By June 10, the Allied forces had established and secured a lodgment in Normandy. Four corps were ashore, with their forward elements well inland of the assault beaches, connected by a continuous perimeter. They enjoyed the benefits of safe logistic and administration areas, and mutual support.
The US VII Corps was pressing northwards against Montebourg, westwards to force the line of the River Merderet, and south to invest Carentan. To the southeast of the US VII Corps, the US V Corps, having bounced across the marshy flood plain of the River Aure, was pushing south towards the River Elle. East of their area the British XXX Corps was struggling through the bocage south of Bayeux, British I Corps was deployed astride the River Orne, held to the north of Caen, with the troops east of the river crowded into a shallow bridgehead overlooked by enemy positions. Reinforcements and supplies poured in across the beaches; the minor ports were being cleared, and the two Mulberry harbors, one off Omaha beach and one near Gold, were being assembled.
Rommel’s plan to contain the landing forces on the beaches with his fortified positions, and destroy them between the tidelines, had failed. Because of Hitler’s belief that the Allied assault on Normandy was a feint, he was reluctant to release the mobile reserve forces that von Rundstedt and Geyr von Schweppenburg wanted to launch in a counterstroke. Those German units that were ordered to Normandy were hindered and delayed by the effects of Operation Point-blank, the offensive patrols of the 2nd Tactical Air Force, and disruption caused by the French Resistance. The German forces were unable to mount a major counteroffensive; all they could do was to defend and make local counterattacks. In the American sector, these were directed towards clearing the area around Carentan, in an attempt to force the US VII and V Corps apart. But the fall of Carentan to a pincer attack by both US corps on June 12 frustrated these German efforts. In the British sector, the most dangerous counterattacks were made by 21st Panzer Division, which continuously probed the defences of the bridgehead east of the Orne.
As the Allied buildup continued, the senior commanders considered their plans. Montgomery had expected that once the hard crust of coastal defenses had been penetrated, the Germans would conduct a fighting withdrawal, using counterattacks, ambushes and blocking actions to reduce and delay the Allied armies, until they reached strong positions on the Seine. Fie had planned to make the whole Allied beachhead absolutely secure, and build up an overwhelming superiority of men and materiel. Once certain of this superiority, he would launch breakout operations on both flanks simultaneously. The Anglo-Canadian armies in the east would pivot on Caen, swing to their left, and drive for the Seine. In the west the American forces were to break out on an axis selected by Gen. Bradley. Once through the enemy lines, they were to send one army southwest-wards to liberate Brittany. Another army was to move to the southeast, and advance parallel to the Anglo-Canadian troops, to the Seine. Once on the Seine, the Allies would have to prepare for a succession of opposed crossing operations.
But it was apparent by June 10 that the Germans would not conform to Montgomery’s expectations, and that his plans would have to be changed. Contrary to the conventional military doctrines, the Germans did not conduct a withdrawal after the beach defenses had been overrun. Hitler insisted that his soldiers must defend every inch of ground, and die in position rather than yield. This meant that the Allied armies did not advance as rapidly as intended. In the British sector, operations were particularly inhibited by the failure to take Caen as planned on D-Day. Caen was of critical importance as the most important center of communications in the British area. The Germans proved to be tenacious and very skillful in making the best possible use of the ground they were defending. They were assisted by the weather. Spells of heavy rain deprived the Allies of the benefits of their superiority in air power and in artillery.
Allied plans and actions were modified in accordance with the enemy behavior and adverse circumstances. The British Second Army mounted a series of offensive operations which aimed to take Caen and advance south of the city. An attack eastwards was barred by the inundated valley of the Dives, where the German engineers had worked to extend the flooded area. An attack south to the west of Bayeux would be impeded by a series of steep ridges, and dense bocage country. The British offensives. Perch, Epsom, Charnwood, and Goodwood, did not achieve a breakout. But they did maintain pressure on the German Army, so that it was never able to assemble a reserve big enough to make a successful counterattack. The British offensives also drew in German reinforcements. Highly mobile Panzer units were employed in static containment operations, digging in to hold ground. When not involved in making major offensives, the soldiers of the British Second Army kept up the pressure by constant local attacks and aggressive patrolling. These offensive activities were not decisive, but did have a great effect on the Germans. The Panzer reserves were held in waiting in front of the Second Army’s sector, because it was closest to Paris and to Germany, and therefore, according to conventional military thinking, the most likely place for the Allies to attempt their decisive attack. This meant that the German Army was never able to seize the initiative, and suffered from a very limited maneuver.
