In general, with but few exceptions, the Arab armies gave a good account of themselves in defence, primarily because the scheme of battle could be planned well in advance, and did not have to be departed from. They did not, however, give a good account of themselves in attack because of the
Inability of the junior leadership to adapt in the heat of battle to changing and unexpected circumstances. They continued to be plagued by the political mistrust between the Arab states and the internal bickering and lack of trust that characterized inter-Arab relationships. Always, the Israelis were able to take advantage of this lack of cohesion and unity between the Arab armies, and at times to deal with them piecemeal and individually. Thus, the Arabs have never been able to take full advantage of their numerical superiority, while the Israelis, usually operating along internal lines of communication, have always been capable of taking advantage of the rifts within the Arab world.
This was the situation in the 1956 war when, in effect, Israel succeeded in isolating Egypt both politically and militarily, creating a situation whereby its attack did not give rise to Arab intervention at Egypt’s side. The basic Arab mistake was to assume that the defeat of the Egyptian forces in 1956 was caused by the intervention of British and French forces against Egypt. This assumption led to overconfidence and an underevaluation of Israel’s forces on the eve of the Six Day War in 1967, with the resultant catastrophic results for Egypt, Jordan and Syria in the war. In 1967, the Arab world did indeed mobilize its forces at the side of President Nasser of Egypt as he publicly prepared for war against Israel. But here too the inherent problem emerged. The Jordanian forces were misled by false Egyptian reports into attacking Israel, and the Syrian Army, despite King Hussein’s pleas for support, dragged its feet and did not come to Jordan’s aid in its hour of need.
Nevertheless, in some ways, the Arabs did learn from their defeats. President Nasser, and after him President Sadat, analysed together with the Egyptian General Staff the errors made by their forces. The opening phases of the 1973 war as executed by the Egyptian Army proved that the lessons had been learned. President Sadat’s war of 1973 was intended to serve primarily a political rather than a military purpose, namely to set in motion a political process that would oblige Israel to return to the 1967 borders without requiring any Arab country to sign a peace treaty with Israel. The strategic and tactical surprise that the Egyptians and the Syrians achieved against Israel was undoubtedly an outstanding military success in itself, and followed the creation of a highly sophisticated and successful deception plan. The Egyptian crossing of the Suez Canal was a major military achievement, and was to be celebrated over the years as one of the great victories of Egyptian arms. (Ironically, in one of the bitter turns of history, it was at a military parade in Cairo to mark the eighth anniversary of the crossing of the Canal that President Sadat was assassinated.)
The Yom Kippur War undoubtedly led to the historic trip of President Sadat to Jerusalem, which in due course brought about the first peace treaty between Israel and an Arab state. The War had a major military and political impact on the Middle East, and must assume its place as a war of great historical significance. The entire science of military strategy and technique was re-evaluated in the light of its lessons. Furthermore, this was a war in which oil was used by the Arab oil-producing nations as a
Weapon, which became an international factor of consequence in the years after the war. As this war recedes. into history, it gains considerably in perspective, because of its military and political implications and lessons. The disengagement agreements between Israel and Syria and between Israel and Egypt; the interim agreement between Israel and Egypt in Sinai in 1975 involving the withdrawal of Israeli troops from the Suez Canal, the Abu Rudeis oilfields in Sinai and other strategic points; the activation of an electronic surveillance system by the United States in Sinai - all of these led ultimately to the peace treaty between Israel and Egypt coupled with the Israeli withdrawal from Sinai, and to a stabilization of the situation along the Israeli-Syrian border in the Golan Heights.
World History
