IN mid-March 1945 the artillery regiment and the fusilier battalion were engaged in anti-partisan operations south of the Sava. Division command was notified that Tito’s partisans, among whom was the longstanding “friend” of the Division, the “Bachern” Brigade, had reappeared in the Bachern (Pohorje) area. Despite the proximity of the front, the Division’s command decided to mount another four-day operation against them. The intent was to attack the partisan concentrations to push them back from the Division’s district and the rearguard of the front. Such measures were also necessary because the Division would probably be soon thrown into frontline action and would not be able to continue to neutralize the partisans.
The Division and its reserve regiment soon cleared the Kozjak (Possruk) district and crossed the Drava River into Pohorje, where all units at the Division’s disposal were deployed to encircle the partisans. The operation was going according to plan, the partisans were unable to break out, when, suddenly, an order from Army Group South hit us like a bolt of lightning: it was an order to disarm the Division and hand over its weapons to newly created German divisions. The order was issued by ss Reichsfiihrer Himmler. The Division was to gather all of its weapons and supplies, take them to a railway depot, and load them onto freight cars bound for Nuremberg. The army group was to ensure that this order was carried out.
The Division’s command was dumbfounded. This was a purely political directive, issued by politicians from behind their “green desk.” It appeared that they knew nothing whatsoever about the situation on the south Austrian front. This order arrived at the Division’s headquarters on 20 March 1945-
According to the order the Division was not to be disarmed permanently but was only required to hand over its weapons temporarily; it would be shipped new ones in a short while. However, this was scarcely possible considering the situation at the front. Allied forces were deployed near Nuremberg and any weapons shipment would most probably not reach its destination. All railway lines in Austria were completely paralyzed. Any railway vehicles available were needed to keep supplies moving to the front. Transport administration officials claimed that obtaining the requisite freight cars was not possible at that time.
On the Eastern front the situation was becoming increasingly critical. A Red Army tank column had advanced to within forty kilometers of Maribor—directly in front of the Division. Now the Division was in an area with a high concentration of partisans. Even if this insane order were to be carried out, there would be no way to transport the weapons and supplies to their destinations. Also, the Division was a unit of twenty thousand men. If it were disarmed, its soldiers would become a powerless target for any attack and would not be able to fire a single shot in their own defense. The order for disarmament would also arouse the deepest suspicions of the Ukrainians and, if carried out, would surely mean the dissolution of the Division. Many Ukrainians would probably go over to the partisans, driven by their instinct of self-preservation. The only way out was to attempt to have the order rescinded.
The commander of the Division left for Himmler’s command post in Salzburg. The anti-partisan operation in Pohorje continued, pending a clarification from Ereitag in Salzburg. In Salzburg no one initially seemed to have heard of such an order until Ereitag addressed Himmler’s personal bureau, where it was confirmed. The Division was very cautious about orders issued by SS authorities, because they were notorious for resorting to spurious “Fuhrer’s orders” or “Reichsfuhrer’s orders.” Obviously, with an order for the complete disarmament of the Division, the greatest caution had to be exercised. The Division was forced to halt the very successful action undertaken against the partisans, to prepare to hand over weapons, and to acquire means for their transportation. In the meantime, the chief of staff of Himmler’s command post in Salzburg was to take up the matter of rescinding the order with Himmler himself.'
The Division’s command tried to play for time and delay carrying out the order in any way possible. However, at no time did the Division’s command consider sabotage or simply refuse to carry out the order; it wanted only to have rescinded an order issued without due appreciation of the situation in Austria. Complying with the order in undue haste could have resulted in tragic consequences. After all, the Division was a strong unit.
Ready for action at the front, which happened to be only forty kilometers away. Because of the situation at the front, the weapons and supplies of the Division would probably not reach their destinations, while the Division itself would be left at the mercy of fate in an area teeming with partisans. The Division’s command also felt compelled to stand up for the rights of the Ukrainian soldiers and defend them against these harsh measures in such a grave situation.
