Plan D

The Arab strategy during April and May was to harass the Jews — to hold on to positions such as on the Jerusalem road, but not to enter into major military confrontations. They preferred to await the withdrawal of the British forces and the conclusion of the Mandate, when the Arab armies would invade the country. Meanwhile, the Haganah was obliged by the accelerated withdrawal of the British forces to advance the moves envisaged in Plan D. Part of this called for the reorganization of the Haganah, establishing regional commands and mobile brigades. By the time of the British withdrawal, the Haganah and Palmach field forces would number some 40,000 fighters under arms.

The Palmach forces were now under the command of Yigal Allon, a son of Galilee, born in the final month of the First World War in the shadow of historic Mount Tabor. One of the early commanders in the Palmach, he

The Conquest of Safed and its Surroundings (Operation 'Yiftach'May 1948)

Had been trained in Wingate’s Special Night Squads and had commanded a reconnaissance unit leading the Allied advance to the River Litani against the Vichy French in 1942. He was a young, handsome, dashing figure, a natural leader, and he became at the time a symbol for the Jewish youth. As commander of the Palmach, he proved to be the most effective Jewish military leader in the War of Independence. His generalship was outstanding. (When the state was established, he achieved general officer rank; but, because of political differences with David Ben-Gurion, he did not continue in the service and for this reason alone did not reach the top military position. He entered politics, serving in ministerial positions in various governments, including that of Deputy Prime Minister under Golda Meir and Yitzhak Rabin, and also as Foreign Minister. He died in March 1980 of a heart attack while running a campaign to become leader of the Israel Labour Party.)

The operational aspects of Plan D called for the securing of all areas allocated to the Jewish state under the United Nations Partition Resolution — plus areas of Jewish settlement outside those planned borders, in order to be in a suitable position to meet the invading Arab armies by deploying defenders across the axes of advance. The areas vacated by the British automatically became autonomous Jewish or Arab regions; thus, for instance, the area between Tel Aviv and Petach Tikva to all intents and purposes became the first district of the State of Israel, in the same way as did areas such as the triangle based on Nablus or the area of Hebron on the Arab side. In the implementation of Plan D, the Haganah went over to the attack in various parts of the country. In mid-April, units of the ‘Golani’ Brigade captured the city of Tiberias. When they cut the city in two, isolating a major part of the Arab population, the Arabs chose to evacuate the city and, with the assistance of units of the British Army, were transported east to Transjordan. Thus began the great tragedy of the Arab refugee population, which was to plague the Middle East for decades after the war.

On 30 April, Allon launched Operation ‘Yiftach’ to capture the strategically-important town of Safed in Galilee. The Jewish quarter there (with a population of some 1,500), had been under siege since February, for sited above it was the Arab town of some 10,000 inhabitants. On the eve of the British withdrawal from Safed on 15 April, the Palmach had infiltrated a platoon of troops to strengthen the depleted Haganah garrison. As the British forces had withdrawn, the major tactical positions in the city had been taken over by the Arabs — a police fortress on Mount Cana’an, an ancient fortress in the town and an additional strategically-sited building, Shalva House. Allon realized that failure to capture Safed could affect the entire military situation in northern Galilee. The strategic Nebi Yusha fortress overlooking the Huleh valley was also in Arab hands, and attacks on it on 15 April by both Palmach and Haganah forces were driven off with heavy loss of life.

On 28 April, Haganah forces captured the police fortress in Rosh Pinah and a neighbouring army camp. Bypassing Mount Cana’an, Palmach forces occupied the villages of Birya and Ein Zeitun to the north of Safed,

And from here opened a corridor leading into the Jewish quarter of Safed through which the first supplies were manhandled by the soldiers and carried into the starving quarter. The Jewish forces in the area were now strengthened by an additional Palmach battalion.

