After the Koiso-Yonai cabinet was formed in July 1944, the lord keeper of the privy seal, Kido, successfully argued that Shigemitsu should be kept on as foreign minister, and should also take over as minister for Greater East Asia.2324 The foreign ministry had thus largely won its two-year battle with the army to control policy on Asia, although the distinction was kept as a matter of form. The influence of the jushin was also growing, and Koiso took this into account, inviting them to his residence twice a month throughout his term of office.2325
The real aim of at least some of those responsible for the change of cabinet had been to seek peace, but the formation of the new government did not bring them any nearer to that objective. Nor did the opposition have any clear ideas. The emperor gave the new prime minister no instructions on the subject, having long been committed to Tojo and Tojo’s policy. In the cabinet only the foreign minister, shigemitsu, the navy minister, Yonai, and the minister of state, Taketora Ogata, were in favour of peace. Koiso’s own position was unclear, though he evidently had an interest in reaching a settlement with China.2326 He had not managed to get back on the active list, so he could not take the additional post of army minister. In order to have more access to military decisions, he established the supreme council for the direction of the war, to replace the former liaison conference.
The new body consisted of himself, the foreign minister, the army and navy ministers, and the two chiefs of staff. other senior military commanders attended as observers. unlike the liaison conference, it did not include the finance minister, who was a civilian. Imperial conferences could still be convened, to lend greater weight to the supreme council’s decisions, which had to be endorsed by the government and had to be unanimous: a majority vote would not suffice. In the army high command the new chief of staff, Gen. Umezu, now began to establish his ascendancy, following Tojo’s removal.
Dissatisfaction with the new cabinet grew rapidly. The army retained its strong position, and it was felt, particularly in the peace party, that the cabinet was unlikely to change direction. The peace party included Konoe, and also Hirohito’s brother Prince Takamatsu, who was critical of the emperor because, on principle, he allowed only men in public office to express opinions and act, and did not appoint his own experts as advisers.4 His other brothers,
Chichibu and Mikasa, were also in favour of seeking peace without delay, but the emperor would not allow them to approach him.2327
Konoe and his circle continued to keep in touch with senior foreign-ministry officials, especially the minister’s secretary Toshikazu Kase, who thought it would be advisable to send an envoy to a neutral country, such as Spain, to negotiate peace terms. He submitted two studies produced in his department, which gave an account of current US thinking on the imperial house, and American plans for Japan after the war. The authors explained that most Americans were sympathetic to the emperor. The United States took the view that he was essentially peace-loving, and had merely been abused by military cliques intent on war. The general view was that the imperial house should be allowed to survive, and should have a place in the rebuilding of Japan, the primary US aims being demilitarization and democratization. Most of the peace party in Japan, including Konoe, welcomed these conclusions,2328 and Konoe expressed an interest in going to Spain as an envoy himself. However, the foreign minister, Shigemitsu, angrily informed him that someone else had already been chosen.2329
Konoe and his circle repeatedly expressed the fear that, if the war continued and reached the home islands, Japan would be so impoverished that revolution would be inevitable. Japan, with its time-honoured monarchy, would lose its special national identity (kokutai), and of all the bad consequences of the war that would be the worst.2330 This argument continued to be deployed, to the day Japan surrendered. It was again insinuated that most army officers were covert communists, and had deliberately picked a quarrel with China and the western powers so as to prepare the ground for the Bolsheviks. Towards the end of 1944 there were signs that Moscow intended to establish communist regimes in Bulgaria, Romania, and the countries of northern Europe, and at least smuggle some communists into government in France and Italy. The Japanese suspected it of similar intentions in Asia, including Japan, and hoped that the Allies, likewise fearing Soviet expansion, would agree to make peace with Tokyo on relatively reasonable terms.2331 Prince Higashikuni, a general and kinsman of the emperor, was increasingly suggested as the ideal person to head a government and mitigate the dangers that were likely to ensue if Japan were to surrender.2332
Meanwhile, in August 1944, Shigemitsu revived the idea of a German-Soviet peace settlement, clearly with a view to getting the USSR to mediate between Japan and the western powers. However, Berlin said it was not interested, and the Japanese ambassador did not even put the proposal to
Moscow, as it would have been completely pointless.2333 It was also proposed to seek a peace settlement with China, based on a reconciliation between Nanking and the Kuomintang government.2334 Unlike the opposition, the cabinet hoped to exploit the growing tensions between the western Allies and the USSR to persuade the Soviet Union to treat Japan kindly.
The navy too was looking for ways to reach a peace settlement. The deputy minister, Shigeyoshi Inoue, ordered Rear-Admiral Sokichi Takagi to drop everything and concentrate on finding out what chance there was of reaching a settlement. Takagi, a known fanatic when it came to gathering information, immediately set to work. A generally correct picture gradually emerged of the occupation policy America was likely to pursue, its views on the imperial system, and the important part played by members of the various planning bodies, like Grew and his circle, who were pressing for a moderate policy.2335
The naval officer Prince Takamatsu was an important contact for Takagi. In a conversation in mid-September, the prince suggested that the objective of the peace policy must be to preserve the kokutai—in other words to retain the monarchy—and that was the only condition Japan should insist on.2336 The two officers continued to meet periodically.
