In the US sector, while VII Corps advanced to Cherbourg, VIII Corps faced south and struggled towards the northern edge of the Carentan marshes. East of the marshes, the XDC and V Corps made a slow advance south. After the storm of June 19/22 these formations were severely rationed in their use of ammunition, and could not make progress. The Germans, principally the II Parachute Corps under the resourceful Gen. Meindl, made good use of the respite to survey the ground and prepare positions. Meindl’s men complained bitterly that all their time was spent digging.
By June 21 Bradley was considering plans for a breakout. He regarded a penetration and mobile exploitation essential, because, as he wrote in his memoirs, “As long as the enemy confined us to the bocage... where we were forced to match him man for man, he could exact a prohibitive price for the few miserable yards we might gain.” The essential thing was to find an area which gave sufficient room for the deployment of large-scale mobile forces. What Bradley wanted to do was find a weak place in the enemy line, concentrate sufficient force to break a hole in the line, then send mobile forces through it to exploit. These requirements entailed getting control of a line of departure south of the Carentan marshes, and finding a system of parallel roads sufficient to support the movement and supply of several divisions of mechanized troops. Bradleys analysis of the terrain led him to select the St. L6-Coutances road as the ideal line of departure. From that straight highway, two adequate roads ran parallel along elevated ground to the southwest. A few miles south of the line of departure, beyond Marigny and St. Gilles, the whole country tilted so as to give the advantage to an army approaching from the north, and the bocage gave way to more open country.
World History
