The deployment of anti-aircraft forces also created new tension between the arms. This time the disagreement arose between the commanders of the land and air forces, under whose joint command the anti-aircraft defences came. Rommel knew, better than anyone else, how efficient the 8.8-cm anti-aircraft gun could be when used as an anti-tank gun, and he would have liked to place a large number of such batteries between the Orne and the Vire. But Goring was obstinately opposed to any such redeployment and Rommel had to resign himself to not having his own way.
This tension lasted after the Allied landing, and brought these bitter words from Colonel-General Sepp Dietrich of the Waffen-S. S., commander of the 5th Panzerarmee:
'T constantly ordered these guns to stay forward and act in an anti-tank role against Allied armour. My orders were just as often countermanded by Pickert, who moved them back into the rear areas to protect administrative sites. I asked time and time again that these guns be put under my command, but I was always told by the High Command that it was
Impossible.”
On the other hand, Major-General Plocher, chief-of-staff of Luftflotte III at the time, has taken up the cudgels for Pickert:
"We had insisted on these guns being controlled by Luftwaffe officers because the army did not know how to handle such equipment. There was always a great deal of argument about who was to deploy the 88’s but Field-Marshal von Rundstedt finally allowed us to chose our own localities.” He adds, with a sting in the tail; "This was necessary in order to prevent the army from squandering both men and equipment. We used to say that the German infantryman would always fight until the last anti-aircraft man.”
The least that can be said of these incoherent remarks is that, though Rommel and Rundstedt had received orders to wipe out the Allied landings in the shortest time possible, they were refused part of the means necessary to carry out their orders.