The Sinai Campaign was in many ways classic. The opening phase was a brilliant application of the strategy of the indirect approach. Captain Sir Basil Liddell Hart, who coined this strategy, characterized the opening moves in the Sinai as one of the most brilliant applications of such an approach in the history of warfare — he considered the Sinai plan to have been ‘a work of art’. It was also the first opportunity accorded to the Israel Defence Forces to prove that what it had built since the War of Independence was an effective fighting force retaining the originality of movement and thought that had prevailed in the Israeli forces as they fought for the establishment of Israel in 1948-49. A marked degree of flexibility also characterized the main decisions in battle, with commanders proving themselves capable of adapting rapidly to changing conditions. This was particularly evident in the manner in which the task forces of the 7th Armoured Brigade were handled during the breakthrough at Abu Ageila. The Israeli reserve system, which had mobilized the Army for operations against Egypt in Sinai and had yet managed to keep the objectives of the operation secret, had proved itself. Israel succeeded at the same time in maintaining command of the air, before it became evident to the Egyptians that the British and French air forces were likely to become involved. But perhaps the most important point to note was that the tradition established in the War of Independence — whereby the officers invariably led and set a personal example in battle — was implemented in this campaign. A very high percentage of the casualties were incurred by the officers and NCOs and, in all phases of the battle, senior officers were to be seen leading their men under fire.
The Egyptians, who by and large had suffered many reverses during the operations against the Israelis, could maintain that they had not been defeated by the Israelis because they had been obliged to withdraw under the Anglo-French threat. Indeed, Nasser’s stand against the onslaught gained for him considerable political prestige, which he portrayed as a highly successful outcome in the final analysis of the war.
The Sinai Campaign also marked the inauguration of the United Nations Emergency Force for peace-keeping purposes. For ten years, the Force performed a valuable task. The failure in 1967 was not that of the Force on the ground, but rather that of the Secretary-General of the United Nations and of that organization itself. A new and important element, which was to become part of the Middle East scene, had been introduced.
World History
