The Strategic decision of the Israeli General Staff had been in favour of priority for the Golan Heights. In this area there was no depth, such as in the Sinai, and any local Syrian breakthrough could well endanger the Israeli centres of population in northern Galilee. The Syrians therefore had to be seen off the area as rapidly as possible, after which the Syrian Army had to be broken, thus removing the military threat poised against the country’s northern frontier. Only then could the weight of Israel’s military force be turned against the Egyptian forces. An additional consideration was the fact that help in the form of reinforcements — above all from Iraq, but also from Saudi Arabia and Kuwait — was on the way. And it was obvious that King Hussein of Jordan, until now sitting awkwardly on the fence of non-intervention, would be influenced in his future decisions by the fate of the Syrian Army. Time was of the essence, as reports of the Iraqi troop movements towards Syria were received. Furthermore, the withdrawing Syrian Army must not be given a chance to recover and absorb the equipment beginning to flow in from the Soviet Union.
At 22.00 hours on Wednesday 10 October, the General Staff held a conference to decide whether to consolidate positions along the ‘Purple Line’ or to continue the attack into Syria. Minister of Defence Dayan entered during the conference and Elazar outlined the pros and cons of the problem to him. Dayan was hesitant about an advance into Syria, mindful as he was of the danger of the possibility that such an advance could spark off Soviet intervention in order to defend Damascus. The Chief of Staff, General Elazar, however, was of the view that the Israelis had to achieve a penetration some twelve miles in depth: an advance to such a line would
Bring the Israeli forces to a point where an adequate defence line could be established, and also from where Damascus could be threatened by long-range artillery. Elazar believed that the establishment of the Israeli forces along such a line would neutralize Syria as an element in such a war and bring pressure to bear on Egypt. Dayan took Elazar and a number of officers to see Golda Meir. Following a discussion, the Prime Minister decided in favour of continuing the push into Syria, and General Elazar issued orders to Northern Command accordingly. The counterattack would commence on Thursday 11 October.
Hofi decided to launch the attack in the northernmost sector of the Golan, choosing this area because the left flank of the attacking forces would rest on the slopes of Mount Hermon, which would be impassable to Syrian armoured forces. The axis of advance constituted the shortest route to Damascus, 30 miles away, and the resultant threat to their capital city could influence the Syrian deployment. The terrain was rolling ground, affording good observation on the main Kuneitra-Damascus highway, along which Laner’s forces were due to advance. ‘Raful’ Eitan, with the 7th Brigade in the lead, was to command the break-in. Laner’s division, with Orr’s 79th Brigade and Sarig’s 17th Brigade under command, was to attack two hours after Eitan’s division along the heavily-fortified main Damascus road. Should Laner’s division be blocked, it would follow Eitan’s; if, however, Laner were to succeed along the Damascus road, Eitan would cover him and support him from the high ground to the north as he advanced. H-Hour was 11.00 hours on Thursday (it being difficult for the Israeli forces to attack earlier in the morning because the sun would be in their eyes). Laner would move at 13.00 hours.
Meanwhile the 7th Brigade was feverishly being refitted, tanks were being repaired, replacement equipment was being absorbed, and reinforcements were joining the units. As a result, two days after he was down to his last reserves in battle, Ben-Gal was ready to move into battle with a re-equipped and reinforced brigade.
The 7th Brigade mission was to take Tel Shams and Mazrat Beit Jan. Its southern boundary was to be the main Kuneitra-Damascus route passing through Khan Arnaba, Tel Shams and Sassa. The break-in point was chosen on what proved to be the correct assumption that the area was less-strongly defended in the north. As Ben-Gal saw it, one of his main problems would be to get through the Syrian minefields as rapidly as possible, because success or failure would be dictated by the rapidity with which he managed to deploy all his forces in battle. The break-in area was rocky, hilly and well-wooded. Ben-Gal divided his brigade into two forces. The northern force was composed of Avigdor Kahalani’s 7th Battalion and Amos’s newly-arrived reserve battalion — its mission was to capture Hader and Mazrat Beit Jan. The southern force, led by the remnants of 188 Brigade commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Yossi, consisted of two battalions of tanks with additional forces: the 5th Battalion under Lieutenant-Colonel Josh, a battalion under Yossi, and the remnants of the 4th Battalion. Their mission was to capture Jubata, the high ground north of Khan Arnaba, the Syrian Army camps at Hales and Tel Shams.
The Breakthrough, 11 October 1973
On Wednesday evening, after the Command orders group, Ben-Gal addressed all his assembled commanders. Looking at them, and recalling what they had been through in the past four days (many with difficulty managing to keep their eyes open), men to whom he knew the country owed so much, a strange emotion moved him. He launched into a
Touching address. In their logical sequence, the dry recital of the elements of an operation order, instinctive to every officer in every army, became a moving pronouncement. He was inspired as he faced the red-eyed, weary officers who had led their men so valiantly in so fateful a battle. He outlined the plan for the break-in to Syria and the exploitation of success.
At 11.00 hours on 11 October, units of what had been 188 Brigade crossed the ‘Purple Line’ and led the 7th Brigade forces into Syria. The remnants of a brigade that had been decimated in battle had reorganized and were leading the Israeli attack. 188 was a brigade in which 90 per cent of the commanders had died or had been wounded — only one original company second-in-command and two platoon commanders remained, not one company commander having survived the first battles. And yet here again the Brigade was in action. Facing Ben-Gal’s forces was the Moroccan Expeditionary Force in brigade strength, backed by some 40 tanks and covering the approaches to Mazrat Beit Jan. To the south of these forces was a Syrian infantry brigade reinforced with anti-tank weapons and some 35 tanks. The advance forces found the breaches through the Syrian minefields and, backed by artillery and air support, broke through them.