Like Montgomery and Dempsey, Bradley gave top priority to securing his base in Normandy. He felt confident that given a secure beachhead he could build up a local superiority that would guarantee victory, and was in no mood to risk a setback by optimistic and premature offensives. By mid-June he decided that his first aim must be to clear the Cotentin Peninsula and take Cherbourg. If the Cotentin remained in enemy hands, it would be a permanent menace to the rear of the US First Army. Furthermore, the German division in the Channel Islands and other formations located in Brittany might be sent into Cherbourg to reinforce the threat. On the other hand, once captured and cleared, Cherbourg would be a major asset to the Allied logistic infrastructure. Again, the fall of such a strongly fortified and garrisoned port would be bound to damage the morale of the German Army.
Once the Cotentin and Cherbourg were clear, Bradley could choose a suitable place for a breakout to the south. He was intent upon breaking through the German defenders, and conducting a war of maneuver deep in their rear. Pushing back the enemy was bound to be a slow process, and costly in casualties. Bradley wanted a swift, decisive operation to minimize casualties. But it was not easy to pick a good axis for the breakout attack. In the far west of the American sector there were desolate moorlands strewn with rocks, bad going for armor and affording little cover for infantry. Inland of the moors were extensive marshlands, extended by German hydraulic engineers, crossed by long straight causeways, too deep for wading and too shallow and reedy for boats to cross. Beyond the marshes lay the bocage country, hills and deep, narrow streams, the hills one-third woodland and orchard, the rest a patchwork of tiny fields surrounded by hedgerows. In the extreme east of the American sector lay the great Foret de Cerisy, dense woodland traversed by a few roads and rides which would canalize any large-scale movement.
The key ground to the south of the US First Army was the town of St. L6, which had been scheduled for capture by June 12. St. L6 was at the center of the major road network in west Normandy, and commanded crossings of the Vire, the most important river in the American sector. The town had been flattened by incessant bombing between June 6 and 12, but remained in German hands. As Bradley was deciding to take Cherbourg before moving south, the German command concluded that St. L6 was more important than the Cotentin. Accordingly, the German plan was to hold St. L6, not only to retain a center of communication, but also to test the morale and resolution of the American Army and if possible to break its spirit.
Bradley knew that the capture of St. L6 would cost his army bitter fighting and heavy casualties and was reluctant to attack the town directly. But the logic of geography was inexorable. Having attempted to push his troops across the marshes to the west of the Vire, and probed the moorlands beyond, Bradley was eventually driven to the conclusion that there could be no breakout until St. L6 was taken. Thus, just as in the British sector the vital operations were centered on Caen, in the US sector the most important and vicious battle was fought for St. L6. Once St. L6 fell, on July 18, the way was clear for operation Cobra — the decisive breakout attack.
¦ Operation Perch
The first major British offensive began on June 10. The plan for Operation Perch was to make a wide outflanking maneuver to the west of Caen, crossing the River Odon to seize high ground near Evrecy. The XXX Corps was to employ the 50th Division to break defensive positions held by Panzer Lehr in the area of Tilly sur Seulles, Juvigny, Hottot and la Senaudiere. Once the way was clear, 7th Armoured Division was to drive through to Evrecy, taking Villers-Bocage on the way. Montgomery arranged for Allied tactical aircraft: to provide reconnaissance. The initial attack by 50th Division was also supported by the fire of two cruisers and a battleship.
Despite the lavish support, the attack by 50th Division made litde progress. This was due in part to the inherent difficulty of movement through the bocage. But it was also because of the sheer quality of the enemy, the elite Panzer Lehr Division, which was effectively supported by the 12th SS Panzer Division (Hitler Youth) from the east. On June 10 the Germans launched their own preemptive attacks on the forward positions of 50th Division. On the left side of 50th Division, the 8th Durham Light Infantry (DLI), newly in possession of the village of St. Pierre, next to Tilly, were vigorously attacked. From across the River Seulles they were subjected to heavy artillery and mortar bombardment by Panzer Lehr. From the east the 12th SS sent tanks to shell the village, and infantry to infiltrate through the orchards and gardens. These infiltration teams established machine gun posts to pour concentrated fire onto the Durhams. The 24th Lancers were deployed on Point 103, north of St. Pierre, to support the Durhams. But neither they nor the Sherwood Rangers who relieved them for the night of June 10/11 could move forward because the slope south of the hill was covered by the fire of Panzer Lehr’s heavy tanks and self-propelled guns, dug in on higher ground west of the Seulles.
