Unlike other wars in which the Israel Defence Forces participated, the air and naval battles that took place in the Yom Kippur War were in many ways a reflection of the new developments in the fields of technology and tactics that had evolved as a result of the introduction of new types of aircraft and, above all, of the introduction of missiles into the field of battle. The Egyptian Air Force, in planning a future air war, was deeply influenced by the trauma of the three hours on the morning of 5 June 1967 — when the Israeli Air Force had surprised all the Arab air forces poised to attack Israel, and particularly that of Egypt. A second major factor that guided the Egyptian strategy was the overall influence of Soviet thinking on Egyptian military thought and planning ever since the Soviet Union became the main supplier of arms to Egypt. Large numbers of Egyptian pilots and officers were sent to train in the Soviet Union. Gradually, over the years, the Egyptians as well as the Syrians became imbued with Soviet doctrine. As the Egyptian planners prepared for war, the air problem was a paramount one, predominant in their thoughts. They realized that they had to find an effective answer to Israeli air supremacy; otherwise there would be no point in launching a war. For this purpose, their front-line must be covered in such a way that Israeli air intervention would have little or no effect on the initial stages of the attack, and would allow the Arab preponderance in artillery, troops and armour to be concentrated fully at the point of attack.
For this purpose, the Soviet Union gradually evolved, during the War of Attrition and thereafter, a system of surface-to-air missile air defence batteries along the Suez Canal. This provided a ‘mix’ of SAM-2, SAM-3 and SAM-6 batteries. There were 150 batteries in Egypt at the outbreak of war, composed of SAM-2 and SAM-3 batteries (with six launching pads per battery) and SAM-6 batteries (each with twelve missiles ready for launching on four tanks). Of the 150 batteries, some 50 were concentrated along the Suez Canal front. The mobile SAM-6, with an effective range of
24,000 yards, fitted into a comprehensive pattern provided by the comparatively static SAM-2 (with a range of 55,000 yards) and the more mobile SAM-3 (33,000 yards). Each of these weapons possessed different electronic guidance characteristics, which complicated the application of electronic countermeasures. The main advantage of the SAM-6 lay in its mobility: mounted on a tank chassis, it could be moved into action rapidly, requiring only minutes to be folded up before being moved to an
Alternative site and then another short period to be ready for action again. To seek out a SAM-6 missile launcher, an aircraft would of necessity enter the range of the SAM-2. If one adds to this formidable interlocked system hundreds of SAM-7s — portable, Strela missile launchers organized in platoons in the ground forces — together with conventional anti-aircraft weapons (in particular the multi-barrelled ZSU 23), there is little wonder that the Egyptians and their Soviet advisers were convinced that, from the point of view of anti-aircraft defence, their forces were well protected.
The second problem exercising the Egyptian Command as it prepared for war was the Israeli ability to attack targets in depth in Egypt and Syria without any adequate response, because it was felt that once outside the range of missile surface-to-air defence systems, the Egyptian and Syrian air forces would be no match for the Israeli fighters. The answer to this was given by the Russians. They supplied frog (Free Rocket Over Ground) battlefield support missiles (with a range of up to 55 miles) to Syria, and these were near enough to engage urban centres of population in Israel. In March 1973, following the visit of a very high-level Soviet military delegation to Cairo, the Soviet Union began to ship the scud battlefield support surface-to-surface missile to the Egyptian Army. Capable of carrying either a high-explosive warhead or a nuclear warhead, this had a range of some 180 miles, enabling it to engage centres of population in Israel from Egypt. President Sadat believed that with this deterrent in his hands he could replace the deterrent that would have been created by a medium-range bomber force, and he is on record as saying that his final decision to go to war was made in April 1973 — when the first SCUD missiles arrived on Egyptian soil.
On 13 September 1973, a routine Israeli patrol off the coast of Syria, in the area of Latakia, tangled with Syrian air units. In the course of the ensuing dogfight, the Israeli force shot down thirteen Syrian aircraft for the loss of one Israeli machine. General Benjamin Peled, the commander of the Israeli Air Force, realized that such a result was bound to bring on a retaliatory Syrian move, such as mass artillery bombardment. If the Syrians reacted in this way, the problem, as he saw it, posed by over 30 Syrian surface-to-air missile batteries of hypersensitive SAM-6s would be a very serious one. When the air force was placed on a very high level of preparedness on 5 October, with its combat effectives fully mobilized, Peled ordered his planners to prepare a pre-emptive strike. This strike, it will be recalled, was not approved by the Government by 6 October.
