Although Guderian did not become one of Hitler’s immediate circle, the Fiihrer cultivated him to the extent of having him to dinner and sharing a box at the opera with him. Guderian was considered reliable by the Nazis, but, like many of those who occupy military positions of power, he was naive. His concern was solely with the development of the panzer force and the petty arguments and rivalries that involved it. Writing to his wife after the occupation of the Sudetenland, he described Hitler as “a very great man... a courageous man.” But in the same letter he reveals his understanding of the way in which Hitler had used him and his tanks to seize this territory: “It was of course only possible because of the new sharp sword in our hand and the will to use it, had peaceable means not been possible.”
Guderian was an impatient man, seldom waiting to consider all sides of a dispute before giving orders to resolve it. During the opening stage of the Polish campaign, his corps contained only one armored division plus two motorized infantry divisions. The temptation to interfere with the detailed working of the panzer division proved too much for him. Friction arose between him and his divisional commander. There was an especially bitter exchange when the tanks were getting near to what had once been the Guderian family home. Using his fully equipped half-track command vehicle, he went ahead with the leading tanks. It was the first time such a senior officer had accompanied tanks in this way. He found the division halted at the river Brahe. The commander of the tank regiment had decided to halt because the river might be strongly defended and the divisional commander was not there to press the advance onward, as Guderian’s plan had ordered. Guderian was enraged. He sent men of a motorcycle battalion across the river in inflatable boats and then moved tanks across a bridge. The defenders withdrew and the Germans had a vital bridgehead for the advance.
The Incident nonetheless worsened the poor relationship between Guderian and his divisional commander. Underlying this bad feeling was the fact that this man, Generalleutnant Leo Freiherr Geyr von
Schweppenburg, had seen Guderian appointed to the corps command over his head. It is especially interesting that Liddell Hart, after interrogating so many of the German generals, chose the description of Guderian that Geyr gave to sum him up.
Sixty per cent of what the German Panzer forces became was due to him. Ambitious, brave, a heart for his soldiers who liked and trusted him; rash as a man, quick in decisions, strict with officers, real personality, therefore many enemies. Blunt, even to Hitler. As a trainer— good; thorough; progressive. If you suggest revolutionary ideas, he will say in 95% of cases: “Yes,” at once.*