The 7th Brigade’s northern effort broke through the wooded area and, in bitter fighting, gradually gained the high ground and captured the Hader crossroads, forcing the Syrian 68th Brigade of the 7th Infantry Division to withdraw. Several days later the commander of this brigade, a Druze, Colonel Rafiq Hilawi, was paraded in a camp on the outskirts of Damascus: his badges of rank were torn off him as, with eyes blindfolded, he faced a firing squad. He had been court-martialled and sentenced to death for withdrawing, his guilt having been compounded by the intense suspicion with which the Syrian regime regarded the Druze people. The northern advance continued against Mazrat Beit Jan. After being held up initially by a counterattack mounted by Syrian armour backed by air support, the Israeli forces broke into the village on Friday 12 October. Heavy fighting took place in the village for some six hours. By 17.00 hours, Mazrat Beit Jan and the hills surrounding it were in Israeli hands. Golani infantry with armoured elements moved in to hold the area.
In the southern sector. General Eitan’s advancing division captured Tel Ahmar overlooking Khan Arnaba from the north. Eitan’s right flank and Laner’s left flank were now parallel one to another. By Thursday afternoon, the Druze village of Horfa had been taken, while on Friday morning the Maatz crossroads was taken. The leading battalion under Yossi was ordered to attack and capture the dominating feature facing the attacking forces along the Damascus road, Tel Shams. Three times his battalion was beaten back by intense anti-tank fire from Sagger anti-tank units positioned among the rocks and boulders in the volcanic plain on both sides of the road — the rocky nature of the terrain made it extremely difficult for tanks to deploy off the road. An attempt by Ben-Gal with two battalions failed to develop a wide sweep across the well-nigh impassable plain, despite the fact that some twenty Syrian tanks were knocked out at extreme ranges of some two miles in the fighting.
With two battalions deployed on the main road as a firm base engaging Tel Shams, Yossi cautiously led two companies totalling twenty tanks through the boulders and rocks along a path that they had discovered. The plan was to circle Tel Shams and attack it from the rear. Of his total tank force, eight arrived in the vicinity of the rear slopes of Tel Shams, took the Syrian force by surprise and destroyed ten of the Syrian tanks at close range. Covered by a heavy artillery bombardment, Yossi led his small force and stormed Tel Shams, with two tanks covering the attack and six attacking. As they neared the top of the hill, a hidden anti-tank battery opened fire, destroying four of the attacking tanks. Yossi himself was thrown out of his tank and lay wounded among the rocks. The covering force on the main Damascus road endeavoured to extricate Yossi but failed. Ultimately under cover of darkness a special paratroop unit, led by a young officer called ‘Yoni’, made its way through Syrian-occupied territory and, in a dramatic rescue operation, evacuated Yossi from under the noses of the Syrian forces on Tel Shams. (Three years later, the same ‘Yoni’, now Lieutenant-Colonel Jonathan Netanyahu, was to lead the attacking forces in one of the most remarkable rescue missions ever mounted, and saved over 100 Israeli hostages held at Entebbe airport; in that operation, Yoni, a Harvard graduate and an outstanding officer, was killed.) The ill-fated attack on Tel Shams was considered to have been a mistake, especially as it had not been co-ordinated by Ben-Gal with Eitan. Indeed it constituted a classic misuse of armour. This fact was emphasized when, on the night of Saturday 13 October, Eitan ordered units of the 31st Parachute Brigade to attack Tel Shams. Storming the dominating height at night, these crack units of the Israeli Army, fighting in their element, captured the position with a total loss of four wounded.
Meanwhile, to the south of Eitan’s forces, Laner’s division broke through the Syrian positions on the main Damascus road. The 17th Brigade was led by Colonel Sarig, who had been wounded in the initial attack across the ‘Purple Line’ and, heavily bandaged, had discharged himself from hospital to assume his command. Born in a kibbutz. Ran Sarig was the son of Nahum Sarig, who had commanded the ‘Negev’ Brigade in the War of Independence. When Ran was wounded in battle, his younger brother, who was serving in the Army, was lying seriously injured following a road accident. And, but a week before, a third brother, one of Israel’s promising young music composers, an officer in a paratroop brigade, had been killed while stemming the tide of the Syrian onslaught.
As the 17th Brigade moved forward in attack, a murderous concentration of artillery opened up on them, and seventeen of Sarig’s reconnaissance tanks were knocked out. Seeing the difficulties Sarig was experiencing, Laner moved forward units of the 79th Brigade to extricate him from the battle. However, as the situation looked its most desperate, Sarig’s remaining battalion mounted a second charge, and two tanks of the leading platoon reached the Khan Arnaba crossroads. Laner immediately altered his instructions and ordered the 79th Brigade to exploit Sarig’s success and move through Khan Arnaba, followed by the 19th Brigade, which had been transferred to Laner from Peled’s division.
As the 79th Brigade moved forward and the 19th Brigade moved southwards to Jaba and took Tel Shaar, the Syrians counterattacked and cut the main road in the area of Khan Arnaba, thus cutting-off and endangering those elements of Laner’s division that had moved forward. Moving stealthily under cover of darkness through the rocks and boulders of the lava plain, Syrian infantry with anti-tank bazookas turned the area into a virtual deathtrap for the Israeli tanks. Faced with this situation, Laner sent in a paratroop battalion, which fought all night mopping up the Syrian forces and evacuating the Israeli wounded.
World History