The Germans made four strong attacks on St. Pierre and Point 103 on June 11. The most violent occurred in the evening, described by an officer of the 24th Lancers:
“...a number of Tigers penetrated our positions, up to Brigade HQ. Six of our tanks were knocked out in as many seconds. We withdrew to the west of the hill. Hidden in the trees we sighted our guns onto the advancing monster Tigers and Panthers. The Shermans shook with the recoil of their guns. Most of our armour piercing shells were bouncing harmlessly off the enemy... the few remaining tanks were called up, those that mounted the new enormous 17 pounder... An ear-splitting crack, a vivid flash - and whoosh - the leading Tiger stopped, smoked, and then burst into flames. The others began to withdraw. Meanwhile the German infantry were working their way up the left flank of the hill. I could hear the bullets pattering on the outside of my tank. The infantry could hardly lift their heads. The firing became intense... we held. Slowly darkness fell. The enemy withdrew.”
Next morning the HQ Squadron of 24th Lancers discovered a whole company of Panzer Grenadiers, lavishly equipped with close-range antitank weapons, who had infiltrated into their midst during the night.
On June 12 the enemy attacks abated. The 8th DLI were withdrawn from St. Pierre, having been reduced to half their effective strength.
Further west, 231st Brigade attempted to push south towards Hottot and Longraye, but were held up in the hedgerows. The German defenders had prepared successive defensive positions, and supported them with mobile counterattack groups of armor and infantry. They employed mines and antitank weapons to separate tanks from infantry, and snipers to kill leaders at all levels. The British attackers found it difficult to counter these tactics, and to coordinate their artillery and air support in the close country.
On June 12, the XXX Corps commander, Gen. Bucknall, decided that he must change the plan. Whilst the 50th Division continued to attack to hold Panzer Lehr, the 7th Armoured Division would move further west. Here they would advance through positions held by the German 352nd Division, which had been heavily engaged for six days and was showing signs of demoralization. During the afternoon of June 12, the 22nd Armoured Brigade, followed up by 131st Motorized Infantry Brigade, moved round the western flank of Panzer Lehr, skirting the inter-army boundary beyond which the US V Corps was advancing on Caumont. Enemy resistance was light, and early on the morning of June 13, the 7th Division’s leading elements passed through Villers-Bocage unopposed. At Point 103, on the road to Caen, A Squadron of the County of London Yeomary (CLY) and A Company of the 1st Rifle Brigade halted. As the sentries were being deployed, the column was attacked by a detachment of German tanks led by SS-Hauptsturmfuhrer Michael Wittmann, who had driven west from Baron-sur-Odon in search of action. Wittmann’s approach had been masked by the bulge of the ridge, and the noise of his tanks’ engines muffled by the trees and drowned by the sounds of CLY’s own vehicles so he achieved complete surprise. The first round from the 88mm gun on his Tiger destroyed the leading vehicle in the British column, so immobilizing the tanks and halftracks stretching behind it into Villers-Bocage. As his accompanying four Mark IV Panzers engaged the head of the column, Wittmann motored along it, putting a shell into each vehicle as he passed. Wittmann drove through the town, then returned to attack the confused British troops in it again. On his third pass through the town centre, a Sherman Firefly waiting in ambush, using a shop window opposite the square as a mirror, knocked out the Tiger with a hit on the engine. Wittmann and his crew fled on foot, pistols in hand, and got clean away.
Meanwhile, German tanks and infantry began to arrive in small detachments, and attempted to break into Villers-Bocage from the south. By late afternoon the Germans were making well-coordinated attacks with infantry and artillery, and the 22nd Armoured Brigade moved back westwards to occupy a position just east of Amaye-sur-Seulles. Here the brigade set up a box position. This position withstood a series of German attacks: noisy attacks made by armor and infantry with substantial support from mortars and artillery, and silent infiltration by infantry. Meanwhile, the 7th Armoured Division HQ ordered the 131st Brigade to keep open the line of communication to 22nd Armoured Brigade, and hoped that 50th Division could advance to reach the box. However, the corps commander decided that 7th Armoured Division was vulnerable to isolation, and ordered it to withdraw. During the night of June 14/15, with massive support from the corps artillery, 7th Armoured Division withdrew to positions in conformity with the 50th Division’s front line. The 2nd Panzer Division attempted a pursuit, but was severely checked by the 7th Division’s rearguard. The operation had not reached its objectives, indeed 50th Division did not secure Hottot until June 19, and Villers-Bocage was not taken until early August. However, German plans to insert 2nd Panzer Division along the inter-army boundary had been frustrated.