Other imperial princes—a title bestowed on all the emperor’s male relatives, not just his brothers and his son—were thinking about ways of bringing the war to an end, and they frequently discussed the matter. This circle included four army men with the rank of field marshal or general, who were in touch with Hirohito’s brother Mikasa, a major in the army.2337 The lord keeper of the privy seal, Kido, did not approve; in his view their actions were contrary to the principle that the military high command and the emperor’s family must not mix, and he insisted that the princes cease their activities.2338 The emperor had long since let it be known that he too disapproved. His brothers Maj. Mikasa and Capt. Takamatsu had recently been relieved of their duties on the army and navy general staffs, and transferred to less sensitive posts in their respective services.2339 In October 1944 Prince Higashikuni, the peace party’s favourite candidate for the office of prime minister, consulted a number of eminent people, including the chief of the general staff, and recommended that ways be sought of ending the war by diplomatic means.2340 The military, however, were absolutely determined to fight on to the bitter end.
At this point the Battle of Leyte Gulf took place, with its disastrous outcome for Japan. It prompted Yoshida to try once again to seek a suitable candidate, who was in favour of a peace settlement, for the office of prime minister. He met Konoe and Admiral Suzuki Kantaro, a good friend of his and president of Hirohito’s advisory body, the privy council, but he was quite unable to win the old gentleman over to the cause. Suzuki considered that the war was by no means lost, and that the outcome was still completely open. Yoshida nevertheless continued to keep in touch with him.2341
Tokyo soon found itself under threat from another quarter. At the beginning of November Stalin made a speech describing Japan as an ‘aggressor nation’, and strongly attacking it. Tokyo began to pay more attention to the danger of the Soviet Union entering the war, and to reflect on the price of keeping it neutral, whether in the form of territorial concessions, granting rights to Manchuria, or recognizing Soviet dominance and/or communist control in China. Tokyo was ready to make concessions in all these areas, but it could not find out what Moscow wanted.
On the other hand, the peace party in Japan saw encouraging signs coming from the United States. There were Grew’s activities,2342 and the decision, apparently broadcast on American radio, not to bomb the imperial palace or Shinto shrines and temples.2343 In November Grew was appointed undersecretary in the state department, a post he had held once before in the 1920s. His moderate attitude towards the Japanese monarchy was not without its critics in the USA. He defended his position when he was interviewed for his new appointment; he had not, he said, suggested that the Japanese emperor should remain on the throne after the war, or that he should be deposed. He recommended that the whole question should remain in abeyance until the war was won. In any case, he did not consider that the USA should continue to bear the burden of supporting and controlling Japan indefinitely.2344 That clearly meant, among other things, that the monarchy should not be abolished, as that would upset the people and the future political leadership unnecessarily and force America into an extremely long and manpower-intensive occupation. In Japan, some members of the cabinet rashly took Grew’s appointment as a sign that Japan could look forward to all sorts of peace initiatives in the near future.2345
The fall of Leyte, the looming failure of the policy on China, and the increasingly heavy air strikes on Japan in 1945 all spelled the end for the Koiso cabinet. The emperor too began to have second thoughts, and showed an interest in learning the views of the jushin. On 6 January he told the lord keeper of the privy seal that he intended to consult the former prime ministers about the war situation.24 Kido persuaded him not to receive all of them together, but to see them one by one, on different days, so as to avoid provoking the military into taking countermeasures against this ‘conspiracy’.25 Receiving them one by one would also have the advantage of allowing them to speak freely, without fear ofTojo, who was regarded as a ‘warmonger’. Kido himself had by this time been won over to the idea of seeking a peace settlement.2346
The emperor carried out his plan in February, and on the 14th he saw Konoe, who was the only one to present a detailed study, strongly influenced by Yoshida.2347 In it, he claimed that the USSR’s aim was to spread communism throughout Europe and Asia, and accused the Japanese military of instigating conflicts, from the ‘Manchurian incident’ in 1931 to the Pacific war, and working with civilian extremists to pave the way for revolution in Japan. They were therefore, in his view, actually helping the USSR to spread communism worldwide. Konoe advised the emperor to acknowledge that defeat was inevitable, adding that, according to statements made so far by the western powers, it would not necessarily entail any change to the kokutai, the peculiarly Japanese system of a state ruled by emperors descended from gods. He deduced from the ideas of Grew and the ruling elite in America that the United States was certainly not intent on abolishing the monarchy in Japan. Japan would, however, probably lose half of its territory,2348 notably Taiwan, Korea, and Manchuria.
These territorial concessions were also discussed by the three great powers, the United States, the Soviet Union, and Great Britain, at the Yalta conference held early in February, although this was mainly concerned with the strategy for Germany after the war. In a secret agreement the USSR undertook to enter the war against Japan within three months of the end of the war in Europe. The US joint chiefs of staff calculated that the war with Japan would last for a further 18 months or so after Germany had been defeated, that is, until the end of 1946 at the very least. Stalin was therefore able to demand substantial concessions in return for his promise to enter the Pacific war: south Sakhalin and all the Kurile Islands to be ceded to the USSR, Port Arthur and Dairen in Kwantung to be handed over, and special rights to be granted in Manchuria. The agreement affected China, but it was not even consulted. Japan’s leaders, on the contrary, believed that they still had a period of grace until the Neutrality Pact with the USSR expired in April 1946.
