While the pursuit of von Blaskowitz got under way, fighting raged at Toulon and Marseilles. The II Corps of de Lattre’s army followed O’Daniel’s 3rd Infantry Division ashore on August 16 and advanced on the two ports, expecting to capture them in 40 days. Toulon presented a formidable challenge to the French, lightly armed by American standards. Three fortified heights barred the way, backed up by minefields, barbed wire, trenches, and pillboxes. French shock troops scaled the hills and routed the defenders with flamethrowers and fire from rifles and mortars. By August 23, the attackers had captured the three objectives and begun probing Toulon itself, where some 1,800 Germans, commanded by Adm. Heinrich Rufus, manned the fortifications that dominated the harbor. The undamaged pair of 340mm guns taken from the battleship La Provence formed the backbone of the harbor defenses, which exchanged salvoes with an Allied fleet that included Lorraine, a sister ship of La Provence, and two other battleships, USS Nevada and HMS Ramillies. The hammering of the fortifications took a toll among the German guns, enabling the attacking warships to steam past the batteries on August 26 and enter Toulon harbor. Acknowledging the futility of further resistance, Rufus prompdy agreed to surrender; he formally capitulated on August 28.
Instead of seizing Toulon before attacking Marseilles, the French II Corps moved simultaneously against both ports. Marseilles lacked Toulon’s powerfiil hilltop defenses, and the Resistance provided information on the minefields and batteries the Germans had prepared. With the hour of liberation apparently at hand, the FFI inside Marseilles attacked German strongpoints, which proved too rugged for the irregulars. A call went out for help, and II Corps responded. With the assistance of air strikes and naval gunfire, French troops overran the enemy defenses, sometimes in a building-by-building struggle. After brief negotiations, the Marseilles garrison surrendered, also on August 28.
While one corps of de Lattre’s Army B seized the ports to which Eisenhower attached such importance - the French I Corps had not yet landed - Truscott set out to trap the German forces withdrawing northward. Von Blaskowitz had two first-rate divisions to screen this risky maneuver, the 388th Infantry Division and the 11th Panzer Division. The armored unit had reorganized and refitted after serving in the Soviet Union, where its mobility earned it the nickname “Ghost Division.” Again and again, the Ghost Division had materialized at the critical moment on the Eastern Front, and it would continue to do so as Army Group G retreated.
Truscott planned to harry and delay the German retreat toward the Belfort Gap so that the 36th Infantry Division, spearheaded by Brig. Gen. Frederick B. Buder’s Provisional Armored Group, known as Task Force Buder, could speed northward up the Route Napoleon in the direction of Grenoble. The Resistance might be able to seal the Rhone Valley; if not, Buder could veer westward to sever Route N7 on the river’s east bank. Butler’s objective would be the narrow gorge at Montelimar, through which road and river passed. While O’Daniel’s 3rd Infantry Division, advancing at a Truscott Trot, pursued the Germans up Route N7, Butler led the 36th Infantry Division up the Route Napoleon and established a blocking position at the Gap. On August 20, when he realized that the FFI could not contain the retreating Germans, Truscott ordered Butler to head west, generally along the Drome River valley, to cut Route N7 and slam shut the so-called Montelimar Gate. En route, Butler established a series of outposts to protect the road he had followed.
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