¦ Operation Epsom
The next major British offensive, Epsom, was carried out by VIII Corps, which was forming up in Normandy. The assembly of the corps, and the offensive, were delayed by the storm of June 19-22. The attack began on June 26. The plan for Epsom had two phases. For Phase I the objectives were Hills 112 and 113 near Evrecy, as in Operation Perch. Once this high ground had been taken it was to be the base for Phase II, an advance eastwards across the Orne, to seize key ground south of Caen, so threatening that city with encirclement. The axis of advance for Phase I was east of TiUy-sur-Seulles, and ran across the front held by 3rd Canadian Division, part of I Corps. To the immediate west of the VIII Corps’ avenue of attack was the Rauray Spur, a ridge of high ground which dominated ground to the east and south, and covered the road running from Villers-Bocage to Caen. The 49th Division, part of XXX Corps, was ordered to take this feature on June 25. On the other flank, 3rd Canadian Division was to continue its attempts to take the aerodrome at Carpiquet. Before the ground troops moved forward, German positions south of the start line were to be attacked by a mass of strategic bombers. Tactical aircraft based in the theater were to cover the flanks of the VIII Corps sector, and interdict enemy forces moving into the area. Phase I was to commence with a massive artillery barrage fired by 552 field, 112 medium, 48 heavy and 24 heavy anti-aircraft guns drawn from all three corps and Army Troops. The Navy would provide additional support from three cruisers and a monitor. The 15th Scottish Division was to lead the attack for Phase I, with two brigades forward, following a creeping barrage, supported by Churchill tanks of the 31st Tank Brigade. Once the 15th Division had cleared the bottleneck at the village of Cheux, provided all was going well the 11 th Armoured Division was to advance through 15th Division on two axes, seize bridges over the Odon, and go on to take Hills 112 and 113. The 43rd Division would consolidate the captured ground whilst 15th Division moved up to support the armored division. If the 15th Division was held up, then 11th Armoured would be held back until an opportunity for exploitation was perceived. The 4th Armoured Brigade was attached to the corps for use as a mobile reserve.
In the event, the enemy and the weather combined to disrupt the plan for Epsom. The Germans were acutely aware of the importance of the Rauray Spur, and determined to hold it. The attack by the 49th Division on June 25, made with two brigades forward and an armored brigade in support, was repulsed. The village of Rauray was eventually taken late on June 27, but the Germans continued to contest control of the village and Spur with repeated counterattacks. This meant that throughout Epsom, the right flank of the VIII Corps’ axis of advance was insecure, and the road from Villers-Bocage via Noyers-Bocage was open for Panzer counterattacks. On the morning of June 26 the weather in England was too bad for the strategic bombers to fly, so they could not bomb ahead of the start line as planned.
The weather in Normandy was wet, but this did not prevent the artillery from preparing the way for the infantry; 240 field guns and 80 medium guns fired a creeping barrage from the start line just south of Bretteville-rOrgueilleuse and Brouay, whilst the other guns did counterbattery shoots or put concentrations on the flanks and targets in depth. This effort employed the largest concentration of guns used so far on the Allied front. Behind the barrage the infantry advanced, the 46th Brigade, with two battalions leading, heading for Cheux, and the 44th Brigade in similar formation moving on St. Manvieu. They were closely accompanied by Churchill tanks. The ground ahead was held by the Engineer Battalion of 12th SS Panzer.
Initially, the Scots advanced briskly. The Hitler Youth soldiers deployed in the cornfields had been stunned and driven deep into their rifle pits by the bombardment; when they raised their heads they were assailed by furious Scotsmen yelling and hurling grenades. But around le Mesnil-Patry an anti-tank minefield stopped the Churchills accompanying the 46th Brigade, leaving the infantry to press on alone. The going was heavy due to the rain, and south of the River Mue, the infantry fell behind their creeping barrage. The Hitler Youth sappers had thoroughly prepared Cheux and St. Manvieu for defense; the villages had been loop-holed, mined and garnished with booby-traps. By the time the British assaults began, the German defenders had recovered from the effects of the barrage. The 44th Brigade took St. Manvieu by noon, but were then mortared and shelled continuously, except during two counterattacks made from the east by 12th SS Panzer and 21st Panzer in the afternoon. The 46th Brigade had to clear Cheux by close-quarter fighting house to house, in which-the 2nd Glasgow Highlanders lost 12 officers and 200 soldiers. It proved impossible to drive the Germans out of le Haut-du-Bosq, a straggling settlement southwest of Cheux, running up the rising ground towards Rauray. The Germans on the Rauray Spur and in le Haut-du-Bosq supported each other very effectively. The official history of the VIII Corps remarked of the situation on the afternoon of June 26 “The wooded areas from the southern slopes of le Haut-du-Bosq to the west and southwest were unsubdued and filled with small parties of infantry, supported by tanks, often dug in, and anti-tank guns which.
Through their effective concealment and rapid changes of position, gave much trouble.”