Konoe came away from his audience with the feeling that he had failed to convince the emperor,2349 although the monarch had ostensibly shown some interest in the ideas he propounded. However, early in March the emperor canvassed the views of a number of princes, including Higashikuni and his brother Takamatsu, both keen advocates of ending the war quickly, if necessary by unconditional surrender.2350 After the American air raids on Tokyo on 9 and 10 March, the heaviest so far, in which 100,000 people lost their lives, the emperor visited the parts of the city that had been hardest hit. He appeared to be increasingly thoughtful in the following weeks, but it was several months before he actively advocated surrender. In the spring he seemed, on the contrary, to be in favour of continuing the war and stepping up Japanese action in the field. Thus, he expressly recommended massive counter-attacks after the American landing on Okinawa on i April,2351 and continued to approve all operational decisions as usual. Indeed, he admitted after the war that he was personally involved in some decisions; for example, he approved the operations in the Philippines and on Okinawa, and shared the military commanders’ desperate hope that a Japanese victory in those engagements would force the Allies to offer favourable terms for ending the war.2352
On 5 April 1945 the Koiso cabinet resigned, largely because of differences over policy on China, where a dubious peace initiative had just come to nothing. The peace party’s preferred candidate, retired admiral and temporary court official Suzuki, formed the next government, with Togo as foreign minister. The new army minister, Korechika Anami, was well liked, even by the moderates. He had once been the emperor’s adjutant, and had had good contacts at court ever since. He was particularly friendly with the recently appointed prime minister, Suzuki, and was also on good terms with Kido.
The new head of cabinet was over 80, and hard of hearing, but on the credit side his long years of service had earned the emperor’s trust. He had served as chamberlain from 1929 to 1936—and, as such, had been seriously wounded in an attempted coup organized by young army officers in February 1936. He received no special instructions from the emperor when he took over the government, but the politicians who had chosen Suzuki as their leader were sure he would seek a peace agreement as quickly as possible. It is true that—possibly to avoid antagonizing the army, which was resolved to fight to the finish—all the prime minister’s statements immediately before and after he formed his cabinet showed an absolute determination to hold out;2353 but the Allies welcomed the admiral’s appointment as a sign that the freedom party was gaining strength, as they had long known him to be a reasonable man.2354
On 5 April, the day Koiso resigned, the USSR announced that it intended to denounce the Neutrality Pact with effect from April 1946. The foreign minister, Togo, was nevertheless determined to seek Soviet mediation to end the war, as he was convinced that this was the only course that could save Japan from unconditional surrender.2355 The military too were counting on the Soviet Union. The peace-feelers that had been put out through Sweden36 and other neutral countries, including Switzerland,37 had been stopped because it was felt that these countries did not wield enough influence.
On 12 April President Roosevelt died suddenly. Unlike the German leadership, which imagined that it had just had a miraculous escape and that the enemy coalition would now fall apart, the Japanese did not think the event would have any effect at all on the conduct of the war. The prime minister, Suzuki, even spoke on radio extending his condolences to the American people.2356
At this point, Yoshida thought of going somewhere in the British sphere of power, possibly India, with a view to making contact and discussing peace. He asked the navy to place an aircraft or submarine at his disposal to make the journey, but his request was refused.2357 The former diplomat had long been a thorn in the militants’ side, and the military police, the kenpeitai, had him under surveillance. His activities were brought to an abrupt end. On 15 April he was arrested with other suspects for their role in preparing Konoe’s memorandum for the emperor. Two weeks later he was charged with spreading defeatist rumours, slandering the army by describing it as ‘communist’, and disclosing military secrets.2358 However, he was released at the end of June. The prime minister, Suzuki, and the foreign minister, Togo, had successfully interceded on his behalf.2359 Statements made by Yoshida and two of his fellow-prisoners caused the military to conclude that Konoe was a ‘Japanese Badoglio’, who was trying to make terms with the Allies, and was prepared to abandon old loyalties in order to do so.2360
When Germany surrendered unconditionally with effect from 8 May 1945, Japan issued an official declaration of its intent to continue the war regardless.2361 The German ambassador was taken to task, and told that his country had broken its December 1941 agreement not to make a separate peace.44
2. America’s Plans for Ending the War,
AND ITS Occupation Policy
In December 1944, the United States set up a State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC) to coordinate departmental policy on Japan, Germany, and other enemy states. The committee was chaired by the three undersecretaries, who were briefed by their respective secretaries of state. A Pacific and Far East Subcommittee was also formed, and was chaired by Dooman, representing the state department, George V. Strong, from the war department, and Harold C. Train, from the navy department.
On i April i945, the day US troops landed on Okinawa, this subcommittee was instructed to review the current situation in Asia and the Pacific and
America’s basic policy and aims in the area, and suggest guidelines for a future military administration and the structure of the victorious powers’ occupation of Japan. It was asked to consider, among other things, how the emperor should be treated and what measures might be taken to eradicate militarism and strengthen any democratic leanings. The subcommittee reported in May 1945, and it is apparent from its records that there was, even at this point, a very clear and detailed position on Japanese surrender. The emperor was to announce Japan's unconditional surrender, and order the armed forces to cease all military activities. The supreme commander of the Allied powers was to assume full legislative, judicial, and executive powers, with authority to order Japanese officials and officers to remain at their posts and perform their duties as usual, in order to maintain law and order. Most of the ideas contained in the study had already been considered by various groups and committees in the state department, but the coordinating committee's work formalized them.
