The crisis was solved in the first half of 1917. Several factors contributed
to the Allies' hairbreadth escape from mortal peril. First, the issue was so
pressing that political leaders, notably David Lloyd George, demanded a quick
solution. Second, the chief method to combat the danger was a traditional one;
it needed only to be revived (and expanded) as well as updated. Third, some
militaryleaders in responsible positions, supported by maverick officers at
lower levels, accepted and promoted the new measures.
Nonetheless, even Admiral Sir John Jellicoe, who took command of the
entire British navy in late 1916 primarily to deal with the submarine war,
remained committed to patrolling as the basic response to the U-boat. To
his credit, he immediately setup an Anti-Submarine Division under Admiral
Alexander Duff to plan and coordinate this part of the naval war. Nonetheless,
even while losses escalated dangerously in the first part of 1917, he
refused to move energetically to adopt convoy tactics.
During these bloody months, merchant ships were being sunk faster
than they could be replaced. In January, while the submarines still operated
with some restrictions, Britain alone lost 49 merchant vessels. In
February, with the Germans now uninhibited in their attacks, total British
losses amounted to 105; by March the toll rose to 147. The losses of other
countries on the Allied side as well as those of neutrals more than doubled
these terrifying figures.
Allied sea captains saw their friends sail into the open ocean—to disappear
without a trace. But the totals were the most disturbing news for those
who had access to these figures. In April 1917, German submarines sank
almost 900,000 tons of Allied shipping. One of every four merchant ships
voyaging to or from Britain was destroyed. Such carnage was beyond the
country's ability to sustain. Jellicoe told Admiral William Sims of the United
States Navy as much in April; he noted that the submarine threat could not
be contained and that the war was being lost. By the summer, at the present
rate of loss, supplies to the British Isles would be reduced below the point
at which the war could be continued.