up all the ground won between Rhinau and Erstein by the attack of January 7.
Wishing to press on and complete the attack. General Devers, at the request of the commander of the French 1st Army, put XXI Corps (Major-General Frank W. Milburn) under his command, as well as the U. S. 75th Division (Major-General Porter). Milburn, who from this time on commanded all the American forces involved in the offensive, and the French 5th Armoured Division, was ordered to position his forces between Monsabert’s II Corps and Billotte’s 10th Division, and then push on towards Neuf-
A General Emile Bethouart, commander of the French I Corps. Operating on the south side of the Colmar pocket, his troops initially had a very hard time of it, and Bethouart wished to call off his attack. But de Lattre ordered him to press on regardless so that German forces would not be able to switch to the northern sector, where General de Monsabert’s II Corps was about to launch its offensive.
Brisach and also south towards Ensis-heim to meet Bethouart. The offensive began again. In the evening of January 30, after a terrifying artillery bombardment of 16,438 105-mm and 155-mm shells, the United States 3rd Division (Major-General O’Daniel) succeeded in crossing the Colmar Canal, and this allowed the United States 28th Division to advance as far as the suburbs of Colmar. The division did not enter Colmar itself, for at the gates of the city, which had been left intact, General Norman D. Cota was courteous enough to give that honour to his comrade-in-arms Schlesser, commanding the 4th Combat Command (5th Armoured Division).
The United States 12th Armoured Division sped south to exploit its victory, with the intention of linking up with I Corps, which had taken Ensisheim, Soultz, and Guebwiller on February 4 and then pushed its 1st Armoured Division and 4th Moroccan Mountain Division forward.
The next day, French and American forces linked up at Rouffach and Sainte Croix-en-Plaine. Twenty-four hours later, in the light of searchlights shining towards the night sky, General O’Daniel’s infantry "scaled” the ramparts of Neuf-Brisach in the best mediaeval style. Lastly, at 0800 hours on February 9, a deafening explosion told the men of the French 1st and 2nd Armoured Divisions, who were mopping-up the Forest of la Hardt, together with the 2nd Moroccan Division, that the Germans had just blown the Chalampe bridge, on the Mulhouse-Freiburg road, behind them as they pulled back over the Rhine.
And so, at dawn on the 20th day, the battle of Colmar reached its end. General Rasp left 22,010 prisoners, 80 guns, and 70 tanks in the hands of the enemy, but he had succeeded in bringing back over the Rhine some 50,000 men, 7,000 motor vehicles, 1,500 guns, and 60 armoured vehicles, which underlines his personal qualities of leadership.
As for Allied losses, the figures provided by General de Lattre will allow the reader to appreciate the cost of a modern battle. Of a total of 420,000 Allied troops involved (295,000 French, 125,000 American), casualties were as follows:
French American Killed 1,595 542
Considering just the French, de Lattre’s figures also show that the infantry had taken the lion’s share. On January 20, it had put 60,000 men into the line, that is about a fifth of the men in the 1st Army. On February 9, it could own to three-quarters of the losses, with 1,138 killed and 6,513 wounded. Add to these figures the 354 killed and 1,151 wounded which the battle cost the armoured units, and it becomes clear that the other arms lost only 1,022 killed and wounded. Finally, due credit must be given to the magnificent effort of the medical services under Surgeon-General Guirriec. In spite of the appalling weather they had only 142 deaths, that is 0.9 per cent of the cases received.
As a conclusion to the story of this battle, some tribute should be paid to the menwhofoughtinit. IntheReuMemf/fiafre suisse, Major-General Montfort has written:
"The French, under superb leadership and enjoying powerful materiel advantages, made a magnificent effort, fully worthy of their predecessors in World War I.
"The Germans, under extraordinarily difficult conditions and three differing requirements (operational, materiel, and morale), defended themselves with great ability and fought... with courage worthy of praise.”
World History