The political changes that occurred in the spring, in both Japan and the United States, as a result of Koiso’s resignation and Roosevelt’s death afforded an opportunity for a cautious change of direction. The question was whether it would be taken. In America Grew’s cluster of Japan experts in the state department gained in influence, at the expense of Morgenthau’s treasury department ‘hawks’.2362 At the same time, when Germany surrendered some influential figures in the USA objected to the Soviet Union entering the war in the Far East, although they had previously wanted it to do so. They now feared a sharp rise in Soviet influence in East Asia. This group included the American ambassador in Moscow, W. Averell Harriman, and the navy secretary, James V. Forrestal.2363 The former president, Hoover, also spoke to Henry L. Stimson, secretary of state in his administration and now secretary for war, about his concern over Soviet ambitions in Asia.2364
In view of these fears, it seemed advisable to reach a peace settlement with Japan as quickly as possible, and when Suzuki took office the Americans thought this might be just the opportunity they needed to change course. Although the new prime minister in Tokyo could not openly declare that he was seeking to end the war soon, an American secret service study concluded that his appointment was a last desperate attempt to neutralize the radicals in the army, and to change direction with a view to establishing a basis for peace negotiations, if possible with its assistance.48 The planners in the state department and the navy, where Suzuki was well known and highly rated, came to the same conclusion. The fact that the Allies welcomed Suzuki's appointment, as a sign that the peace party was becoming stronger,49 was no secret in political circles in Japan.50
The Americans realized, from the bloody battles on Iwo Jima and Okinawa, the full implications of invading the Japanese heartland and dealing with an enemy determined to resist to the last man, woman, and child. To avoid prolonging the war, and to make it clear to the enemy that they did not intend to destroy Japan as the Romans had destroyed Carthage, responsible authorities in America began to consider how to redefine the demand for ‘unconditional surrender’.
On 3 May the joint chiefs of staff accordingly produced a draft declaration for the president, explaining that ‘unconditional surrender’ meant an end to the influence of the military leaders who had brought Japan to the brink of catastrophe, and an end to any further sufferings and sacrifices the people would have to endure in the vain hope of victory. ‘Unconditional surrender’ would not mean death or slavery for the Japanese people but, on the contrary, a release from the burden of militarism and a chance to return to the community of peace-loving and law-abiding nations. It was hoped that the emperor would play a crucial and constructive part in the process.2365
So, in a speech delivered on the day the war ended in Europe, the new president, Truman, spoke not of unconditional surrender by Japan in general, but of ‘the army and navy laying down their arms in unconditional surrender’. He also emphasized that such a step would not mean death or slavery for the Japanese people.2366 Statements to this effect were frequently heard from Washington in the weeks that followed. Grew too used the same form of words,2367 and conveyed the same message to Japan.2368
Leading figures, some of them members of the government, were in favour of going easy on Japan. The secretary for war, Stimson, his deputy, John J. McCloy, and the navy secretary, Forrestal took this view—albeit with some reservations. Truman nevertheless also had to consider the ‘hawks’, that is, the ‘China crowd’ in the state department, and above all James F. Byrnes, the new secretary of state appointed early in July. These differences within the US leadership, combined with the fear of a public outcry, prevented America— like Japan—from setting out clear terms.55
In the US navy, too, there were many in favour of negotiating a settlement with Japan, including one of the most active naval officers, Capt. Ellis M. Zacharias, who had spent a long time studying in Japan. Two hours after Truman’s speech Zacharias, as ‘official government spokesman’—it is still unclear on what authority—gave the first of a series of i4 broadcast talks in Japanese, transmitted between 8 May and 4 August. In them, he repeated the president’s statements to the effect that Allied demands were limited, and that unconditional surrender meant only that the Japanese forces must lay down their arms. He presented himself as a good old friend of a great many officers and diplomats, including the prime minister, Suzuki, Prince Takamatsu, and the navy minister, Yonai.2369 The talks were transmitted on short wave from San Francisco, picked up in Honolulu, and relayed from there. They were also broadcast on medium wave on Radio Saipan. Zacharias estimated that there were about 5 million private radios in Japan. Leaflets containing selected passages were also printed, and dropped over Japan.2370
In one of his talks, Zacharias stressed that Japan had only two alternatives: complete destruction and peace by diktat, or unconditional surrender and the benefits of the Atlantic Charter.2371 The Japanese foreign ministry followed the broadcasts closely.2372 Togo agreed with the American that Japan would benefit from the Atlantic Charter, and made the point to his ambassador in Moscow, Sato.2373 Zacharias deduced from Japanese radio programmes, and deciphered telegram traffic, that Tokyo was listening,2374 so he responded in subsequent talks. Prince Takamatsu and the diplomat Kase confirmed after the war that the broadcasts had given the peace party the ammunition it needed in its struggle with those who were determined to fight on to the bitter end.2375
In the meantime, Washington was receiving numerous messages from neutral countries to the effect that the Japanese were putting out peace-feelers through diplomats, military men, journalists, and businessmen in Switzerland, Sweden, and the Vatican. It is still not clear how far the Japanese government and high command were behind these moves. Their one great hope was that the United States would not abolish the monarchy, and they were buoyed up by various statements that had been made by Grew.2376 Grew was convinced that the USSR would pose a greater threat in future than the Axis powers ever had, and that war between America and the Soviet Union was inevitable. So, like the freedom party in Japan, he too found Moscow’s attempts to achieve hegemony in Europe, the Middle East, and East Asia deeply worrying.2377
