The prewar ideas of naval planners proved even more detached from
reality than those of their army counterparts. Both sides expected their battle
fleets to meet in major engagements shortly after the start of the war.
Germany's leading admirals expected the British fleet to do what it had done
in the Napoleonic wars: move close to Germany's ports and naval bases in
the North Sea in order to block Germany's maritime commerce. This
seemed to offer brilliant prospects for the numerically weaker German navy.
By picking its targets and times carefully, Germany could eliminate Britain's
major naval units one at a time. When the strength of the British fleet
had been brought within reach of Germany's High Seas Fleet, Germany
would accept a general naval encounter.
Meanwhile, British leaders expected an immediate offensive by the High
Seas Fleet upon the outbreak of war. The Germans would come out of their
ports, face the full weight of British naval power, and suffer an early and
catastrophic defeat. In Paul Halpem's description of the temper of the times
in Britain, "When the war broke out, the generation that had experienced the
Anglo-German naval race, read widely popular spy stories . . . and remembered
the sudden Japanese attack on the Russian base at Port Arthur a decade
earlier fully expected a major battle within a short period of time."