General Peled was the first Israeli Air Force commander produced entirely in Israel. A fighter pilot, he had been shot down by ground fire at Sharm El-Sheikh in the 1956 Sinai Campaign, and had evaded capture when an Israeli Piper Cub literally snatched him from the hands of his would-be captors. He proved himself in the war to be an outstanding commander of an elite force. His restraint, calm confidence and cool-headedness, inspired all around him with confidence. He at no time underestimated his adversaries, but neither did he underestimate the force he led. After he retired from the air force some years later, he became the head of a highly sophisticated electronics concern. In his public utterances he became noted for an ill-concealed disdain for the type of democracy in Israel, and his views could be characterized as reactionary in the extreme.
Ranged against the Israeli Air Force, which comprised principally among its fighters the A4 Skyhawk, the F4 Phantom and the French Mirage, the Egyptian and Syrian air forces were armed principally with the MiG-21, the MiG-19 and the MiG-17. The ratio was approximately 3:1 in favour of the Arab air forces, with the Egyptian and Syrian air forces alone accounting for approximately 900 fighters against some 350 Israeli fighter aircraft.
The attack of the Egyptian Air Force, which was commanded by General Hosni Mubarak, heralded the major onslaught on 6 October. General Mubarak, a heavily-built, quiet, dour bomber pilot, rose through the ranks of the Air Force, and displayed considerable ability throughout his career. He received air pilot and staff training twice in the Soviet Union. After the 1973 War, President Sadat appointed him to be his VicePresident and, on the assassination of Sadat in 1981, he succeeded him as President of Egypt.
The attacks of the Egyptian Air Force were not directed in particular against Israeli formations, but were concentrated rather on airfields, radar installations, headquarters and camps in Sinai, all comparatively close to the front-line. (The normal depth of their penetration was west of a line passing through Baluza, Refidim, Tasa and the Mitla Pass.) The Syrians, on the other hand, concentrated their attacks on the Israeli combat forces. The very limited depth of penetration by the Arab air forces was adhered to throughout, with some exceptions. The deepest penetration was an attempt late in the war by six Egyptian Mirages (supplied by the French to the Libyans) to attack the area of El-Arish, flying in from the sea; three of them were shot down over the sea. Other attempts included two Egyptian Tupolev Tu-16 bombers that failed in a mission to reach Eilat, with one crashing near Abu Rudeis; and two Syrian Sukhoi Su-20s bound for the Haifa Bay area, one of which crashed over Nahariya while the second fled to Syria. The second Syrian attempt at deep penetration was with four Sukhoi Su-20s, three of which crashed in the area of Mount Miron in upper Galilee. The Egyptians tried to make up for their failure to bomb in depth by launching Kelt air-to-surface stand-off missiles from over Egyptian territory. (In general these missiles were launched from deep inside Egypt.) One such missile aimed at Tel Aviv on the afternoon of 6 October was shot out of the air by an Israeli pilot on patrol; of 25 Kelts fired at Israeli targets, it was reported that twenty were shot down by the Israeli Air Force and only two succeeded in causing damage.
The Israeli air planning had been based all along on the assumption that the initial operations of the air force would constitute an all-out attack against the missile systems in order to free the air force later to support the ground effort. The Egyptian and Syrian initiative, the massive nature of the attack with its effect on the Israeli ground forces, the desperate battle being waged by the Israeli forces along the Canal and on the Golan Heights — all these prevented the Israeli Air Force from attacking as planned, and obliged it to throw caution to the winds and give close support to the harassed ground forces without dealing adequately with the missile threat and achieving complete air superiority. Consequently, losses were comparatively heavy. As the situation of the Israeli forces on the ground became more and more desperate in the first two days of fighting, the Israeli Air Force was thrown into battle against unacceptable odds and incurred very heavy losses. After three days of fighting. General Dayan reported to the editors of the Israeli press that some 50 fighter aircraft had been lost. Despite the very heavy losses, however, the Israeli Air Force persevered in its attacks. As the Israeli ground forces advanced into Syria, the Israeli Air Force succeeded in destroying part of the Syrian missile system and began to range far and wide into Syria, attacking strategic targets (oil installations, power plants and bridges) and causing considerable damage to the Syrian infrastructure. The Syrian fighters fought back and, of 222 Syrian aircraft lost in the war, 162 were destroyed in aerial combat.