In the early afternoon the Northamptonshire Yeomanry, reconnoitering for 11th Armoured Division, struggled through the ruins of Cheux. Just south of the village they were attacked by infantry with sticky bombs. On reaching the Ruisseau de Sabley they were fired on by anti-tank guns direcdy to the south. ITie 29th Armoured Brigade moved southwards through Cheux with difficulty, but did not attempt to rush the Odon bridges.
On the evening of June 26, the 227th Brigade, the third brigade of the 15th Division, moved forward, but was stopped on the Ruisseau de Sabley. During the night the 43rd Division relieved the 44th and 46th Brigades, which prepared to resume the attack next day. On the morning of June 27 all attempts to move down the western axis to take the bridges at Gavrus were stopped. Indeed, in the morning a German armored force fought its way up the road covered by the Rauray Spur and got into Cheux for an hour. But on the eastern flank the British made progress. German attempts to concentrate forces for counterattacks attracted attacks by RAF 83 Group Typhoons, which broke them up. The 227th Brigade forced its way, in column of battalions, down the road through Colleville and Tourville to seize the bridge at Tourmauville. The battalions of the brigade dug-in and held the road. This was uncomfortable, and dangerous, for the enemy held higher ground south of the Odon in its steep wooded valley. The road, now known as “Scotch Corridor,” was fired upon by nebelwer-fers, mortars, artillery and anti-tank guns. The soldiers could do nothing but simply had to sit in their foxholes and endure the bombardment. Despite the shelling, 29th Armoured Brigade raced down the road, across the Tourmauville bridge, and on to Hill 112.
Later in the day the 159th Brigade, the motorized infantry of 11th Armoured Division, moved up to form a defensive perimeter around the bridge. This relieved the 2nd Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders, who went off on an adventure of their own. In the late afternoon patrols sent westwards along the banks of the Odon discovered that the bridges at Gavrus were undefended; the Germans had created a strong position on the road to the north. The whole battalion moved to secure the bridges. This was a difficult move; according to Maj. McElwee, a veteran of the action, it was “a nightmare trek through the thick woods lining both banks of the Odon. All-round defence in such country was impossible. The going was vile, and at one place the whole march was held up for over an hour while the anti-tank guns were man-handled over a sticky patch. Any well-planned ambush might have proved fatal.” Once at Gavrus the Argylls deployed, and waited for the road north to be opened, but it never was. Instead the battalion was isolated by persistent attacks. Attempts by the 15th Division to force the road through the German positions at le Valtru failed. Indeed, this was the area of the strongest and most frequent German counterattacks. Eventually the battalion withdrew on the night of July 1-2, having been cut off for four days.
Meanwhile, 11th Armoured Division had made the most of the eastern axis. On June 28, the 29th Armoured Brigade, reinforced by 44th Royal Tank Regiment, had cleared and secured the crown of Hill 112. Next day the Germans were driven from their positions on the soutfi slopes of the hill. The 29th Armoured Brigade enjoyed excellent views across the valley of the Orne to the rolling downlands south of Caen.
However, Gen. O’Connor, the commander of VIII Corps, was concerned. The enemy continued active resistance on the western side of his axis. The wooded Odon valley was vulnerable to infiltration by infantry. Scotch Corridor, the only line of communication to Hill 112, was subject to enemy observation and under heavy fire. There was intelligence that the II SS Panzer Corps was moving into the area to deliver a counterstroke. Accordingly, on June 28, O’Connor ordered that there was to be no further advance until the area between Cheux and the Odon had been thoroughly mopped up. On June 29 the Germans showed their strength by preparing five counterattacks. A column of three battalions mixed with armor attacked up the road from Noyers-Bocage and broke into Cheux; an infantry assault pushed eastwards into Grainville; there was a push on Gavrus which forced the Argylls out of the village; 29th Armoured Brigade was forced back up the south slope of Hill 112 and a force of 40 tanks moved westward from Caen. These attacks were all greatly disrupted by British artillery and tactical air power. The Panzers motoring out from Caen were caught in the open near Carpiquet by Typhoons and dispersed. The other attacks were crushed by massive artillery bombardments. The Germans made no serious attacks on June 30, but on July 1 attempted to push along four axes, from east and west, simultaneously. Once again, the artillery broke up these attacks before they could make an effective impact. The sheer volume of high explosive demoralized the German soldiers; the commander of 2nd Panzer Division, von Luttwitz, remarked: “The incredibly heavy artillery and mortar fire of the enemy is something new both for the seasoned veterans of the Eastern Front and new arrivals.”
