Small wonder then that under these conditions, the German commanders in western Europe had from the start to discount any possibility of direct military participation by the occupied countries against an Allied invasion. The population and their representatives were only to comply with certain instructions to facilitate German defensive measures in the event of a landing: not to block up transport routes behind the front by unnecessary travel or movement; to hand over any vehicles or other logistic material required; and to hold the Resistance movements in check with their police forces. They would continue, however, to work hard for the occupying power: in the German-controlled armaments and supply industry, in administration and in the security forces, and above all on the still-unfinished fortifications on the coast and in the ports. In the event of a major British and American landing, the Commander-in-Chief West, Field Marshal von Rundstedt, was looking for the same “loyal” behavior from the French as during Operation Jubilee zt Dieppe in 1942.
Even if German relations with the populations of the occupied countries were not overly friendly, they at least succeeded, by means of a series of flexible measures, in avoiding a repeat of the situation in the “real bandit countries” - by which they meant mainly the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. The Chief of General Staff at C-in-C West, Gen. Blumentritt, estimated that 10 percent of the population might undertake active resistance following a landing — and the Germans could live with that.
In addition, the Germans in the west were in a position to carry out their defensive preparations in countries which possessed an excellent infrastructure (roads, railways, rivers, canals, workshops, and depots). Allied bombers together with the Resistance, however succeeded in destroying much of this network by D-Day. Thus at the end of May thousands of supply trains were stuck in Belgium and eastern France, unable to proceed further westwards because of the shattered railway system.
This was the situation as the Germans found it (or brought about themselves) in the occupied countries. The main question remained — when, in what strength and above all where would the Allies land? German leaders had been asking themselves this question off and on ever since the cancellation of Operation Sealion, the plan to invade England following the defeat of France in the summer of 1940. By mid-May 1941, according to officers of the Naval War Staff, Britain was already in a position to mount raids and small landings, and exactly a year later the Army High Command estimated the strength of enemy forces in the UK at 44 divisions. The C-in-C West was prompted by these and similar indications to alert his units as early as February 1943 to the Possibility of a landing: “The signs and the available information give growing evidence that we must very soon face the long-expected major landing by the Anglo-Americans.”
In contrast to the Allies, the Germans had no central commanding authority where all information could be collated in the event of a landing. There existed instead a glorious profusion of intelligence agencies of all kinds, who not only worked solely for their own benefit, but also competed viciously against each other: besides the legendary “Abwehr” of Adm. Canaris, the “Foreign Armies West” department of the Army High Command was also responsible for intelligence-gathering. Similar departments with the same job were operated by the Foreign Office, C-in-C West, the Navy, the Luftwaffe and Himmlers Reich Central Security Office. The Reich SS Leader even succeeded in February 1944 in wrestling the “Abwehr” from the Armed Forces High Command. This process continued until June 1944, with a consequent fatal effect on intelligence-gathering and evaluation.
¦ Invasion Targets
This plethora of secret service agencies and their lack of cooperation inevitably meant that information obtained was never collated thoroughly enough to evaluate exacdy how true it was. It is no wonder therefore that in May 1944 the Germans believed Allied reports that there were approximately 80 divisions in Britain, making up five armies (British Second and Fifth, Canadian First and US First and Ninth) in two army groups, who were capable of launching 20 divisions across the Channel simultaneously. The defenders were also convinced at an early date that the main attack must come at the Pas de Calais, since the Allies would without doubt want to advance by the shortest route on the Ruhr. At the same time their vast potential would enable them to carry out diversionary operations practically anywhere along the coastline of Europe, from Norway to the Balkans. Hitler, the Wehrmacht Operations Staff, von Rundstedt and Rommel (the commander of Army Group B) all persisted in this basic evaluation of the situation until well after the actual landing. It was only Naval Group West and Air Fleet (Luftflotte) 3 in Paris who preserved any doubts in this respect. At the beginning of 1944, the officers of the Navy could not believe that the Americans and British would attack across the narrowest part of the Channel - just where the Germans might expect them to. They also regarded with some scepticism the copious reports of an American group of forces (FUSAG) in southeastern England, since according to their intelligence there was no shipping assembled there for them. How were these FUSAG troops to get across the Ghannel? In their view a more likely landing site was between the Somme estuary and Cherbourg.
In May 1944, Luftflotte 3 also came to this conclusion, following the Allied bombing of the Seine and Loire bridges. When the Luftwaffe officers
Reported their findings to superior authority, Allied intelligence managed to intercept and decode the transmission. Although it caused some anxious moments at SHAEF, this was not the case in the German camp. Hitler, the Wehrmacht Operations Staff, von Rundstedt and Rommel, luckily for the Allies, all ignored it. They continued to anticipate an invasion further to the northeast where, according to experience, the enemy would land in the vicinity of large ports. Huge concrete caissons (sections of Mulberry) had of course been observed in British harbors, but they were thought to be merely embarkation aids.
In addition to the site of the landing, the date and the time of the start of the invasion were naturally of critical importance for the defenders, if they wanted to avoid keeping their units on the coast at a permanent, wearying state of alert. According to the Germans, the invasion would have to be mounted after the winter storms, most probably in May, the earliest time by which at least five consecutive days of good weather could be guaranteed. The practice landing operations of the Allies in England and the recently completed operations along the Italian coast, however, also gave various indications of the nature and date of the coming invasion. The Germans thus knew they must expect a heavy air bombardment of their defenses and the early deployment of airborne forces and armored units, together with large-scale shelling from the enemy navy off the coast. All this would take place in the early dawn of the first day, about two to three hours after the low water.
If, with this background information, one studies the exact tables of Naval Group West, showing tides, phases of the moon and first and last light, the amazing conclusion becomes inescapable: in the area between Le Havre and Cherbourg - where many Navy officers indeed expected the landing to occur - the optimal conditions for a landing, should May slip by quietly, would prevail only during the period from June 5—7. Similar favorable conditions would not recur until the 19th of the month - and even then without the moonlit nights so important to the Allied air forces. Yet Hitler, Jodi (Chief of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff), von Rundstedt and even Rommel still remained unmoved by this evidence. They steadfastly maintained the same attitude towards the enemy that they had held for years. It was only Hitler himself who briefly adopted the idea that Normandy offered good conditions for an airborne landing. The strengthening of defenses against this eventuality however made little difference to the overall German defense plan.
World History