Grew used his position as acting secretary of state—when Stettinius was in San Francisco for the inaugural meeting of the United Nations—to gain influence with the president. At a meeting on 28 May he advised Truman to consider all measures that would facilitate the immediate unconditional surrender of the Japanese, without in any way abandoning American principles or aims. Grew made it clear that the Japanese were a fanatical people, quite capable of fighting to the last man; the American casualties in that case would be incalculable. In Grew’s view, the greatest obstacle to unconditional surrender was the Japanese belief that it would automatically entail the abolition of the imperial system. If they could be assured that they would be free to determine their future political structure, once they had been completely defeated and steps had been taken to make sure that they could never wage war again, this would enable them to save face. Otherwise, they were most unlikely to surrender. The best the United States could hope for in the long term was that a constitutional monarchy might be developed in Japan, as experience showed that democracy never worked there. Those who insisted that the roots of aggressive Japanese militarism lay in the emperor and the imperial system did not know their history. Once the military extremists had been discredited by defeat the emperor could, and probably would, serve as a purely symbolic figure for the new leaders who would emerge as soon as the people were convinced that the military had deceived them. The throne could be the key to building a peaceful future, once the militarists had learned the hard way that there was no hope for them.2378
Grew advised Truman to say something about this in his Memorial Day address to Congress on 31 May. The president expressed an interest, and suggested that a meeting be arranged with the war and navy ministers, the army chief of staff Gen. George C. Marshall, and the C-in-C of the US fleet Admiral King, to ascertain their views. They could then all come to the White House to discuss the matter. The meeting was held the very next day, and Grew found that his interlocutors all agreed in principle that everything possible should be done to facilitate Japan’s surrender but, for military reasons which they did not disclose, they considered that it would be unwise to give any public assurances to that effect at that point.2379 According to Stimson’s diary, only some of those present were privy to the reason for this reservation, namely, the development of the atomic bomb.2380 The intention was clearly to wait, and review the matter in the preparatory phase, before dropping the bomb.2381 So Truman did not mention the emperor in his address, but expressly insisted on unconditional surrender.2382 The aggressive tone of his speech attracted criticism, even within the USA.2383 Both politicians, notably Grew, and military men called for the surrender terms to be defined, but the president decided to wait and announce terms at the ‘Big Three’ conference in Potsdam in July.71 The secretary of state, Stettinius, also thought the conference would provide a good opportunity to send Tokyo a considered demand for surrender, with the necessary definitions—that is to say, with a qualification of the term ‘unconditional’.2384 Grew was deeply disappointed at the delay, but saw no way of exerting further pressure on the president.2385
Zacharias was accordingly unable to address the most important problem in his broadcasts, namely, the fate of the imperial house and the imperial system after the war. He himself was in favour of going easy on the monarch, and he raised this explosive issue in an anonymous letter to the Washington Post, recommending an official approach to Japan through diplomatic channels. The letter attracted a good deal of notice in the USA,2386 and it was also brought to the attention of the Japanese envoy in Switzerland, who forwarded it to Tokyo without comment.2387
On 18 June Grew again tried to persuade Truman, in the light of the imminent fall of Okinawa, to give Japan certain assurances, so as to strengthen any inclination it might have to seek peace, and to reduce American losses. He suggested that the Japanese should be assured that they would be free to determine their future political structure. They should not be given any definite guarantee regarding the monarchy. But Truman showed no interest even in this watered-down version.2388 Public pressure was too strong.
Grew and other eminent people tried to ensure that the declaration to be issued at the ‘Big Three’ conference at Potsdam would at least give some assurances to Japan. Stimson chaired the drafting committee, and state department officials were largely responsible for the wording. The draft was completed on 29 June, and forwarded to Truman in a memo on 2 July. It did not preclude the possibility of a constitutional monarchy, under the existing dynasty.2389 However, on board the Augusta on their way to the Potsdam conference, Truman and Byrnes finally decided to remove the controversial sentence from the declaration.
Grew’s expertise was nevertheless still much in demand, to determine the structure of Japan in the post-war period, among other things. On 16 July Brig. Gen. William E. Crist, newly returned from Okinawa, sought him out on Gen. MacArthur’s behalf to seek his advice about the selection of eminent political, economic, and financial experts to be appointed in Japan after the invasion. They would need not just political experience and expertise in their particular field but also, and above all, special knowledge of the defeated country. It was also hoped to get Grew in as a special adviser. He replied that it was extremely difficult to find people who met these requirements, but the US army had trained a great many men for precisely this purpose. Gen. Crist objected that such specialists could only be considered for subordinate tasks.
Grew then said—and Crist agreed with him—that selection should be confined to people who had spent some time in Japan, as they were the only ones who could really understand the problems. He himself would not consider returning under any circumstances, as anyone who had served there for ten years as ambassador, and knew the people well, would not want to return as a conqueror. He therefore recommended, among others, the diplomat Dooman, with whom he had worked in Tokyo and who was currently attending the Potsdam conference as adviser to the secretary of state on Japanese affairs.2390
3. The End: From the Potsdam Conference TO Japanese Surrender
Konoe had told the emperor in February that there were strong pro-USSR sympathies in the army. This allegation was certainly exaggerated, but the army did appear at this time to be quite ready to seek support from the Soviet Union in order to carry the war against the Allies through to the bitter end. Two weeks after Togo took over as foreign minister, the general staff advised him to follow that course. An internal study listed once again the concessions to be made to the Soviet Union, if necessary: Manchuria, together with all rights in the rail network, the Liaotung peninsula, southern Sakhalin, and Korea were to be handed over, and USSR rule in China was to be recognized.2391
Togo’s real intention was to seek peace with the United States and Great Britain, with Soviet help. All the members of the supreme council for the direction of the war, including Prime Minister Suzuki, agreed with the plan, but it was not as yet clear what price would have to be paid, so the meeting was adjourned.2392 The Japanese ambassador in Moscow, Sato, came to the conclusion that the US/UK war aims meant that even a Soviet-mediated peace would be very close to unconditional surrender. He also agreed with Togo that there was a sword of Damocles hanging over Japan: the Soviet Union might enter the war, despite the neutrality pact that was still in force.2393