In response to the increasing insistence of the chief quartermaster of Army Group South, the Division’s command stated that it would hand over w'eapons only when the requisite freight cars arrived to transport them. Thirty-eight trains were required to effectively transfer the Division’s weapons and supplies, yet not a single one had arrived. Then the chief quartermaster realized the dimensions of the problem and promised to review the order at German High Command; until then, he had been under the impression that this was a matter of only one shipment of arms.
The Division immediately sent out a very sharply worded teletype message to the higher authorities, including Himmler, about its concerns. After all, the Division was potentially faced with complete annihilation. The superficial excuses that the order to hand over weapons was temporary, and that similar orders had been issued to every foreign national unit, proved to be untrue.
In a few days Army Group South sent orders specifying that the Division was to hand over part of its small arms arsenal. Both Ukrainians and Germans listened to this directive in horror, then silently and tearfully handed over their rifles and machine guns.
At the front the situation was worsening. The Red Army moved still closer to Maribor. Apart from the Ukrainian Division, there were no reserves in the rearguard, and if the Red Army managed to penetrate the front in this sector, it would seize control of the important communications and supply centers of Graz and Maribor. This would effectively cut supply lines to the south and southeast, and had to be prevented at all costs. Therefore, the Division’s command drew up plans for the defense of Maribor on its own initiative. It brought its regiments in closer to Maribor in order to build up defensive emplacements on both sides of the city, mainly to the east.
As the moment of crisis approached, artillery and anti-tank detachments took up positions in Maribor itself. The sapper company also set up in the city. The commander of the infantry regiment, who was stationed at the bridgehead at the outskirts of the city, became the local commander. He replaced the acting commander, who had proven to be unsuitable for commanding a frontline unit.
The independent actions of the Division restored a measure of calm to the Maribor district. It reported them to the znd and 6th armies, which were holding the front. If the Division was to defend Maribor, it had been deployed incorrectly and should have moved farther to the east. However, the Division was under orders to hand over its weapons and thus had to remain close to a railway station. In addition, it was ready to move to new positions in a very short time. For the moment the two infantry regiments were entrenched near Maribor, while the 31st Regiment remained in the southern sector of the Division’s original area of deployment. Since the Division was still considered to be in a stage of reformation, it was subject to the command of the rearguard.
In response to its queries the Division soon received many replies containing new orders from the following authorities:
- ss Reichsfiihrer
- Field command post of the ss Reichsfiihrer
- Operations department of the German High Command
- Chief quartermaster of the German High Command
- Army Group South
- Army Group Southeast
- 18th Military District Headquarters
- znd Army Headquarters
- 6th Army Headquarters
In this flurry of messages some orders grotesquely contravened others. Various higher military commanders demanded that they be given the weapons and supplies. A few of the directives were clearly designed to benefit certain commanders, and the matter was undoubtedly completely confused. It was decided that the Division could keep twenty percent of its weapons and twenty percent of its supplies.
In response to the reminder that, with supplies cut back to twenty percent, the butchers’ and bakers’ companies would not have sufficient food to feed all of the men, the higher authorities decided that the Division was to hand over all supplies. Apparently, no one bothered to consider how the Division was to continue feeding its twenty-two thousand men. The Division’s command did not even consider carrying out such an absurd order. It was responsible for the fate of the Ukrainians in the Division, and no one had relieved it of this responsibility.
The concentration of the Division’s forces around Maribor and the construction of the defensive emplacements continued. These initiatives were welcomed by the znd and 6th armies. The company of fusiliers was moved to Spielfeld, where it was to defend the Mur River narrows and crossing. The Division’s staff kept in constant touch with its commanders in anticipation of its imminent deployment at the front. The regimental commanders in turn kept their officers informed of developments. The sapper battalion continued to build all kinds of emplacements.
Resistance to the disarmament order continued. The Division demanded that only the highest authorities decide the matter. Because of the dangerous simation at the front the Division decided to return small arms to its soldiers, who received them gladly. The Division considered this to be essential, since it was now manning a line of defense.
On 26 March 1945 the former Governor of Galicia, Otto Wachter, and the leader of the MC, Colonel Bisanz, arrived late at night. Freitag refused to lodge them in the staff quarters or discuss the Division’s current situation with them. Only after my intervention did he agree to do so.
