When war began in September 1939, the German Army plan for an attack on France was the one that had failed in 1914. The armies would wheel through the Low Countries rather like a gigantic door, the hinge in Luxembourg, the outer edge the Channel coast. If this door could be slammed down upon Paris, well and good; otherwise a mighty battle would be fought on the great plain of Flanders, which has for centuries been Europe’s favorite battlefield.
For such a movement, the units on the outer edge—which would have so much farther to travel around the rim—would need to consist of motorized soldiers; slower horse-drawn units would be positioned nearer to the hinge.
The Allies guessed that the Germans would adopt such a plan and, having decided to advance to meet the enemy and do battle in Belgium, also allotted their motorized formations to the outer rim of their front line. Although both sides were in accord as to what sort of war it was to be, few generals on either side believed that such strategy would come to fruition. The German High Command reported that their army was not strong enough to carry it through. Only after the victory in Poland did the prospect begin to look more feasible. When Hitler ordered the German Army to be enlarged to 130 divisions and the number of armored divisions increased from six to ten, the German generals looked toward France with new confidence. On the same afternoon that Poland capitulated, 27 September 1939, Hitler ordered his army to prepare an operational plan.
Arbeitsstab Rundstedt, the team which had produced the successful attack against Poland, was not consulted. This time the task was given to planners of the OKH headed by Haider, Director of Operations of the Army General Staff. By 10 October, Hitler had produced a fifty-eight page memorandum describing in some detail the way in which armored forces should attack on both sides of Liege. With this to inspire them, the OKH produced an equally mediocre plan for an envelopment of Ghent. Both of these ideas aimed for only modest gains which, at best, would merely separate the British Expeditionary Force from the French armies and secure for the Germans some forward air bases.
World History
