On the assault line, fifteen miles long, the British placed 1,437 guns. The
preliminary bombardment, seven days in length, dropped 1.5 million shells
on the enemy's front. But within these staggering numbers there rested the
origins of future trouble. The newly trained artillerymen of the BEF were
far from possessing the skills of the regulars from the old army. These
enthusiastic amateurs could at best only blanket a given area with as many
shells as possible; aiming at specific machine gun strongpoints was beyond
them. Moreover, British industry was sdll unable to produce enough highexplosive
shells. Much of the barrage hurled shrapnel shells at the enemy,
useless in an effort to cripple well-constructed fortifications.
The attack began at 7:30 on the morning of July 1 , a Saturday. Haig hoped
that his forces would punch through the German defenses, enter open
country, and fight a decisive battle. His cavalry forces were ready to swing
into action as soon as the first phase of the battle was over. General Herbert
Rawlinson of the Fourth Army, which bore the brunt of the fighting, had
long been skeptical about the possibility of such a breakthrough. He looked
instead to a series of offensives with limited objectives. By taking enemy
strongpoints, the British could tempt the Germans to respond with costly
counterattacks. Haig overruled his subordinate, but Rawlinson had influenced
the plan for the Somme in disastrous fashion. The untrained infantrymen—
120,000 men in twelve divisions—could not be allowed to move
independently, he decided. They were to march forward in orderly ranks to
occupy the enemy's battered positions. Every man carried sixty-six pounds
of equipment and supplies.
By evening, approximately 21,000 members of the British army had been
killed, most of them during the first sixty minutes of fighting. Another 40,000
were wounded. German machine guns led the slaughter, but effective German
artillery barrages on the attacking troops took a heavy toll as well. The single
day's loss stands as the worst suffered by any army before or since. German
losses were tiny by comparison: 2,200 taken prisoner, 6,000 killed or
wounded. As Martin Middlebrook has pointed out, the Germans inflicted
seven casualties for every one they suffered. Often it was worse: when the
British 8th Division encountered the German 180th Regiment, the Germans
killed or wounded eighteen of the enemy for every loss they suffered.
A sergeant serving in a brigade of the 26th Northumberland Fusiliers
vividly recounted his brief time in the battle just after leaving the British
trenches. "I could see, away to my left and right, long lines of men. ... By
the time I'd gone another ten yards, there seemed to be only a few men left
around me; by the time I had gone twenty yards, I seemed to be on my own."
He himself fell a moment later. Two battalions of his brigade, with a
thousand men in each battalion, lost a total of 1,100 killed and wounded.
The brigade's leader was wounded, as were two of its four battalion
commanders. Another battalion commander was killed, lo
As in all great offensives, the attacker's preparations alerted the defenders
to what was likely to happen. In particular, the Germans were able to protect
their troops with deep underground fortifications. When the bombardment
lifted, there were more than enough Germans left alive to man the strongest
element in trench warfare: the machine guns.