In the volume of his memoirs entitled Triumph and Tragedy, which he wrote in 1953, Churchill tells us:
"At first I violently opposed this idea. But the President, with Mr. Morgenthau-for whom we had much to ask-was so insistent that in the end we agreed to consider it.”
This is both true and false. There is no doubt that he recoiled when he learned of the Morgenthau plan, as Lord Moran heard him say on September 13 at the dinner of the Citadel Night, when the subject came up:
'T’m all for disarming Germany, but we ought not to prevent her living decently. There are bonds between the working classes of all countries, and the English people will not stand for the policy you are advocating.” And he is said to have muttered: ' "You cannot indict a whole nation.”
On the other hand, when Roosevelt and Morgenthau insisted, Churchill, in spite of what he said, not only promised them that he would examine the plan for reducing Germany to a pastoral existence, but after it had been examined by Professor Lindemann (later Lord Cherwell), put his signature to it on September 15. According to Lord Moran, Cherwell as Churchill’s scientific adviser had persuaded the Prime Minister, explaining what he had not noticed at first sight, that "the plan will save Britain from bankruptcy by eliminating a dangerous competitor”.
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1. General H. H. Arnold
2. Air Chief-Marshal Sir Charles Portal
3. General Sir Alan Brooke
4. Field-Marshal Sir John Dill
5. Admiral E. J. King
6. General G. C. Marshall
7. Admiral of the Fleet Sir Dudley Pound
8. Admiral W. D. Leahy
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It is tempting to dismiss the versions of Churchill and his doctor out of hand, as they are contradictory. However, the evidence given by Anthony Eden, later Lord Avon, supports Lord Moran’s version point by point; he writes;
"On the morning of September 15th I joined the Prime Minister and the President, who were by now in agreement in their approval of the plan. Cherwell had supported Morgenthau and their joint advocacy had prevailed. Large areas of the Ruhr and the Saar were to be stripped of their manufacturing industries and turned into agricultural lands. It was as if one were to take the Black Country and turn it into Devonshire. I did not like the plan, nor was I convinced that it was to our national advantage.
"I said so, and also suggested that Mr. Cordell Hull’s opinion should be sought for. This was the only occasion I can remember when the Prime Minister showed impatience with my views before foreign representatives. He resented my criticism of something which he and the President had approved, not I am sure on his account, but on the President’s.”
Meanwhile, Cordell Hull, on whose territory Morgenthau was trespassing, and Stimson, who refused to admit defeat, were left behind in Washington. However, they did not relax their opposition to the Morgenthau plan and on September 18, the deputy Secretary of War, John Me - 7 Cloy, also condemned it to Forrestal: 'Tn general the programme according to Mr. McCloy, called for the conscious destruction of the economy in Germany and the encouragement of a state of impoverishment and disorder. He said he felt the Army’s role in any programme would be most difficult because the Army, by training and instinct, would naturally turn to the re-creation of order as soon as possible, whereas under this programme they apparently were to encourage the opposite.”
World History