The first attack mounted on 5 May against the police fortress on Mount Cana’an failed, so Allon withdrew his forces and reorganized them. Then, on 10 May, a simultaneous offensive was mounted against the three strategic positions in Safed — the citadel on Mount Cana’an, the municipal police station in the old quarter and Shalva House. Aided by an unseasonably heavy rainfall, the Palmach forces fought all night, attacking in waves up the hilly streets of the town, fighting from house to house and from room to room. By the morning of the next day, the strongpoints were in Jewish hands and the by-now-familiar mass Arab evacuation from the town began. With the imminence of invasion by the Arab armies, the capture of Safed had been vital to maintain the Jewish position in north-east Galilee.

Operations in pursuance of Plan D spilled over into the northern Jordan valley with the seizure by the ‘Golani’ Brigade of the fortified police posts

The Battle for Haifa, 22 April 1948

At Zemach, south of the Sea of Galilee, and Gesher, to the south of it on the River Jordan. Farther south, Haganah troops seized Beit Shean, while a number of villages were captured to the west in the mountains of lower Galilee, thus giving depth to the area under Jewish control running north and south along the Jordan. At the same time, the Haganah secured the Mount Tabor and southern Carmel regions.

On 21 April, the British forces in Haifa evacuated their positions and concentrated in a number of military camps and in the port of Haifa. Operation ‘Scissors’ for the capture of the whole of Haifa was initiated by the ‘Carmeli’ Brigade. Mounting an attack from the high ground of the Carmel, the Jewish forces surprised the Arabs and succeeded in cutting Arab Haifa into three parts, whereupon the Arab commander of the city fled to Beirut. Major-General Hugh Stockwell, commander of the British 6th Airborne Division, convened a meeting of the Arab and Jewish notables of the city. The Jewish demand was for the Arabs to surrender and hand over their arms; at the same time, they urged their Arab neighbours to remain and to continue to live peacefully in the city. The Arabs went into caucus and were subjected to the urging of the representatives of the Mufti and of Kaukji, who advised them that an Arab military invasion was imminent, that the Jews would be wiped out and that their property would be ‘fair game’ for the Arab population. They could return to their homes after the Jews had been driven out. The Mufti’s consideration in giving this tragic advice was that the resultant stream of refugees would move the neighbouring Arab countries to go to war, a development that was not at that point wholly certain. Following the Arab decision, the Jewish mayor addressed them movingly, and promised them that they could continue to live peacefully side by side with their Jewish neighbours; but the Arab leaders persisted. General Stockwell and some of the leading Arab citizens also attempted to dissuade them, but again these efforts were unsuccessful. A five-day truce was arranged and a mass evacuation began. Out of an Arab population of 100,000, only a few thousand Arabs opted to remain in Haifa.

In Operation ‘Ben-Ami’, units of the ‘Carmeli’ Brigade, after securing Haifa, now seized Arab strongholds north of there and northeast of Acre, partly isolating that town. At the same time, they struck towards the north-east to establish direct communication with the Jewish settlements in western Galilee, such as Yehiam and Hanita. Napoleon Hill, east of Acre, had been constructed as an artillery emplacement overlooking the city fortifications by Napoleon Bonaparte during his siege of the city in 1799. A Jewish force now reached Shavei Zion by sea, took the hill and moved southwards towards Acre. On 17 May, after a few hours of mortar shelling, the city that Napoleon had failed to take when it was defended by Sir Philip Sydney, fell to the forces of Israel three days after the establishment of the state.

