As we have already seen. Vice Admiral Rawlings rn in H. M.S. King George V brought all combatant elements of the British Pacific Fleet, including four fast carriers, up to the Sakishima Gunto, where their planes struck airfields and installations on 26, 27 and 31 March. Still designated Task Force 57, these ships contributed to the success of Operation iceberg by neutralizing airfields in the southern group of the Nansei Shoto and, to some extent, those on Formosa. Their efforts were neatly dovetailed with those of Rear Admiral Durgin’s escort carrier support group (TG 51.2), so that Sakishima Gunto had no respite.
The Japanese air forces first counterattacked TF 57 on Okinawa L-day, i April. Rear Admiral Sir Phihp Vian’s carriers sent off first fighter sweep at 0640. Ten minutes later bogeys, 75 miles westward, registered on radar screens. The sweep was recalled to intercept and
See table at head of Chap. XV.
12 See footnote to Chap. VI Sec. 5 for authorities, and end of Appendix I for task organization.
Additional fighters were launched. Interception took place about 40 miles from the task force and four aircraft were shot down. This failed to break up the Japanese formation. On it pressed, pursued by Hellcats, Corsairs and Seafires, and reached the carriers shortly after 0705. One plane made a low-level strafing run on H. M.S. Indomitable, killing one man and wounding six, then turned its attem tion to King George V but did no damage there. Next, a kamikaze crashed the base of the island of H. M.S. Indefatigable, killing 14 men and wounding 16. Her steel flight deck was out of action only briefly and she continued to launch and recover on a somewhat reduced scale. H. M. destroyer Ulster received a near-miss from a 500-pound bomb, which ruptured the bulkhead between the engine room and after fire room. She had to be towed to Leyte by H. M.N. Z.S. Gambia.
At 1215 the carriers launched a strike against Ishigaki airfield and runways in the Sakishima Gunto, and destroyed a few more grounded aircraft. At 1730 a low-flying bogey was picked up 15 miles to the northwest and Hellcats were sent to intercept. The bogey, which proved to be two planes, evaded them in the clouds, and one dived on H. M.S. Illustrious, which evaded by use of full rudder; one wing touched the edge of the flight deck and the plane splashed in the sea, where its bomb exploded harmlessly. The Japanese pilot’s instructions, listing the priority of kamikaze targets, were blown on board by the explosion and made very interesting reading for Captain Lambe and staff, and for Fifth Fleet Intelligence.
Inferring from his experience on L-day that the enemy was launching planes from Sakishima airfields at first light. Sir Philip Vian sent off two aircraft at 0510 by moonlight to cover Ishigaki, and two more for Miyako, but they had to return owing to radio failure. No activity was noted and at daylight 2 April a fighter sweep was launched to cover all airfields in the Sakishima Gunto. The task force then retired for fueling and was relieved, during its absence, by planes from Admiral Durgin’s escort carrier group.
Bad weather prevented the fueling scheduled for 3 April and it was not completed until the 5th. On 6 April pairs of aircraft were launched to be over the Miyako and Ishigaki airfields at daybreak, but no enemy planes were there to be found. At about 1700 bogeys were picked up by radar and the fighter intercept shot down one Judy. One kamikaze out of four dived on Illustrious. Again this carrier successfully took radical evasive action. The wing tip hit the island and the plane spun into the sea; there were no casualties and but slight damage.
During the day a message was received from Admiral Nimitz indicating that in his opinion all-out enemy reaction to Okinawa by kamikazes was under way; and he was only too right. Consequently, TF 57 canceled a bombardment of Ishigaki planned for 7 April. Fighter cover was maintained over Sakishima Gunto all that day, and when it appeared that craters previously blown in the airfields had been filled, three bomber strikes were sent to re-hole them. Admiral Rawlings’s task force was enjoying a peaceful sail; sailors were reading, playing chequers and shooting darts, and a Royal Marine barber was cutting hair on the deck of King George V, when the Stand-to was sounded and everyone jumped to battle stations. The fleet chaplain. Canon J. T. Bezzant (survivor from the sinking of H. M.S. Repulse on 10 December 1941), explained over loudspeaker that enemy planes were flying about. One Judy was splashed by Seafires close aboard Illustrious; Seafires shot down a second at a safe distance, and the only air attack of the day was over.'
That evening TF 57 retired to fuel, while a veteran U. S. escort carrier division — Sangamon., Suuoannee, Chenango and Santee, with Rear Admiral Sample as O. T.C. — took over the job of pounding targets in the Sakishima Gunto.
Fueling completed 9 April, Sir Philip Vian’s carriers had already started back to their launching area when a message was intercepted from Commander Fifth Fleet to Cincpac, recommending that TF 57 strike the northernmost airfields of Formosa on 11 and 12 April, while Luzon-based aircraft of the Southwest Pacific command took care of those in southern Formosa, and Admiral Durgin’s escort Trumbull in NY. Times i6 Apr. 1945.
Carriers covered Sakishima Gunto. Admiral Nimitz approved this diversion and the Royal Navy carriers reached launching position 30 miles off Formosa at 0600 April 11. Weather conditions were so unfavorable that the strikes were postponed to the 12th. Warned by Admiral Spruance that heavy air attacks were to be expected, Sir Philip Vian put up an unusually heavy C. A.P. when reaching his launching position. But no planes molested the four carriers as they sliced off 48 bombers, accompanied by 41 fighters, in two waves to hit Formosan airfields. The first wave well performed its mission. The second, impeded by weather, shifted attention to Kiirun and attacked a chemical plant, docks and shipping. Strikes were repeated next day, after which TF 57 withdrew for another drink of oil. Very few enemy aircraft were seen in or over Formosa, but the British carriers’ C. A.P. had to deal with strikes from the Sakishima Gunto. Consequently, on Admiral Rawlings’s advice, Admiral Spruance decided to leave Formosa to the Southwest Pacific command and let TF 57 concentrate on the smaller islands which were giving trouble.
World History