But the German counterattacks on June 29 had been effective, for they persuaded O’Connor that he could not proceed to Phase II of Epsom, and should withdraw 29th Armoured Brigade from Hill 112, The 29th Armoured Brigade felt disappointed, but, as Gen. Roberts, the divisional commander, observed, they were “.... out on a limb”. The brigade evacuated Hill 112 on the night of June 29. The VIII Corps was reinforced by 53rd Division and 32nd Guards Brigade, and consolidated its gains. Epsom had gained about six miles (9.6km) and inflicted serious damage on the enemy, especially during the repeated and unsuccessful counterattacks made by the Panzer formations. Apart from 12th SS Panzer, these included Panzer Lehr, 2nd Panzer, 21st Panzer, 1st SS Panzer, 9th SS Panzer and 10th SS Panzer. All the divisions could have been employed more effectively in the offensive role had they not been drawn to contain the Odon bridgehead. In fact, Epsom had forced Rommel to commit his entire strategic reserve in Normandy, and convinced him that the German Seventh Army should make a fighting withdrawal to the Seine. But Hitler absolutely forbade any withdrawal; he argued that in the face of Allied superiority in airpower and artillery the only sensible policy was to dig in deep and defend every inch of ground.
¦ Operations Chamwood and Goodwood
Having failed to take Caen on D-Day, and made two fruitless attempts to compromise the garrison of the city by flanking maneuvers, Montgomery decided that the British Second Army must storm it. He had considered an offensive operation from east of the Odon, but ruled it out because the bridgehead was small, congested with troops, and overlooked by the enemy from three sides. However, there was no doubt the Germans would exact a very high price for Caen. On July 4, the Canadian 3rd Division attacked and took the village of Carpiquet, but were repulsed from the airfield by 12th SS Panzer. The main attack on Caen, Operation Charn-wood, was made on July 8. The I Corps deployed the 3rd Canadian Division to the west, British 59th Division in the center and the British 3rd Division on the east. In order to overawe the enemy and hearten the attacking troops. Bomber Command devastated the city in a massive raid on the evening of July 7. But the Germans had located most of their defensive positions so close to the British front line that the bombs missed them. In fact, the physical effects of the bombing made the task of clearing Caen much more difficult for I Corps. However, they fought through the German defenses and cleared the city up to the Orne. The Germans, however, retained the industrial quarters east of the river.
Ten days later. Second Army launched Operation Goodwood, the last great British attack before the breakout in the west. By mid-July Montgomery was under political pressure to do something decisive, or at least spectacular, to appease the press and public opinion. The success of the landings on June 6 had created a euphoria and expectation of easy victory which had been disappointed. Montgomerys critics at SHAEF, in particular Air Marshal Tedder, claimed that the Allied breakout had been delayed because Montgomery was too cautious. This pressure made Montgomery apprehensive. He was also aware that in the American sector Bradley was having difficulty; his plan to advance dovm the west side of the Cotentin to Coutances had stalled, and progress towards St. L6 was slow and costly The Germans had reinforced Seventh Army with infantry, and were planning to create a mobile armored reserve with which to make a major countermove in the US sector. But it was difficult to decide where to attack; Perch and Epsom had tested the possible avenues west of Caen; the city itself was still choked with rubble and pardy held by the enemy. Only the Orne bridgehead remained, and this was the area through which Good-woodwsis launched, despite its inherent disadvantages. Chief amongst these was the constricted and crowded nature of the bridgehead; this meant that only one armored brigade of the main attacking force could be assembled there before the offensive began; it also meant that there was no room to deploy extra field artillery behind the start line, so the fire support provided by 25-pounder field guns could cover only the first few miles of the advance from positions west of the Orne. These considerations did not deter Dempsey, commander of the Second Army, who believed that the German army in Normandy had been so worn down by attrition that it was no longer capable of effective resistance. According to his intelligence, the enemy facing I Corps east of the Orne consisted of the 346th Infantry Division, 16th Luftwaffe Field Division and 21st Panzer, all seriously depleted and exhausted, deployed in a defensive position four miles (6km) deep. In fact, Rommel had realised that the open rolling country between the Orne and the Bois de Bavent ridge to the east was good going for tanks, and had taken measures to defend it. The German defenses were actually eight miles (12km) deep, and very well designed.
The forward posts were held by the 16th Luftwaffe Field Division and 346th Infantry Division; behind them, on the slopes of the Bourguebus Ridge was a network of stone-built villages, each held by antitank guns protected by infantry, and with overlapping arcs of fire, under the 21st Panzer Division; along the crest of the Ridge were 78 88mm guns of the II Flak Corps; on the reverse slope of the Ridge three counterattack groups were in waiting, each of some 40 tanks and a battalion of Panzer Grenadiers. The general artillery reserve of guns, mortars and nebelwerfers was concealed in the woods of Garcelles-Secqueville, also on the reverse slope. On the eastern flank, around Emieville, a detachment of Tigers lurked amongst the copses and manor houses, with excellent views across the open fields towards Caen. In Colombelles, the Germans had observation posts on the chimneys of the steelworks which gave a panorama of the whole area. The 1st and 12th SS Panzer Divisions were ready to reinforce this area if necessary.