On the Egyptian front the Israeli Air Force attacked missile sites and enemy airfields, but above all gave close support whenever an Egyptian force emerged from under the protection of the missile umbrella — as in the case of the Egyptian brigade that advanced on Abu Rudeis on the southern Egyptian flank in the large armoured battle on 14 October, when the Israeli Air Force was a major element in destroying the attacking Egyptian forces. As from 18 October, when the Egyptian Command at last appreciated the significance of the Israeli crossing to the west bank of the Suez Canal, the Egyptian Air Force proved to be more daring and more persistent in attack. Aerial encounters reminiscent of the Second World War were seen again, with 40-50 aircraft in the air at times. The Israelis, however, held the upper hand. Indeed, throughout the war the Egyptians succeeded in downing only five Israeli aircraft in air battles, as against 172 Egyptian aircraft lost in the same manner, making a total of 334 Arab aircraft against 5 Israelis shot down in air-to-air combat.
On the west bank of the Suez Canal, an unusual example of mutual coordination emerged between the advancing ground forces and the Israeli Air Force. As the armoured forces on the west bank of the Canal destroyed one surface-to-air missile battery after another, the Israeli Air Force gained a freer hand and became a major factor in supporting the advancing Israeli forces. But the Israeli Air Force had dealt directly with the missile batteries according to plan after the initial onslaught of the Egyptian ground forces, particularly in Port Said which, after 13 October, was without any missile defences until the end of the war. By 14 October, Israeli Air Force air attacks against nine missile batteries in the area of Kantara made this area missile-free too. From 21 October, most of the area of the Egyptian Second Army, the whole area of the Egyptian Third Army on the east bank of the Canal and the area of the Gulf of Suez to Ras Adabiah were missile-free.
The Israeli Air Force was instrumental in protecting the area of Sharm El-Sheikh by interdicting the helicopter-borne commando forces. Furthermore, the skies over Israel remained ‘clean’ throughout the war: not one bomb fell in Israel, and the air force infrastructure remained unaffected. The maintenance of air superiority also had major strategic implications. King Hussein explained to his Arab colleagues that a major consideration in Jordan’s unwillingness to commit its forces against Israeli territory was Israel’s control of the air over the potential battlefield.
During the war, the total losses of the Egyptians and the Syrians were 514 aircraft, some 58 of which were shot down by their own forces; Israeli losses totalled 102, of which, according to Minister of Defence Dayan, 50 were lost in the first three days. The bulk of the Israeli losses were caused by missiles and conventional anti-aircraft fire, with honours roughly even between the two, particularly during close-support missions. The conflict was a major proving ground from which many will have drawn their lessons. Despite the manner in which the Israeli Air Force acquitted itself in the face of the missiles, there was no doubt that many of the accepted concepts about air war would have to be re-evaluated. The role of aircraft in war had changed, and new strategies and uses of air power would have to be evolved. Obviously, the whole new generation of stand-off air-launched weapons and tactical surface-to-surface missiles, enabling antimissile battery operations to be mounted out of the range of the enemy missiles, would change considerably the conditions in the field of battle, while surface-to-air missilery would be based to an increasing degree on highly mobile platforms, such as the SAM-6. To a degree, air power would not be as influential as it had been, and would affect the immediate battlefield less than hitherto. The proliferation of light, portable missile launchers in the front-lines meant that close support would be the exception to the rule in the future, with the air force being obliged to concentrate on isolating the field of battle, maintaining supremacy in the air, and destroying the forces in and near the field of battle. Considerable emphasis in the use of air power in the future would be placed on the protection of the home front, in addition to attacks against the surface-to-surface missile systems threatening the home front and also the battlefield.
World History