On 29 May Ambassador Sato received instructions from Tokyo to seek an audience with the Soviet foreign minister, Molotov, to ascertain the USSR’s intentions vis-a-vis Japan. He did so, and received an assurance that the Soviet Union would maintain its neutrality towards Japan. Sato assured Molotov that his country wanted to end hostilities as quickly as possible but, as a result of America’s attitude, it had no alternative but to fight on. The ambassador reported to his foreign minister that in his view the USSR might enter the war in about two months’ time, and that it would then either attack or demand an extremely high price for reaching a settlement.2394 Togo asked Sato to keep up the dialogue with the Soviet leaders, and told him that he, Togo, had asked the former premier and foreign minister Koki Hirota to discuss matters with the Soviet ambassador, Jacob Alexandrovich Malik.2395
On 6 June the supreme council for the direction of the war decided, despite protests from Foreign Minister Togo, not to compromise but to continue the war, if necessary even on Japanese soil. The imperial conference endorsed this decision two days later. Togo, now completely isolated, deserted even by the prime minister, Suzuki, and the navy minister, Yonai, resigned.2396
The emperor and his lord keeper of the privy seal both felt, like the foreign minister, that they had been ambushed. Kido suggested that the emperor should personally issue instructions that a peace settlement must be concluded. He hoped that, in that case, even the obstreperous army would obey. Kido produced a paper expressing the view that the enemy had given ample evidence in its peace overtures that its principal aim was to get rid of Japan’s military clique. If the country fought on, it would forfeit any chance of saving the imperial system and the kokutai. In his view, the only solution was for the emperor to intervene, to seek personal contact by letter through a mediating nation (preferably the neutral USSR), and to send an envoy to Moscow. The next day Kido spoke at length to the emperor, and obtained his agreement. He also approached Konoe, had a series of talks with the most important members of the cabinet, and obtained the consent of the prime minister, Suzuki, the navy minister, Yonai, and the foreign minister, Togo, to send a special imperial envoy to Moscow. Only the army minister, Anami, was in favour of fighting a decisive battle on Japanese soil. So began the court’s endeavours to end the war.2397
Meanwhile, at Togo’s request, the former prime minister Hirota had had a number of talks with the Soviet ambassador, Malik, starting on 3 and 4 June. Hirota began by conveying Japan’s general interest in maintaining good relations with the Soviet Union, and its wish to improve them yet further by entering into some kind of agreement that would replace the Neutrality Pact, which the USSR had denounced.2398 There was no mention of Soviet mediation at this stage.
On 18 June the supreme council for the direction of the war decided, despite continued resistance from the army minister and both chiefs of staff, to approach the Allies through a neutral power, preferably the USSR, and make a peace offer subject to the condition that the imperial system be maintained. The plan was to sound out the Soviet Union by the beginning of July, and then take steps to end the war as quickly as possible. Should the enemy insist on unconditional surrender, however, Japan was prepared to continue the war without compromise until all was settled in a final battle on Japanese soil. Members of the radical military faction were at least willing to await the outcome of mediation.2399
Two days later the foreign minister, Togo, reported to the emperor on Hirota’s talks with Malik, and the decision—already taken in principle in the previous month—to seek Soviet mediation. The emperor expressed great satisfaction.2400 The foreign minister now asked Hirota to continue the talks with Malik. Soviet mediation should start, if at all possible, before the planned American-British-Soviet summit meeting in Potsdam.2401
Kido was effectively acting as prime minister at this point. He now advised the emperor to personally instruct the six leading politicians and military men on the supreme council for the direction of the war to initiate peace negotiations through the diplomatic channel. The monarch acted on this advice on 22 June, convening a meeting of the supreme council for the purpose. This was the first time he had convened such a meeting himself, and he also, exceptionally, spoke first and to some extent conducted the proceedings. He did not give any orders, but expressed a wish that the war be ended as soon as possible, despite the decision taken on 8 June not to compromise but to fight on. Most of those present said they were in favour of seeking peace, and of inviting the USSR to mediate. The army minister, Anami, and the army chief of staff, Gen. Umezu, offered only token resistance.2402 This was the first time the emperor had openly expressed to his high command and his leading statesmen his wish that a peace settlement be concluded as quickly as possible, and the first time a decision of the imperial conference had been reversed without a prior change of cabinet.
Togo informed his negotiator, Hirohita, of the new development and urged him to resume his talks with Malik. He did so on 24 June, but the Soviet ambassador showed no interest in the reiterated proposal to replace the neutrality pact, which would shortly expire, with some other system. Hirota was in despair, but endeavoured at least to arouse some interest in improving bilateral relations in a wide range of other areas. For example, he offered rubber, tin, lead, and tungsten in exchange for oil. He also argued that if the Soviet army and the Japanese navy joined forces, their two countries would be the strongest powers on earth. At a further meeting, on 29 June,
Hirota presented a new proposal, this time in writing. Japan announced that, in return for support in its efforts to achieve peace in East Asia and for the conclusion of a non-aggression pact, it was prepared to grant Manchuria independence, and restore Soviet fishing rights. Malik merely replied that he would inform Hirota as soon as he received an answer from Moscow,2403 but he did not receive Hirota again, because he was ‘unwell’.2404
Togo had not yet submitted a formal request for Soviet mediation through Hirota. Clearly he was trying to pave the way by reaching a bilateral agreement first. Now, at least, he gave his ambassador in Moscow, Sato, a detailed account of Hirota’s talks with Malik, and instructed him to request an answer as soon as possible.2405 Sato saw no point in talking to Molotov, as his principals in Tokyo were clearly unaware of the USSR’s true position and interests.2406 Telegrams on these lines flew back and forth between the ambassador and the Japanese foreign minister for weeks.