The Second Army plan drawn by Dempsey envisaged a massive air raid by 2,000 aircraft to destroy all enemy positions ahead of the start line, then a rolling barrage to work over the first four miles (6km) of the advance. The main attack, from between Ste. Honorine-la-Chardon-nerette and Escoville, was to be made by VIII Corps. For Goodwood, VIII Corps consisted of 11th Armoured Division, Guards Armoured Division, and 7th Armoured Division, advancing in echelon in that order. The 29th Armoured Brigade was to follow the barrage, leaving the Divisions motorized infantry, 159th Brigade, to clear the villages of Demouville and Cuverville on the eastern outskirts of Caen, then race forward southwards over the Bourguebus Ridge, as far as possible towards. Falaise. Guards Armoured and 7th Armoured were to follow as swiftly as possible, the armor leaving the infantry brigades behind if they could not keep up once beyond range of the 25-pounders; Typhoons were there to provide any close support required. But Dempsey believed the Germans were demoralized and on the verge of collapse, and that it might be possible to push light forces into Falaise, so cutting the line of retirement of all German forces west of the Orne. Whilst the VIII Corps was racing southwards, the II Canadian Corps was to slog through and clear the industrial suburbs of Caen, on the western flank. On the eastern side of the VIII Corps axis, 3rd Division was to advance along the Bois de Bavent Ridge, taking the villages at the foot, clearing the woods on the crown, and seize Troarn.
Montgomery considered Dempseys plan far too optimistic, he had a much greater respect for the German defenders. He altered the plan to set VIII Corps objectives just beyond the Bourguebus Ridge; his aims were to tie down, draw, and reduce the German armor, and to expand and make safe the Orne bridgehead. Gen. Roberts, commanding the 11th Armoured Division, had doubts about the plan; he thought it was unsound to push his tanks forward without their infantry. His comments were discounted by O’Connor and Dempsey, who believed that the weight of the aerial bombardment and sheer number of tanks would overwhelm the enemy.
July 18 was a fine day, and the heavy bombers of Bomber Command arrived over the battlefield at 05:45 to attack the villages along the flanks of VIII Corps’ sector. They were followed by medium bombers which carpeted the main axis with fragmentation bombs; the intention was to destroy enemy personnel and equipment without cratering the ground. The artillery fired counterbattery missions against German flak during these air raids. At 07:45 the main barrage commenced, as a third wave of aircraft attacked Troarn and Bourguebus.
The heavy bombing on the flanks was effective. Half of the Tigers in the heavy tank unit at Emieville were knocked out, and the commander, Lt. von Rosen, recalled that under the stress of the bombardment two of his men committed suicide and one went mad. Later in the morning, soldiers of the 3rd Division moving up the eastern flank found “villages that were battered beyond description. Those Germans left conscious were far too dazed to offer any resistance.” But by the time the 3rd Division’s leading elements reached the outskirts of Troarn and the Caen-Troarn railway, the Germans had recovered, and mounted a stout defense. Despite strenuous efforts, the 3rd Division could not take Troarn or the hamlets around Emieville.
In the center, the 29th Armoured Brigade advanced through the positions of the 51 St Highland Division. They were delayed and disordered by having to pass through a defensive minefield laid by the 51st, but kept moving forward. Until they crossed the Caen-Troarn railway they were opposed only by snipers hiding in the corn. The 159th Motorised Infantry followed, then swung west to clear and secure Demouville and Cuverville. The 29th Armoured Brigade pushed on alone. The armored brigade of Guards Armoured Division was held up by a traffic jam on the approaches to the bridges over the Orne and Orne Canal; the Guards were on time, the leading elements of 7th Armoured Division were ahead of schedule.
The 29th Armoured Brigade was alone, with only its integral battalion of half-track infantry the 29th Armoured Brigade was alone, when it reached the Caen-Vimont railway. The 3rd Royal Tank Regiment were on the right, 2nd Fife and Forfar Yeomanry on the left, with the 23rd Hussars in reserve. As the leading regiments ascended the gentle concave slope of the Bourguebus Ridge they came under concentrated crossfire from antitank weapons in the villages, backed up by 88s from the crest of the Ridge.
