Truman and the Pentagon were now agreed for a variety of reasons that MacArthur should be replaced. It was a question of timing. His remarks leaked to the press criticizing Truman’s conduct of the war in a ‘no-win’ policy received wide publicity, and he had already disobeyed orders on more than one occasion. MacArthur’s letter to Joe Martin, Republican House Minority Leader, in which he concluded: ‘There is no substitute for victory’. When he called for a lifting of restrictions on bombing Chinese military and industrial targets, this statement read on the floor of the House of Representatives received the widest publicity. His public communique of 24 March denegrated China’s industrial strength and suggested that if the China coast and interior bases were bombarded, China would soon be defeated. This last example of insubordination sent Truman into a rage. He had already warned MacArthur on 6 December that he should not issue statements without clearing them with the Pentagon. Truman felt he had no choice but to replace him. The London Dai7)> Telegraph published an interview with MacArthur where he restated his views: ‘The true object ofa commander in war was to destroy the forces opposed to him. But this was not the case in Korea. The situation would be ludicrous if men’s lives were not involved.’ From 6-9 April Truman held meetings with members of his Cabinet and the Joint Chiefs. The decision was made and on 11 April Truman relieved MacArthur of his command, replacing him with Matthew Ridgway, who had helped cut the ground from under MacArthur’s feet through his reports
Direct to Washington, .ftcr 32 ycaiN of di>-tinguished military service, Houglas Mac. Xrthnr’s career uas at an end.
I'he public reaction within the States and around the world sas shocked and uncomprehending. Rage at the sacking of. Xmerica’s great militars hero resounded throughout the coiintr and e en impeachment of President Truman sas suggested. MacArthur arris ed in San Francisco to a tumultuous greeting, and Mac. Vrthur for President was heard throughout the countrs He was gisen the opportunits to address Congress in a televised broadcast on t9 ,pril, wheie Mac. hur deliscred his most famous address in which he presented his plan for winning the u, ir in Korea :
1. Intensification of the economic blockade of China.
2. Impose a nasal blockade on China's coasts.
3. Remo e impositions on aerial reconnaissance of China’s coasts and. Manchuria.
4. ,Allos. Nationalist China to help in the fight against Communist China.
He repeated his argument that 'in war. . . there can be no substitute for ictory.’ Interrupted many times during his 34-minute. iddress, .Mac. Arthur concluded;
'1 am closing m liliy-iwo sears of militai"s sersiie. When 1 joined the arms even before the turn ol the ccnturs, it ssas the fultillmeiu of. ill ms hosish hopes and dre. ims. The ssorld h. is turned user mans limes since I took the oath on the Plain at West Point, and the hopes and dreams base long since sanished. But 1 still remember the refrain of one of the most popular barrack ballads of that das sshich proclaimed most proudls that “Old soldiers nescr die, thes just fade assas". 1 noss close ms militars career and just lade assas an old soldier ssho tried to do his duts. is (iod gase him the light to see that dutw CIoiKlhse.'
There svas not a dry eye in the Congress or the country ss hen.Iac. hur concluded his speech. His popularity ssas at its height, but as he toured the countrs it rather rapidly diminished svith his presidential hopes, as the country began to realize that he had defied his commander-in-chief, had disobeyed svritteii orders, and that insubordination could not be tolerated of any general bs ans president.
Hack in Korea the svar began to ssind dossn in its intensits, although to any man in the (leld it did not seem that ssas. Tsso Camimunist spring olfensises, the first in late. April and the set ond in late. Mas Hr)>. pushed the L'.N back, but. Seoul held, .ind bs Juls all grouiul lost in the spring had been recosered. Indeed, the L'N pushed atross the gBth Parallel in all areas except that surrounding Kaesong in the extreme northeast corner of South Korea. It ssas in Juls th. it the (irst peace talks sseri - held at Kaevmg hetsseen .Nortli Korean and (Chinese generals and rep-resentatises ol the L'X fortes. ,s sporadn. intl often (juite intense lighting t ontiiiued on the Iroiit line, the talks mosed to P. mmunjoin and ton-tinued there loi the next tsso sears ssai ol attrititm along a fixed front ensued during this period, .IS the.merit an publit bei. une in-treasingls Irustratetl. it the f. iiliire to end the Korean conllit t, sshitli teased to ta|)ture the imagination of the.merican people after .M at. Xrthui sas recalletl anti chances tifoutright sictors ssere gone. .I. ic. hur ssas not esen insited to the peace conference later in 1931 in Sshich the olhci. il.merican occupation ofj. ip. in ended and the ss. ii ssith Japan ollici. ills c. ime to an end. When the final armistite ttiok |)lace on -’7Jnl> 1933, roughls. ilong the lines reaihetl tsso sears before, a sense of relief. ind frustr. ititm ssere the ines it. ihle results. South Kore. i’s independence had been secured, and to that extent the ss. ir had been ssorth lighting. Hut the legats of the .Mac. Xrthui-Truman controserss ssas to hang oser the United States long. liter both men had left the political and milit. irs stage. I he Korean War ssas the U. N's first svar and. Xmerica’s first experiment in limited svar. .Although fighting has taken place along the truce line since 1953, no major conllict has as yet broken out oser Korea. The Korean conllict, then, shosved Russia and China that the US ssould defend ss hat it construed to be its interests in.sia. Phis bolstered the credibility of. N.AFO and the other bilateral treaties the US svas making in 1951 svith the .A. NZUS Pact, the Philippine and Japanese defense treaties negotiated during and after the Korean War, not to mention the SlwA FO Pact of 1954.