As the USSR did not respond to Hirota’s proposals, and the Japanese politicians did not pursue the idea of sending a special envoy, the emperor lost patience. He called for the prime minister, Suzuki, on 7 July and told him too that he wished to seek Soviet mediation. This wish was to be conveyed by special envoy with a personal message from the emperor himself.2407 Suzuki informed the emperor that the foreign minister, Togo, was already in Karuizawa, trying to persuade Prince Konoe to lead a delegation.2408 In order to obtain the agreement of the military, the prime minister called a meeting of the supreme council for the direction of the war on the evening of 10 July, and informed members of the emperor’s wish. The supreme council approved the plan—albeit in a somewhat vague form—without much discussion, and recommended that the necessary action be taken without delay.2409
Two days later Konoe signified his consent, and was immediately granted an audience with the emperor. The prince warmly welcomed the idea of ending the war with the emperor’s assistance, although unconditional surrender was almost inevitable. This was something no one wanted to contemplate, for reasons of domestic policy.2410 The foreign minister, Togo, sent a telegram to the ambassador Sato in Moscow telling him that it was intended, and was now considered advisable, to apprise the Soviets of the emperor’s will concerning an end to the war, before the three-power conference opened. Molotov should be told that the emperor earnestly desired to end the war but that, so long as the United States and Great Britain continued to insist on unconditional surrender, Japan had no alternative but to fight on, to defend its honour and its life. The ambassador was also instructed to inform Molotov that the emperor intended to send Prince Konoe to Moscow as a special envoy, with a personal letter to that effect, and to obtain the necessary entry permits for the delegation. The Japanese proposed that the visit should take place immediately after the Soviet delegation returned from the Potsdam conference, as it would be impossible to arrange a meeting earlier.2411 Togo also sent a message to the Soviet ambassador, Malik, informing him of the initiative, and asking him to convey the message to the Soviet government, which Malik duly promised to do.2412
Sato in Moscow immediately sought an audience with Molotov, but Molotov was about to leave for Berlin and had no time to see him. Sato spoke instead to the deputy minister, Solomon Abramovich Lozovsky, on 13 July. Sato handed him a Russian translation of Togo’s message about the proposed visit of the special delegation, together with a confidential letter to Molotov, urgently requesting a rapid reply if only in principle. Lozovsky said he doubted whether the foreign minister would be able to give an answer before he left. The Japanese ambassador then suggested that he might telephone Molotov in Berlin to discuss the matter.2413
Sato received a message from Lozovsky in the middle of the night, to say that it was impossible to reply to his letter now because Stalin and Molotov were about to depart,2414 but Sato had the feeling that Molotov was slipping away to avoid taking a position on the proposals. The ambassador told Togo that even he did not really understand Japanese government policy, but he was sure the Soviet delegation to the Potsdam conference would, when the subject of the Far East came up, mention Japan’s wish to send a special delegation.2415
It was nevertheless concluded in Tokyo that Stalin and Molotov had been informed, before they left for Potsdam on 14 July, of the emperor’s desire for peace and his wish to send Konoe to Moscow.2416 But the Japanese ambassador heard no more until 18 July.2417
Meanwhile, in the United States the uncompromising attitude of the hawks headed by Secretary of State Byrnes was gaining the ascendancy in the battle over what to do about Japan. Instead of a guarantee that the imperial
House would survive if Japan surrendered, all that now remained was an assurance that the form of government would be determined by the people.2418 But the presence or absence of that guarantee was of enormous importance to the decision-making process in Japan. Figures like Konoe2419 and the monarch’s family, who played a prominent part in the attempts to reach a peace settlement, were prepared if necessary to accept that the emperor abdicate and one of the young crown princes succeed to the throne.
On the evening of 16 July news that the atomic bomb had been successfully tested reached Truman in Potsdam. The event further hardened the American attitude. The first plenary session of the conference took place on 17 July. The Americans were aware of the content of the telegrams that had passed between Togo and Sato, and everyone attending the conference knew that the Japanese were seeking Soviet mediation to end the war with at least some shreds of dignity. Moreover, Stalin himself told the American president about Konoe’s proposed mission.2420 In the meantime, Togo had explained Japan’s intentions in detail in an exchange of telegrams with Ambassador Sato, expressly drawing attention to the connection Zacharias had mentioned between surrender and the Atlantic Charter.2421 On 26 July the western Allies issued the ‘Potsdam declaration’, calling on Japan for unconditional surrender. There was no mention of retaining the monarchy, nor was there any warning that the atomic bomb might be used, although leading members of the US administration had occasionally considered issuing such a warning. The document did, however, offer Japan the prospect of fair and lenient treatment. The future government was to be established in accordance with the freely expressed will of the people.2422
The next day, Tokyo learned of the terms of the Potsdam declaration from an Allied radio broadcast. Togo acknowledged that the declaration had some redeeming features2423 but, predictably, it met with resistance from the military in the supreme council for the direction of the war, and in the cabinet. It was finally agreed to await the Soviet reply to the Japanese initiative before responding. It was also decided that the government should pass over the declaration in silence, and that the press should publish excerpts but without undue emphasis or editorial comment.112 The foreign minister was accordingly astonished to read in the papers next morning that the cabinet had decided to show its contempt by ignoring the declaration. It emerged, on inquiry, that the military had again put pressure on the prime minister the day before, and the press had simply printed what he had said at a press conference.2424
On 28 July, before the session opened, Stalin reported that the USSR had been approached by Japan to act as mediator in the Pacific war, and gave an account of Japanese initiatives and Soviet responses since 13 July. He then explained that the latest Japanese proposal was a little more specific than earlier ones but that essentially it contained nothing new, and would therefore be rejected. Truman thanked Stalin for the information, and told him that no official reply to the Allied ultimatum had as yet been received from Japan, but radio broadcasts just picked up from Tokyo suggested that it would be rejected out of hand.2425
Soon after, according to instructions, the Japanese ambassador in Moscow, Sato, spent several days trying to obtain an audience with Molotov, who was now back from Berlin. He had still received no reply when, on the morning of 6 August, just after o8ooh, an American plane dropped the first atomic bomb on the Japanese city of Hiroshima. Truman again issued a statement calling on the Japanese to surrender, otherwise he would drop more atomic bombs, with even greater destructive power.2426 The next day Sato was told that the Soviet foreign minister would see him on 8 August in the evening.2427
The Japanese army at first doubted whether the device dropped on Hiroshima really had been an atomic bomb, and called for a thorough investigation.2428 The general staff accordingly dispatched a commission to the city on 8 August. It quickly concluded that only an atomic bomb could have caused such devastation, but the imperial headquarters press release merely stated that the enemy had dropped a new kind of bomb on Hiroshima.118 Even before the report on the investigation reached Tokyo, Togo, with Suzuki’s consent, advised the emperor to accept the Potsdam declaration without delay. The emperor immediately agreed, as it was senseless to fight on against new weapons of this kind. The prime minister then called a meeting of the supreme council for the direction of the war, but it could not be held because one member was unable to attend.119 It was now 8 August 1945.
