And maybe north Bengal would fall. Appeals for help were addressed to the US and Britain.
Unexpectedly, on November 21, China announced a unilateral cease-fire and their withdrawal behind what they termed “the line of actual control”, meaning the border they had claimed in earlier negotiations with Nehru. India was warned to keep 12 miles (20km) back on their side, leaving a demilitarized zone of 25 miles (40km). This included the Aksai Chin sector. Defeat did have positive consequences. There was a shakeup at the senior levels of command and the “political” generals departed. The army embarked on a massive re-equipment and re-armament programme. In two years, defence expenditure more than doubled. Six special mountain divisions (later increased to ten) were formed. When next India went to war it was a very different story. HT.
India-Pakistan Wars (1965, 1971). These conflicts have more in common with 1914-18 than with other recent Asian wars. The 1965 affair ended in stalemate; that in 1971 in the decisive defeat of Pakistan. In 1965 all operations took place along the Punjab border; the second war saw inconclusive fighting on the same lines but the decisive clash was in East Pakistan (subsequently Bangladesh).
The first conflict arose out of Pakistan’s frustration at the denial of Kashmir, a largely Muslim territory which they saw as their rightful possession. An attempt to foment a guerrilla rising totally failed, and Pakistan sought to isolate Indian forces in Kashmir by advancing through the neck of territory north of Jammu (the Chhamb salient). This armoured thrust went well and India responded by a counteroffensive across the Punjab border towards Sialkot. This involved crossing a recognized international frontier (September 6) and the Pakistan Air Force responded with a preemptive strike which knocked out most of the Indian fighters on the ground. The attempt to repeat this success by launching the armoured division “The Shield of Pakistan” against Indian tanks was a disaster: most of the Pattons were knocked out. Thereafter hostilities
Were limited to a series of slugging actions by the infantry. One Indian battalion penetrated to the outskirts of Lahore, but the overcautious divisional commander failed to reinforce them. Both sides were reluctant to throw in everything: they did not intend to destroy their military strength for no clear objective. India was satisfied to have frustrated the attempt to gain advantage in Kashmir; after the initial failure of surprise, Pakistan could not hope to obtain its goal; and the US had frozen military aid on which they relied. There was a cease-fire on September 22 and subsequent negotiations at Tashkent confirmed the status quo: both sides pulled back.
The 1971 conflict followed the political demand for complete autonomy by East Pakistan. The Bengali agitation was forcibly suppressed and massive military and paramilitary forces were ferried around, via Ceylon, to East Pakistan from the West. Ten million refugees fled into India; Mrs Gandhi appealed to the international community without response. Military action seemed to be the only remedy. Pakistan had the active support of the US and China (in 1965, China had organized a hostile demonstration on the Himalayan border). Military intervention would have to be quick and decisive. Mrs Gandhi gave resolute support to the armed forces, placing Gen Manekshaw in overall command. The field commander was Lt Gen J S Aurora.
His forces consisted of three army corps, along with the Mukti Bahi-ni, the underground army of Bangladesh, said to number 100,000. The Pakistan defences were commanded by Lt Gen A A K Niazi and included three infantry divisions, a Border Security Force of 39 battalions, and the Razakars, paramilitary forces raised from the East Pakistan population.
All these forces were waiting on the eastern front, but the first action came on the western front when on December 3 1971 the Pakistan Air Force launched another pre-emptive strike, aimed at the airfields of Srinagar, Avan-tipur, Pathankot, Jodhpur, Amba-la and Agra. This time the Indians were ready for them. On the eastern front, India had overwhelming air superiority. Niazi’s plan was to hold the frontiers without giving up ground. Aurora planned to move rapidly: for political rather than military reasons. There was the danger that Pakistan’s friends would protest at the un against an invasion of a neighbouring country. Making a massive singlepronged attack, the Indian army reached the outskirts of Dacca by December 16 1971 and Niazi signed an instrument of surrender. In the path of the invasion, 1,293 Pakistani defenders were wiped out and 2,539 wounded (according to their own estimates). Over
India-Pakistan War, 1971: India’s victory saw the establishment of Bangladesh
90,000 Pakistani officers and men passed into Indian captivity, and it would be a whole year before they were repatriated. HT
World History
