By the time the first Allied ships appeared off the coast of Normandy at dawn on June 6, 1944, and before a single Allied soldier had set foot on land, the German defenders had already lost three battles over “Fortress Europe”: for many months British and American aircraft had not only ruled the airspace over England and the Channel, but also dominated the skies over the mainland of western Europe; German surface vessels and U-boats had also failed even to interfere significantly with the vast flow of men and materiel from America to the UK, let alone bring it to a halt; last but not least, all attempts to obtain accurate intelligence about Allied intentions and options had proved fruitless. The Germans remained ignorant of the place, the time and the strength of the attack on “Hitler’s Europe” until the actual moment of the landing.
Despite these important Allied successes, the Germans nevertheless attempted to arm themselves against the expected attack. First and foremost it was of critical importance as to how cooperation could be ensured with the countries of western and northern Europe, on whose territory a defensive network was to be established. Whether the French, Belgians, Dutch, Danes and later the Norwegians cooperated with the occupying forces, maintained a passive stance, or actively aided the
Resistance, would inevitably have a significant effect on the efficiency of the defensive buildup.
Although the Germans never intended to treat the peoples of western Europe as harshly as those in the east and southeast of the continent, they still failed by a long way to establish a forward-looking policy of partnership. This failure was caused both by their ideology and their lack of a cosmopolitan outlook: they established in the occupied countries only puppet governments, whose collaboration was assured, but which conse-quendy enjoyed litde popular support, left them in ignorance about their future role in a “German League of Nations” or the “New European Order”: instead they set up an efficient regime of suppression everywhere and from the very beginning devoted their efforts to exploiting the manpower and material resources of the occupied countries to the full.
All these factors drove many people into an attitude of resignation, and not a few into active resistance, even though they may initially have nurtured positive expectations towards the Germans. With the waning military strength of the German Reich, their sympathies turned increasingly towards the Allies. The governments of collaboration, such as the Vichy regime in France for example, gradually lost credibility, and de Gaulle’s “Comite Frangais de Liberation Nationale” (French Committee of National Liberation) began to gather support in its native country. De Gaulle’s uncompromising attitude towards the reclamation of French sovereignty and the expulsion of the invader came to represent a credible prospect for more and more French people. Similar movements were under way in the other occupied countries of western and northern Europe. Of the concept of a common European imperium, somewhat in the style of the Holy Roman Empire as the Nazi leaders now and then liked to portray it, no trace was evident by the time of the Allied landings.
World History