Both Wachter and Bisanz were well acquainted with the situation at the front but knew nothing of the disarmament order. After the evacuation of Galicia, Wachter was given a post in the SS administration with responsibility for all units of foreign nationals. Thus, the person who was in the best position to defend the rights of the Division had arrived at a critical time.
Wachter immediately went into action. He contacted all relevant authorities, including Himmler. He persuaded the local Gauleiter, Uiberreither, that it would be in the interest of his province to have the disarmament order rescinded; Uiberreither apparently had direct contacts with Hitler. Although Wachter’s efforts seemed to be in vain, it proved impossible to carry out the disarmament order because the heavy bombardment of the Maribor railway station halted all traffic for a few days.
Wachter left for Army Group South headquarters, to explain the situation to Commander Alexander Lohr. Wachter argued that rather than allow the Division to be destroyed without weapons, it should be sent to the front, for which it was entirely ready. Wachter was accompanied by the first liaison officer, who served as a professional adviser. Because of the considerable amount of work to be done, Freitag declined to allow me to accompany Wachter, despite requests from both of us.
There was constant activity among all of the Division’s staff throughout the day and night. Because of the threatening situation at the front, orders, reports, directives, and questions concerning disarmament all followed in quick succession.
The Division had moved its defensive positions farther to the east and north to the Mur River in order to approach the znd and 6th armies at the front. Enemy reconnaissance had discovered a weakness in the front line where the two armies joined and quickly took advantage of it to burst through the front. The Division could not move farther east independently, but it took up positions that would enable it to close the breach in the front line. The commanders of all sub-units received orders to begin reconnaissance missions, particularly to survey the approach roads to the districts of Gleichen-berg and Feldbach, where the breach was made.
Wachter returned from army group headquarters with the good news that the commander would arrange for the Division to be taken into frontline action. In the interim the Division had actually collected and returned small arms from the soldiers several times. Confusion spread through the ranks in the wake of these contradictory orders.
In early April a Fieseler Storch was shot down near our supply depot. A Luftwaffe general who survived the crash arrived with orders for the Division. He claimed that he had been authorized to take over the Division’s weapons in order to arm a new para troop division, the loth. He had about one thousand men under his command, who apparently had had no infantry training. Therefore, he had further authorization to appropriate personnel from the Division, and if he did, then the Division would not have to part with any weapons.
This was another puzzle for the Division’s command. They were asked to believe that some Luftwaffe general with one thousand men of the airborne was to form a paratroop division with the weapons and supplies of the Division. The next day a telegram arrived from the headquarters of the i8th Military District in Salzburg, with which the Division had no connection whatsoever, ordering the Division to immediately reform as the loth Paratroop Demolition Division. This kind of order the Division’s command could not fathom, no matter how hard it tried. It was difficult to believe that higher authorities would issue such an absurd directive.
The Division, however, took this as a sign that it was essential to hold on to all of its weapons, reissue those that it had taken from its soldiers, and prepare for the advancing enemy. The Division’s command had no intention of converting into a paratroop division and decided to wait patiently for an explanation.
Finally, the Division’s protests and Wachter’s efforts paid off. On z8 March 1945 we received an order from the command post in Salzburg not to disarm and to await further orders.
In the interim the Division had completed the emplacements along the
Mur River. The 3 ist Regiment had not yet arrived but was on its way, on a forced march from the Konice district. Because the Division had carried out all of these defensive measures on its own initiative, it did not receive additional fuel and ammunition.
Despite the assistance of the local Heimatsbund, our reserves were depleted. There was little prospect of receiving more supplies, because the Division was not under the direct command of any army group. In order to alleviate the situation somehow, the Division was given authorization to stop retreating German and Hungarian divisions and requisition fuel and ammunition from them. However, this was not easily done. All roads were filled with retreating formations. Their discipline was very poor and they were hostile to the Division. A few units were able to requisition some ammunition and fuel, but it soon became necessary to buy them. Only in special cases could requisitions be made by specially designated officers.
The Division was also able to form another artillery detachment out of the retreating Hungarian units. This detachment performed very well in subsequent battles, but it was later taken away from the Division by higher authorities.
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