That evening Molotov received Ambassador Sato, as arranged, but before Sato could speak Molotov read out the Soviet declaration of war on Japan, and handed him a written copy. The reasons the USSR gave for taking this step were that Japan had supported ‘Hitler’s Germany’ for many years, and above all that Japan’s request for Soviet mediation was rendered null and void by its rejection of the Potsdam declaration. Also, the Soviet Union was fulfilling its obligations to its allies, and thus helping to hasten the end of the war.2429 The news was broadcast from Moscow a few hours later, and picked up by the Japanese foreign ministry just after midnight. Togo consulted his closest colleagues, and decided with their agreement to advise the emperor to accept the Potsdam declaration at once, without reservation.2430
On 9 August the supreme council for the direction of the war met in the imperial palace. It was informed, at the beginning of the meeting, that the emperor wanted a decision to surrender.2431 However, the discussion focused on the problems raised by the Soviet Union’s entry into the war. Togo gave a short account of his efforts to obtain Soviet mediation, and admitted that the USSR’s declaration of war had come as a complete surprise. He then spoke of the destructive power of American bombers, including the atomic potential demonstrated at Hiroshima. However, the chief of the army general staff, Gen. Umezu, the chief of the naval general staff, Admiral Toyoda, and the army minister, Anami, would accept the Allied ultimatum only on four conditions: the Japanese state must be preserved in its present form; war criminals must be tried by Japan in its own courts; the armed forces must be demobilized by Japanese officers; and the number of Allied occupation troops must be subject to strict limits. The army minister, Anami, and the army chief of staff, Umezu, still preferred the idea of fighting a last decisive battle on Japanese soil after the Allies had landed, and called for the traditional spirit of Japan to be defended to the last drop of blood. Suzuki then suggested that the meeting be adjourned, and resumed after the cabinet meeting which was to be held that afternoon.2432 The supreme council learned during the meeting that the United States had dropped a second atomic bomb, this time on Nagasaki, but the news did not affect the course of the meeting. It was also reported that the Red Army was encountering hardly any resistance from the Japanese in Manchuria.
This supreme council meeting on the morning of 9 August was to be followed by a long series of consultations on ways and means of ending the war, culminating in an imperial conference on 14 August. The battle-lines remained more or less unchanged, as the three ‘hawks’, that is, the army minister and the two chiefs of staff, blocked the decision to seek a peace settlement. To break the deadlock, Konoe and the former foreign minister, Shigemitsu, advised the emperor to issue an order stating that Japan agreed to surrender on one condition, that the kokutai remain intact. Hirohito agreed, and said he was prepared to hold an imperial conference for the purpose that very evening.2433 Yet another cabinet meeting was held in the interim, but the army minister, Anami, vetoed a decision to surrender.2434
On this occasion, in a break with tradition, the imperial conference to be held in the evening was not going to endorse a unanimous decision taken earlier, but to take a decision itself.2435 Shortly before midnight on 9 August the members foregathered in the imperial bunker, and eventually the emperor too arrived. Suzuki gave a brief account of the discussions that had taken place earlier in the supreme council and the cabinet. He recommended that the Potsdam declaration be accepted, as it did not contain any demand for a change to the emperor’s constitutional position. The other three conditions should be dropped. The foreign minister, Togo, and the navy minister, Yonai, agreed, but the other three senior military officers strongly objected. The discussion continued for two hours. The president of the privy council, Hiranuma, and the prime minister, Suzuki, finally asked the emperor to decide. This was the first time in the history of Japan that the emperor had been called upon to act as arbitrator. Hirohito said he was in favour of surrender, as he could not stand by and see his innocent people suffer any longer. To continue the war would destroy Japanese civilization, and would have a detrimental effect on the rest of humanity. The prime minister, Suzuki, thanked him for his gracious words, and said the emperor’s decision was conference’s decision also.2436 The formal endorsement of the cabinet was also required, and it accordingly met later that same ni
World History