With a population of 70,000 Arabs, the city of Jaffa was adjacent to, and a continuation of, the Jewish city of Tel Aviv, and had been allotted by the United Nations Partition Resolution to the Arab state. Plan D did not call for the capture of the city, but it did call for the reduction of a

Number of Arab villages east of it (manned by Iraqi volunteers), which created a wedge between the Jewish areas to the north-east and south-east of Tel Aviv and endangered the road to Jerusalem. Jaffa was thus a thorn in the Jewish side. Arab attacks were being mounted constantly on the outlying areas of Tel Aviv, and snipers from Jaffa’s high buildings covered the main thoroughfares inside Tel Aviv, so that innocent passers-by could be picked off. However, as long as there was some prospect that the Arab armies would not invade the country and that the Arabs might ultimately reconcile themselves to the Partition plan, the Haganah refrained from attacking Jaffa. Instead, they chose to create a situation whereby the Haganah forces would control all approaches to that city. Accordingly, with the purpose of isolating it, of linking-up the brigade areas to the north and south of Tel Aviv and of opening the road to the international airport of the country, Lod (which had been allocated to the Jewish state), orders were issued to secure the area around Jaffa. In the last week of April, while the ‘Kiryati’ Brigade pinned down the forces defending Jaffa with feint attacks, the ‘Givati’ Brigade from the south and the ‘Alexandroni’ Brigade from the north began to mop-up along the approaches to the city.

Then, in the early morning of 25 April, without notifying the Haganah and without any prior co-ordination, the Irgun (IZL) concentrated a force of 600 men and launched an attack against Jaffa along the coastal strip connecting the two cities in the Manshiya area. However, stubborn Arab opposition forced the Irgun Command to approach the Haganah and reach an accord whereby all Irgun positions would come under the command of the Haganah area commanders. They also undertook not to initiate any actions unless agreed upon beforehand with the Haganah. Then, with limited Haganah support, the Irgun renewed the attack, cutting the Manshiya area in half. At this point, British forces intervened, bringing in a tank battalion and an artillery battalion and threatening to take action against Tel Aviv. An agreement was finally reached for the Haganah to replace the Irgun and the British forces to take up positions between the two cities. Thus, British and Haganah forces faced each other on the border of Tel Aviv for two weeks until the conclusion of the British Mandate. After this, the city of Jaffa surrendered, the bulk of the Arab population having already fled. A few thousand Arabs remained. The surrounding areas had already been cleared by the Haganah, and the central coastal area of Palestine was now in Jewish hands.

The fighting between the Jews and the Arabs had been very fierce, with little quarter being given on either side. The Arab leaders had openly declared that their purpose was to drive the Jewish population into the sea, to annihilate them. The Arab masses had been particularly affected by the uncontrollable hysteria that characterized the leadership as they suddenly and unexpectedly faced defeat. As a result, they had experienced a complete psychological collapse, moving from an extreme of euphoria to one of doom, depression and despair. They fully expected that the fate they had promised the Jewish population would be meted out to them. In

Every case, their leaders abandoned them and were the first to flee, advising the population to follow them and promising them that they would return after the invasion of Palestine with the victorious Arab armies; then, they would not only regain their homes but participate in the looting of the Jewish property that would ensue.

The Jews endeavoured, particularly in Haifa and in other places, to dissuade the Arab population from following their leaders in this. But the Arabs were torn by doubts and beset by an atmosphere of panic. Rather than risk what they believed might occur after the collapse of Arab resistance, they decided in most cases to take advantage of the presence of the British forces and to be evacuated under their aegis. Part of the Arab population (in all, about 150,000) resisted the urge to flee during the war; they remained and became citizens of Israel. The Israeli Arab population has grown today to some 550,000, constituting almost 15 per cent of the total population of Israel.

The Arab refugee problem created by the events of 1948 has been dealt with very frankly and openly by many Arab writers. In his memoirs,3 Khaled al-Azm, Prime Minister of Syria in 1948 and 1949, writes: ‘Since 1948 we have been demanding the return of the refugees to their homes. But we ourselves are the ones who encouraged them to leave. Only a few months separated our call to them to leave and our appeal to the United Nations to resolve on their return.’ And, writing in Falastin al-Thawra (official publication of the PLO) in March 1976, Abu Mazer, a member of the PLO Executive Committee, noted: ‘The Arab armies entered Palestine to protect the Palestinians. . . but instead they abandoned them, forced them to emigrate and leave their homeland. . . .’4