The tanks of the 29th Armoured Brigade continued to fight, and tried to find ways forward. But they lacked the means to attack the villages, because they were short of infantry and were beyond the range of the field artillery. Their own self-propelled guns were insufficient to suppress the antitank batteries. Above, a “cab rank” of Typhoons flew, but were unable to give close support as planned. This was because the brigade had only one Forward Air Controller with them, at Brigade Tactical HQ, and, according to Gen. Roberts’s memoirs, “Only minutes after the armored brigade’s Tac HQ had arrived at their ‘embankment’ position and the RAF had first got contact with the ‘cab rank’, a shell scored a direct hit on the armoured car, the RAF officer was badly wounded and the armoured car was a write-off.” ‘When the self-propelled guns attempted to mark enemy targets with pink smoke, the enemy replied in kind. The pilots could not tell friend from foe in the confused melee on the Bourguebus Ridge.
Meanwhile, the Guards Armoured Division advanced into battle for the first time. The tanks were delayed by the 51st Division’s minefield, and found the Germans recovered from the successive shocks of the bombing and the artillery barrage. Gen. Adair, commanding the division, recalled in his memoirs, “... my tank had two near-misses from a bazooka team lying in a cornfield.” Ahead of the general, the 2nd Grenadier Guards led the division, but found that “Every advantage lay with the defenders; the ground haze was thickened by the dust churned up by the armour, and thick hedges and belts of tall trees limited the vision of the tank commanders as they peered through their fieldglasses, trying to pick out the enemy guns in the corn and root fields. Three tanks of the leading squadron were hit when they were still over a mile (1.6km) from Cagny, and as it was impossible to escape the fire by maneuvering to left or right the squadron was brought to a standstill.” The Grenadiers were engaged from the front, by antitank guns in le Prieure Farm, and from their left by the Tigers around Emieville. As the armor of the division shifted westwards to support the 29th Armoured Brigade, Gen. Roberts gave warning that the village of Cagny was highly dangerous and strongly held. He was in error, for Cagny was occupied by only four 88s, one tank and a section of infantry, but the 88s had opened fire suddenly on the Reserve Squadron of the 23rd Hussars and done great damage, and this had impressed the general. The Guards duly took warning, and made formal attacks, with infantry support, on le Prieure and Cagny.
The fighting on the Bourguebus Ridge continued. On two occasions troops of Shermans managed to reach the crest, using the smoke of burning tanks to cover their movement; but each time they were pushed back by an enemy counterattack group. Late in the morning, the commander of 22nd Armoured Brigade (of 7th Armoured Division) arrive on a recce, and according to Roberts, said: “There are too many bloody tanks here already. I’m not going to bring my tanks down yet.” In his view, O’Connor’s scheme to rush the enemy defenses with a mass of armor had simply provided the German antitank gunners with a big juicy target. When the 2nd Irish Guards arrived northwest of Cagny they observed, “...a confused mass of tanks shooting in all directions... the little rises in the ground and occasional hedges, combined with the standing corn, gave excellent cover from which the Tigers and Panthers could shoot up the steady stream of Shermans as they came across open country.”
The Guards cleared Cagny and its outposts in the afternoon, and tried to press on southeastwards along the railway to Vimont. But they made little progress, because the Germans had posted tanks and antitank guns protected by infantry in the hedgerows on the rising ground from Emieville to Frenouville. The approaches to this belt of dense cover were open, and in places the ground was soft. As the Guards closed with the enemy, according to the history of the Irish Guards, the attack lost cohesion, “... dissolved into isolated games of hide and seek among the corn stacks and hedges...” As the day wore on, “In the failing light the tanks were on top of each other before they fired.” After nightfall the exhausted tank regiments fell back and went into laager. Infantry came up to consolidate the captured ground, and to mop up pockets of resistance in the rear. Some went forward to explore the enemy positions, and came to close quarters.
By the end of the fighting on July 18, VIII Corps had lost about 220 of the 700 tanks committed to the attack. The Germans had lost some 120 of the 240 tanks they had put into the battle. The corps had gained approximately six miles (9km) of ground. On the western flank the Canadians had fought a bitter battle to annihilate the German defenders of Colombelles and Vaucelles, Caen was now completely in Allied hands.
On July 19, the Guards Armoured, 11th and 7th Armoured Divisions mounted a series of attacks on the villages, along the Bourguebus Ridge, using coordinated groups of tanks, infantry, engineers and artillery. These set-piece attacks succeeded in taking villages from the Panzer Grenadiers of the 1st SS Panzer Division. But the Germans were already rolling back to form a new system of defense in depth on the next suitable ridge to the south. Late on 19th the weather broke and rain stopped play; tanks were bogged in the mire, the infantry were stuck, artillery suffered from reduced visibility. So the battle of Goodwood ended.
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